



THE RESURGENCE OF “BUDDHIST GOVERNMENT”

TIBETAN-MONGOLIAN RELATIONS
IN THE MODERN WORLD

Yumiko Ishihama

&

Makoto Tachibana

Ryosuke Kobayashi

Takehiko Inoue

Union Press

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To Goro

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
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Yumiko Ishihama
Makoto Tachibana
Ryosuke Kobayashi
Takehiko Inoue



Map of Tibetan Buddhist Eurasia



Map of Tibet and Mongolia

Note on transliteration

Traditional Chinese characters are used for Japanese and Chinese terms in the articles. In the bibliography, the Chinese characters are rendered in simplified characters, traditional characters, and *jōyō kanji* 常用漢字 (Chinese characters for regular use in Japan), according to the place of publication.

For the transcription of Chinese character sounds, the Hepburn system is used for Japanese, and the pinyin system for Chinese.

We have used the Rigpa English Phonetics transliteration system for Tibetan and the extended Wylie system for the transcription of Tibetan script.

We have basically followed the Modern Mongolian Standard Transcription Table for Mongolian words and the Poppe system for important terminology in quoted documents, but we have adopted common spellings for some proper nouns.

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Introduction

Yumiko Ishihama

“Since the Dalai Lama, the King of Tibet, arrived in this place (Kökenuur), more and more Tibetan and Mongolian people have visited here and prostrated [themselves before the Dalai Lama]. The Kumbum Monastery, which is located in the mountains, has all of a sudden become very boisterous and shows impressive spectacle.”
(Teramoto Enga 寺本婉雅 to Ichishima Shunjō 市島春城, 1907)¹

The establishment of the Tibetan Buddhist world

In the latter part of the fourteenth century, Tsongkhapa (Tsong kha pa, 1357–1419), who was born in Kökenuur and was later active in Central Tibet, brought to completion a body of thought that systematized all the doctrines and practices of Buddhism on the basis of the thought of the Prāsaṅgika branch of the Madhyamaka school. The school of Tibetan Buddhism founded by Tsongkhapa came to be known as the Geluk school (dGe lugs pa), and with its logical and comprehensive teachings it won over other Buddhist orders one after another.

In 1578, Sönam Gyatso (bSod nams rgya mtsho, 1543–1588), a leading incarnate lama of the Geluk school who became the 3rd Dalai Lama, was invited to Kökenuur by Altan Khan, the head of the Tümeds and a descendant of Chinggis Khan. On this occasion Sönam Gyatso conferred on Altan Khan the title of *Cakravartī* King, or “wheel-turning king,” while Altan Khan bestowed on Sönam Gyatso the title of Vajradhara Dalai Lama (*vajradhara dalai blam-a*). This was the beginning of the use of the designation “Dalai Lama” for lamas of the lineage of incarnate lamas that was to exercise the

greatest authority in the Tibetan Buddhist world, and it was also the first time that the title of king (Tib. *rgyal po*, Mon. *qan*) was bestowed on a Mongol prince by the Dalai Lama (Ishihama 2001: 45–70).

Altan Khan’s descendants erected a temple in Inner Mongolia modeled on the Jowokhang (Jo bo khang, a.k.a Trulnang [’Phrul snang]) in Lhasa, and the town that grew around this temple corresponds to present-day Hohhot. After the 3rd Dalai Lama died in Inner Mongolia, Altan Khan’s great-grandson was recognized as the 4th Dalai Lama. During this time, the influence of the Geluk school spread rapidly throughout Eastern Tibet and among the Khalkha Mongols, and by the seventeenth century it had also spread as far as the Manchus as a result of proselytization by monks from Kōkenuur.

In records of the words and deeds of Tibetan, Mongolian, and Manchu princes and others of noble rank who became followers of Tibetan Buddhism in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, the term “Buddhist government” (*chos srid*)² appears with great frequency. This term is rendered consistently in Mongolian as *törü sasin* and in Manchu as the phonically similar *doro shajin*. With the realization of this “Buddhist government” as their professed aim, the princes would refrain from pursuing their own interests, and at times of peace they would fraternize amicably, revering the same lama as their spiritual teacher under the aegis of this term, while at times of war they would fight with one another, denouncing their adversaries as destroyers of this “Buddhist government” and claiming themselves to be its protectors. It should be noted that there was no established Chinese translation of *chos srid*, and therefore it is difficult to gain an understanding of the dynamism of the Tibetan Buddhist world through Chinese sources alone (Ishihama 2004; 2001: 201–257).

Hong Taiji (1592–1643), the second khan of the Manchu dynasty, defeated Ligden Khan, a direct descendant of Chinggis Khan, and in order to commemorate his acquisition of the state seal of the Yuan dynasty and a statue of Mahākāla attributed to Phakpa (’Phags pa), Hong Taiji performed an enthronement ceremony in Mukden in 1636, changed the name of the state to Daicing (Daqing), and embarked on the construction of a temple, called Shishengsi, to enshrine Phakpa’s statue of Mahākāla. The state seal was a symbol of the political power of the Yuan dynasty, while the statue of Mahākāla was a symbol of the Tibetan Buddhism of the Yuan dynasty, and therefore the enthronement ceremony performed in 1636 would seem to have been a declaration on the part of the Manchus that they were successors to the “Buddhist government” of the Yuan dynasty (Ishihama 2001:

50–57).

Meanwhile, in Tibet the Geluk school, based in Lhasa, and the Karma Kagyü school (Karma bKa' brgyud pa), with the Tsangpa (gTsang pa) kings in Shigatse (gZhi ka rtse) as its patrons, were fighting for control of Tibet in the early part of the seventeenth century. In 1637, the 5th Dalai Lama (1617–82) bestowed on Törübaikhu of the Khoshuds, later known as Güshi Khan, the title of “Protector of the Teaching and Dharma King” (*bstan 'dzin chos kyi rgyal po*), and in 1642 Güshi Khan invaded Tsang and overthrew the Tsangpa king (Ahmad 1970: 118–145). At this point, there existed three political forces in Tibet—the Dalai Lama, his regent, and Güshi Khan—but it was only the Dalai Lama's political power, linked to Tibet's historical myths, that continued to grow, and the other two became subordinate entities whose position was dependent on appointment by the Dalai Lama, with the regent acting as the Dalai Lama's representative in secular affairs and Güshi Khan and his descendants serving as his protector (Ishihama 2015; Schwieger 2015).

Before the rise of the Dalai Lamas, the title of khan in Central Eurasia had initially been used by powerful men related by blood to Chinggis Khan, and later it also came to be recognized by third parties. The 5th Dalai Lama, however, also conferred the titles of khan or hong taiji on Güshi Khan and other Mongol princes who were not descendants of Chinggis Khan, and because these titles were further recognized by the Qing dynasty, princes of the Khoshud, Torghuts, and Dzungars among the Oirat tribes vied with each other to serve the Dalai Lama and heap donations on him so as to acquire these titles (Ishihama 1992).

Furthermore, Khalkha and Oirat princes sent their sons to study at the large monasteries in Lhasa. Upon their return home, they would build monasteries with the technical assistance of the Tibetan government, and these became the centers of local communities, with settlements forming around them. As in the case of Tibetan monasteries, the position of abbot of such a monastery was sometimes filled by an outstanding scholar-monk, but in Mongolia it was often passed down through incarnate lamas. An early example of the latter is Losang Tenpai Gyaltsen (Blo bzang bstan pa'i rgyal mtshan, 1635–1723), the son of TüsHEET Khan of the Khalkha Mongols, who later came to be known as the 1st Jebtsundamba. In 1649 he went to study at Tashilhunpo (bKra shis lhun po) Monastery in Tibet, where he studied under the 1st Panchen Lama and 5th Dalai Lama, and in 1651 he returned to Khalkha Mongolia, accompanied by sculptors of Buddhist statues, Tibetan

physicians, monastic administrative officials, etc., and with their help built in 1654 a Geluk monastery at the foot of the Khentii Mountains. The town that formed around this monastery became Ikh Khüree,³ the chief settlement in Khalkha Mongolia (Ishihama 2011: 133–134).

As a result of the active proselytizing activities of the Geluk school, by the second half of the seventeenth century its teachings had spread among the Kökenuur Mongols, Inner Mongols, Khalkha Mongols, and Oirats, and by the second half of the eighteenth century they had spread as far as the nomadic Buryats and Torghuts. The sphere in which there developed personal, material, and spiritual exchange through this sharing of the values of Tibetan Buddhism is in this book referred to as the Tibetan Buddhist world.

“Civil war” in the Tibetan Buddhist world, 1686–1720

The frequent fighting that broke out on a large scale in the second half of the seventeenth century among Mongol princes and between the Dzungars and the Qing dynasty was all related in some way to issues pertaining to the position of the Dalai Lama.

In 1686, in conjunction with the completion of the monastery that the 1st Jebtsundamba had founded in Khalkha Mongolia, a meeting was held at Khürenbelchir. At this meeting, the 1st Jebtsundamba sat on a throne of the same height as that of the head of Ganden Monastery (*dGa' ldan khri pa*), who was standing in for the Dalai Lama, and because Galdan of the Dzungars considered this to be an act of disrespect toward the Dalai Lama, he launched an attack on the Khalkhas. During his youth Galdan had lived in Tibet as an incarnate lama, and even after he renounced his status as a monk and succeeded to the throne, he continued to act as a faithful disciple of the Dalai Lama and had in 1678 been granted the title of khan. In Galdan's view, the 1st Jebtsundamba was no more than a local lama, and it was unacceptable that he should sit on a throne of the same height as that of the head of Ganden Monastery, who stood at the pinnacle of Buddhist scholarship in the Tibetan Buddhist world and was also the Dalai Lama's representative.

On being attacked by Galdan, the Khalkhas sought the assistance of the Qing court, which accepted their request, and consequently the fighting spread, embroiling the Qing. In 1691, the Qing authorities performed a rite at Dolon Nor⁴ in which the Khalkhas became vassals of the Qing dynasty, and a Tibetan monastery called Huizongsi was built there. It goes without saying that this was a reenactment of Hong Taiji's declaration of the estab-

lishment of the *Daicing gurun* and his construction of Shishengsi at the time of the founding of the Qing dynasty. Thereafter, whenever the Qianlong emperor won a political victory over the Mongols, he would establish a Tibetan temple. It is to be surmised that this was done in order to contend that the Qing's intervention in other regions was not based on its own interests, for example, territorial expansion, but was done for the purpose of realizing a "Buddhist government."

In 1705, Gūshi Khan's great-grandson Lhasang (Lha bzang) Khan dethroned the 6th Dalai Lama on the grounds that he had violated the monastic code of conduct, and he installed another monk as Dalai Lama, whom the Qing court then also recognized as the new 6th Dalai Lama. But the Dzungars and Kōkenuur Mongols rejected this new Dalai Lama and instead recognized a boy born in Litang as the reincarnation of the deposed 6th Dalai Lama, and they made plans to take him to Lhasa, by force of arms if necessary. Having got wind of these plans, the Qing court abandoned the new 6th Dalai Lama (1683–1706), whom it had already recognized, and instead recognized the boy from Litang as the 7th Dalai Lama, thereby winning over the Kōkenuur Mongols, and as a result the Dzungars, now isolated, were forced to withdraw from Tibet.

The Qing invasion of Tibet in 1720 has been referred to as "China's conquest of Tibet." But considering that the Kangxi emperor sent troops into Tibet in the name of the Emperor-as-Maṅjuśrī to ascertain the enthronement of the 7th Dalai Lama, having rejected the new 6th Dalai Lama whom he had officially recognized, and that after the enthronement he began to consider the withdrawal of his troops, it is not appropriate to refer to this incident as the "conquest of Tibet" (Ishihama 1997; 2001: 281–320).

The age of the Emperor-as-Maṅjuśrī

There can, however, be no doubt that after these events of 1720 the Manchu emperor became the supreme ruler of the Tibetan Buddhist world. Once the Yongzheng emperor ascended the throne in 1723, he took advantage of internal strife among Gūshi Khan's descendants to bring them under his control (Sato 1986: 425–520; Kato 2013). Further, in order to prevent the Dzungars from making political use of the Dalai Lama, he dispatched officials to Lhasa⁵ and also had officials escort envoys from Mongol princes during their entire stay in Tibet, from the time they entered Tibet until they left, thereby keeping all contacts between the Dalai Lama's government and

Mongol princes under its surveillance.⁶ The Yongzheng emperor also took great care to distance the Dalai Lama from Mongol forces by, for example, having the 7th Dalai Lama move to Gartar (mGar thar; Taining) in Eastern Tibet near the border with China during the Qing’s all-out confrontation with the Dzungars from 1728 to 1735.

Fearing that the Jebtsundamba, the foremost monk among the Khalkhas, would become linked to Mongol nationalism and pose a threat to the Manchus, the Qianlong emperor made it a rule from the 3rd Jebtsundamba that a Tibetan would be chosen as the reincarnation of the Jebtsundamba (Oka 1992). Further, because the banner system imposed on the Khalkhas served to restrict the movement of people, the influence of Mongol princes came to be confined to their own banners.

Meanwhile, the Qianlong emperor legitimized his authority over Tibetans and Mongols as the protector of Buddhism, something that can be confirmed from the fact that he had enshrined in various localities paintings depicting himself as a *cakravartī* and incarnation of the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī (Berger 2003; Ishihama 2005ab; 2011: 207–226). The Qianlong emperor’s activities in the world of Buddhism were aided by the 3rd Changkya (lCang skya ho thog thu), who had been placed under Chinese protection during fighting in Kōkenuur in 1723 and had been raised in the Qing court (Ikejiri 2013: 155–222). In 1744, on the tenth anniversary of his accession to the throne, the Qianlong emperor converted the Yonghe Palace (Yonghegong), the former residence of the Yongzheng emperor when he had been an imperial prince, into Beijing’s first Tibetan monastery, called Ganden Jinchak Ling (dGa’ ldan byin chags gling). Because the Gönlung (dGon klung) monastery where the 3rd Changkya had originally been ordained was a branch monastery of Gomang (sGo mang) College in Drepung (’Bras spungs) Monastery in Lhasa, it was monks from Gomang College who were invited to teach at Ganden Jinchak Ling. This means that, within the Tibetan Buddhist world, this monastery was the Beijing branch of Gomang College (Ishihama 2011: 129–147).

In the mid-eighteenth century the Qianlong emperor finally succeeded in defeating the Dzungars, and consequently there was no longer any need for him to intervene in Tibet’s domestic politics, which led in turn to direct rule of Tibet by the 7th Dalai Lama. Qianlong’s devotion to Tibetan Buddhism peaked in 1780, when the 3rd Panchen Lama visited the Qing court to celebrate the emperor’s seventieth birthday. The emperor kowtowed to the Panchen Lama and received the precepts from him (Ishihama 2001: 321–361),

but so as not to be derided by posterity he gave strict orders that no record be left of his subjects' having kowtowed to the Panchen Lama even though it was quite permissible for them to kowtow to him in a private setting (Murakami 2011).

But as was the case with his governance, in his later years a shadow began to fall on the Qianlong emperor's Buddhist beliefs. Fighting broke out between Tibet and the Gurkha government of Nepal, and because the Qing incurred enormous expenses in the course of this war, it became incumbent on the emperor to explain the reasons for this to Han Chinese and Confucian officials, which he did by arguing that his preferential treatment of Tibetan Buddhism had been an administrative tool.⁷ But Lord Macartney, who visited the Qing court in 1799, reports that the emperor spent some time every morning reciting Buddhist sūtras and considered his own long and prosperous rule to be due to the power of Buddhism (Cranmer-Byng 1962: 136), and it is thus evident that the emperor's faith in Buddhism essentially remained firm until his final years. But after the Qianlong emperor's death the enthusiasm of the Qing emperors for Tibetan Buddhism quickly waned.

The resurgence of the Tibetan Buddhist world in modern times

The period dealt with in this book is the modern period, that is, the period when, with the decline of the Qing dynasty, the Manchu emperors lost their function of patron and, in response to this, the 13th Dalai Lama (1876–1933) in Tibet and the 8th Jebtsundamba⁸ in Mongolia distanced themselves from the Qing and resumed acting independently (Esherick 2006). In particular, the 13th Dalai Lama's stay in Mongolia served to connect followers of Tibetan Buddhism in Russia with Tibet and Mongolia, revived contacts among Buddhists which had been obstructed by Russia and the Qing, and revitalized the Tibetan Buddhist world. In the following, I will briefly summarize the historical background to this period.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, following the decline of the Qing dynasty, Central Eurasia became the stage for a competition for the acquisition of colonies by Britain and Russia, and Tibet was the last power vacuum that remained between the two countries. In 1903 Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, sent Colonel Younghusband to invade Tibet on the pretext that the Tibetan government had failed to observe the provisions of the 1890 "Convention between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet." In July 1904, as British troops were closing in on Lhasa, the 13th Dalai

Lama secretly left Lhasa with a few aides and headed for Mongolia in the hope of gaining the assistance of Russia (Andreev 2006: 132–153).

Thereafter the 13th Dalai Lama traveled from Ikh Khüree to Kumbum Monastery in Kökenuur and then Mount Wutai (Wutaishan). During this period he endeavored to enforce strict discipline at the monasteries where he stayed, calling for the observance of the monastic code, expelling monks who had violated the precepts, and taking a lead in teaching Buddhist doctrine. Further, he established monasteries providing a curriculum for Buddhist studies in Ikh Khüree, at Mount Wutai, and in Saint Petersburg, and he sent scholar-monks who had studied at Gomang College in Drepung Monastery in Lhasa to teach at these monasteries. This could be regarded as a resumption of the proselytizing activities carried out in Kökenuur and Mongolia by the 3rd Dalai Lama in the latter part of the sixteenth century and by the 5th Dalai Lama in the mid-seventeenth century. Eminent monks who were expelled and elderly monks, citing local customs, resisted this enforcement of discipline by the Dalai Lama (Ishihama 2018).

But the general population idolized the figure of the ideal monk presented by the 13th Dalai Lama, and pilgrims from among the Inner Mongols, Buryats, Kökenuur Mongols, and so on converged from all directions. Alexander Izvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister at the time, reported that “with regard to the Dalai Lama’s sojourn in Mongolia, the national consciousness of the local inhabitants has been awakened” (RIT: no. 61), thus attesting to the fact that followers of Tibetan Buddhism who had been separated under Qing and Russian rule became united as a result of the 13th Dalai Lama’s stay in Mongolia.

In 1907 the Anglo-Russian Convention was concluded, and Britain and Russia agreed to place Tibet under the “suzerainty” of China. From around that time the 13th Dalai Lama, seeking assistance for Tibet, had had contact with diplomats and other people from various countries, and he had also sent two secret envoys to Beijing to gather information, all in an attempt to find a solution to the situation in which Tibet found itself. He then went to Beijing and met with the Emperor Guangxu and the Empress Dowager Cixi, but they both died soon afterward. Furthermore, since the Qing court issued the Dalai Lama with a new humiliating title and the Sichuan Army was drawing closer to Lhasa on the pretext of monitoring marketplaces on the border with India, the Dalai Lama fled to British India in the hope of gaining the support of Britain.

In October 1911, the 1911 Revolution broke out in China, and in Decem-

ber Mongolia promptly declared independence from the Qing dynasty and established the Bogd Khaan government, headed by the 8th Jebtsundamba. Following the establishment of the Republic of China in January of the following year, the Dalai Lama rejected Yuan Shikai's offer to grant him a new title and returned permanently to Lhasa from British India. On January 11, 1913, the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty was signed, with Mongolia and Tibet recognizing each other's "independence," and this was followed by Tibet's "Declaration of Independence" (Shakabpa 1984: 246–248).

But in spite of the fact that Tibet and Mongolia had declared their severance of relations with China in such a clear-cut fashion, the great powers ignored their claims. The Russo-Chinese Declaration of 1913, in the case of Mongolia, and, in the case of Tibet, the Simla Convention concluded between Britain and Tibet on July 3, 1914 (with China refusing to ratify it) forced Tibet and Outer Mongolia to accept China's "suzerainty" and compelled China to recognize the "autonomy" of Tibet and Outer Mongolia. But partly because of the weakening of the Republic of China, Tibet proper maintained its *de facto* independence until the invasion of Tibet by the People's Liberation Army in 1950, and traditional Tibetan culture was revived under a government that combined temporal and religious powers. In Mongolia, meanwhile, a government headed by the 8th Jebtsundamba continued to operate until its collapse in 1921 owing to Soviet intervention.

The aims of this book

Next, I wish to point out a number of problems concerning past historical research on the period surveyed above and to set out the aims of this book.

Much of the research on modern Tibetan and Mongolian history has been conducted from the perspectives of the foreign policies of the great powers, international relations between the great powers, or bilateral relations between one of the great powers and Tibet or Mongolia, and there has been very little research conducted from the perspectives of the directly concerned parties, namely, the Tibetan government and the 13th Dalai Lama or the Mongol princes and the 8th Jebtsundamba.⁹

Further, as an extension of this lack of research from the perspectives of the affected parties, research dealing with relations between followers of Tibetan Buddhism in the modern period has also been lagging behind other areas of research. Buddhists in Tibet, Mongolia, Kōkenuur, and Russia possessed a sense of spirituality that had many points in common, with Tibetan

Buddhism acting as a unifying bond, and personal interactions through trade, pilgrimages, study abroad by monks, and so on thrived. Nonetheless, in the past almost no attention has been paid to these trans-regional interactions except the contemporary studies of Russian explorers such as Bazar Baradine. For example, in the case of relations between Tibet and Mongolia, there has been no evidential research on the basic question of the influence that the 13th Dalai Lama's sojourns among the Khalkha Mongols and Kōkenuur Mongols between 1904 and 1909 may have had on the actions of the Mongol princes and 8th Jebtsundamba when they declared independence soon afterward in 1911.

It is to be surmised that one of the reasons for this bias in the content of research is the current upsurge in nationalism in both regions. For instance, because Mongolia was for a long time under the control of the Qing dynasty and the Soviet Union, after it was democratized in 1990, there was an upsurge in nationalism among Mongols in reaction to their emancipation from earlier Qing and Soviet repression. As a result, whereas research on subjects that might be considered to appertain to Mongolia's own culture (history of the Mongol empire, nomadism, epic poetry, shamanism, etc.) is thriving, the influence exerted by other regions on Mongolia has become a topic of research that has fallen into disfavor.

Furthermore, the majority of researchers are shackled by the national history of the present-day "state" of "Mongolia," and there is no discussion of modern Mongolian history encompassing Mongolians living outside the borders of present-day Mongolia, namely, Kalmyks and Buryats under Russian rule and Inner and Kōkenuur Mongols within China under the influence of Tibetan Buddhism. Consequently, it tends to be nationalistic approaches such as Mongolian history, Tibetan history, Kalmyk history, and Buryat history that are accumulating, and there does not yet exist a historical picture that comprehensively covers all of these regions.

A common factor to be universally observed among the Mongol people in modern times, that is, a key concept for gaining a comprehensive understanding of Mongolian history, is Tibetan Buddhism. But for present-day Mongols Tibet lies outside Mongolian territory, and moreover during the period of socialist government religion was rejected, Buddhist monasteries were destroyed, and many texts and people able to read them were lost. As a result, there cannot be said to have been adequate research on the Tibetan Buddhist world in the modern period, bound together as it is by Tibetan Buddhism.

Nor can it be said that research on modern Tibetan history is free from questions of nationalism. The greater part of the areas inhabited by Tibetans are currently under Chinese rule, and communities where Tibetans are preserving their own culture in their own way are only just surviving in refugee society and on the fringes of India and Nepal. For this reason, the Tibet of the past, when it was politically a separate entity from China, is liable to be viewed as a future ideal, and many people seek to discover in the Tibet of the past the germs of Tibet as a modern state. But the notions of nation-state, ethnicity, territory, national borders, and so on were introduced to Asia in modern times, and although these concepts can be legitimately used to discuss Tibetan and Mongolian history only after it has been ascertained when Tibetan and Mongolian statesmen understood them, many writers seek to simplistically apply these modern concepts to the past and interpret the past in the light of these concepts without going through the process of ascertaining when they were first actually understood in the regions in question.

Taking into account the above issues in prior research, in this book we have given particular consideration to the following three points:

- Rather than focusing on relations between the great powers, we give heed to the perspectives of the 13th Dalai Lama, the 8th Jebtsundamba, and other affected parties.
- Instead of being bound by current national territories, we pay attention to trans-regional personal and material exchange among followers of Tibetan Buddhism.
- Rather than uncritically applying to the past concepts that were introduced from the West in modern times and evaluating and interpreting historical events in the light of these concepts, we use the concepts and terms found in contemporaneous sources and interpret them in their contemporary context.

The structure of this book

There follow summaries of each of the chapters together with an overview of the facts that have come to light in line with the above editorial policy. Chapters 1, 4 and 5 were written by Yumiko Ishihama, Chapters 2 and 6 by Ryosuke Kobayashi, Chapter 3 by Takehiko Inoue, and Chapters 7, 8 and 9 by Makoto Tachibana.

During the Dalai Lama's sojourn in Mongolia the Khalkha Mongol

princes found themselves in a complicated situation. Since the 1890s they had been harboring plans of establishing, with Russian support, their own government that would bring together the Mongol people. Therefore, while on the one hand they were relieved to see Mongols coming from across borders in all directions to pay their respects to the Dalai Lama and to see how religious authority was bringing together Mongol peoples, since it meant there was a possibility of establishing a government headed by the 8th Jebtsundamba, on the other hand they could not help being discomfited by the fact that the upright Dalai Lama had pointed out the 8th Jebtsundamba's violation of the precepts, leading to a weakening of his centripetal force as a religious authority. As a result, the Jebtsundamba refused to meet the Dalai Lama publicly and was compelled to justify his transgressions, including sexual misconduct and drinking alcohol, as the divine madness of a tantric practitioner (Chapter 1).

In the end, Russia, which was facing problems of its own both at home and abroad, was unable to come to the assistance of the 13th Dalai Lama, and, searching for a new path, the Dalai Lama left Ikh Khüree and traveled to Kōkenuur and then to Mount Wutai and Beijing. During the course of his travels, he met on his own initiative with ambassadors and other people from different countries and expanded his own views on diplomacy. It is a well-known fact that the 13th Dalai Lama sought the protection of Russia, but he also formed close relations with people from newly emerging powers such as Japan and the United States. In 1906, the Dalai Lama came into contact at Kumbum Monastery (sKu 'bum; Ta'ersi) in Kōkenuur, at Mount Wutai, and in Beijing with Teramoto Enga, a Japanese monk of Higashi Honganji 東本願寺 temple and a private operative, and learning about Japan, for a time he considered visiting Japan. In addition, through his contact with W. W. Rockhill, an American diplomat and Tibetologist, the Dalai Lama learnt about the United States and, following Rockhill's advice, softened his anti-British feelings. This prepared the groundwork for the Dalai Lama's subsequent exile in British India. In 1913, following the withdrawal of the Chinese army from Lhasa, the 13th Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa from British India and issued a "Declaration of Independence." Around this time he also sent several letters to political leaders in Great Britain, Russia, the United States, and Japan. In these letters, the Dalai Lama consistently advocated Tibet's "independence" (*rang btsan*) in an attempt to alter Tibet's political position as determined by the Anglo-Russian Convention (Chapter 2).

One of the foreigners who came into contact with the 13th Dalai Lama at

Mount Wutai was the Russian army officer Mannerheim, who had just completed an expedition across Central Eurasia from west to east. In the course of his travels, Mannerheim had visited the Torghuts in Xinjiang and learnt that they wished to have contact with the Torghuts (Kalmyks) along the banks of the Volga and that Torghuts and Buryats, who were Russian subjects, had been studying at monasteries in Lhasa and Amdo and on Mount Wutai.¹⁰

The statements reported by Mannerheim can be corroborated by contemporary Russian sources. Around this very time the Kalmyks of Russia, who had for almost a hundred years had no contact with Tibet, reappeared in the Tibetan Buddhist world. This began when four Don Kalmyks set out on a pilgrimage to Tibet in 1877, with two of them reaching Ikh Khüree. In 1891, Baaza-bagshi Menkedzhuev succeeded in reaching Lhasa, and his return home occasioned an upsurge in pilgrimages to Tibet among the Kalmyks. While in Lhasa, Menkedzhuev had become acquainted with Buryat Dorzhiev, a close aide of the 13th Dalai Lama, and his invitation to Dorzhiev to visit the Kalmyk steppe opened up the way for direct exchanges between the Kalmyks and the Tibetan Buddhist world and also led to the construction of Tibetan monasteries on the Kalmyk steppe and in Saint Petersburg (Chapter 3).

In 1907, the Anglo-Russian Convention was concluded between Britain and Russia, who recognized Qing China as Tibet's suzerain. Nor was there any let-up in incursions by the Sichuan Army into Eastern Tibet, and in the new title that the Qing court conferred on the 13th Dalai Lama in 1908 the phrase "Master of Buddhist Doctrine on Earth" disappeared and instead the title was strongly tinged with Sinocentric thinking. Upon returning to Lhasa in 1909, after an absence of five years, the 13th Dalai Lama accordingly abandoned the title received from the Manchu emperors and assumed a new title beginning with the phrase "by the edict of Buddha," and immediately afterwards he went into exile in Darjeeling in British India. Thus, the 13th Dalai Lama had already declared his severance of relations with the Qing dynasty two years prior to Mongolia's independence (Chapter 4).

Following the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution in China, in December of the same year the 8th Jebtsundamba and his wife Dondogdulam (Don 'grub lha mo) were enthroned as king and consort, and the Jebtsundamba declared Mongolia's independence. This enthronement ceremony was modeled on the 13th Dalai Lama's in 1895, and the image of his kingship presented by the Bogd Khaan government on the occasion of his enthronement was that

of a married bodhisattva king, which combined the twin images of the 13th Dalai Lama, a bodhisattva king in monk's robes, and the Qing emperor in the guise of a secular king, while his wife Dondogdulam was referred to as a *dākinī*, mother of the state, etc., and their marriage was claimed to be not a violation of the precepts but a spiritual marriage. The fact that Tibet and Mongolia declared one after another the establishment of a politico-religious government that disregarded China can be interpreted as declarations of an intent on the part of their leaders to take the place of the Qing emperor and president of the Republic of China, who were no longer functioning as bodhisattva kings (Chapter 5).

It is well known that four Tibetan students were sent to Britain in 1913, which was of particular importance to Tibet's modernization project. However, few researchers have focused on the fact that their chaperon Lungshar was entrusted with the Dalai Lama's letters to King George V, Queen Mary, and ministers of the British government. These letters, written in Tibetan, were translated into English by an official of the government of British India, although it is to be noted that the word *rang btsan*, which is today translated as "independence," was not translated in this way. But what is important here is that the 13th Dalai Lama, stressing the word *rang btsan*, maintained that historically Tibet had been a separate political entity from China (*rgya nag*) and that it would not be subjected to Chinese interference in the future (Chapter 6).

It is also worth noting that these letters from the 13th Dalai Lama were also sent to the newly emerging countries of Japan and the United States, which were not bound by the Anglo-Russian Convention. When one considers that at the time there were people in Tibet who were thinking of appealing to the World Court in the Hague in order to preserve Tibet's international position,¹¹ the Dalai Lama's letters would suggest that he may have been contemplating a way to encircle China.

On January 11, 1913, immediately before the Dalai Lama issued his declaration of independence, the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty was concluded between Dorzhiev and representatives authorized by the 8th Jebtsundamba, and in the first two articles of this treaty the 13th Dalai Lama and the 8th Jebtsundamba recognized the independence of Mongolia and Tibet, respectively. When one turns one's attention to the domestic situation in Mongolia, it is evident that these two articles had greater significance for the 8th Jebtsundamba. In contrast to the 13th Dalai Lama, who was already head of Tibet's politico-religious government, prior to 1911 the 8th Jebtsundamba

had not wielded the political power to rule over Mongolia, and furthermore his authority had been severely damaged when the Dalai Lama had pointed out his transgressions of the monastic code in 1905. Even after the declaration of independence in 1911, there had been considerable conflict within the government between the princes and the Minister of Interior Affairs, Da Lama Tserenchimed. For this reason, the first two articles of the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty, in which the 8th Jebtsundamba was treated as the 13th Dalai Lama's equal, were of great significance to the Jebtsundamba insofar that they indicated to his domestic audience that his dispute with the Dalai Lama had come to an end and also helped to enhance his own authority. It is to be surmised, in other words, that at the time these two articles had greater meaning for the 8th Jebtsundamba than for the 13th Dalai Lama and that they had greater meaning, moreover, internally within Mongolia rather than externally (Chapter 7).

In Article 6 of the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty, it was agreed that Tibetan merchants would be able to continue trading in Mongolia "as formerly." Following the conclusion of this treaty, the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was given jurisdiction over Tibetans living in Mongolia. Within the Mongolian government there were strong calls to tax the commercial activities of Tibetan merchants, but in the end it was decided that Tibetan merchants, like the Russians, would be exempt from taxation. As a result of the Simla Convention of 1914 and the Kyakhta Agreement of 1915, Tibet and Outer Mongolia were granted autonomy under Chinese suzerainty, and both regions were deemed to be parts of Chinese territory, although the Chinese representative refused to sign the treaty. China sought to have Tibetans living in Mongolia obey Chinese law on the grounds that they were residing in Chinese territory, but when the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Tibetans in Mongolia about this, they replied that they wished to remain under the protection of the 8th Jebtsundamba rather than being subject to Chinese law. After the Mongolian Revolution of 1921 the 13th Dalai Lama became wary of Mongolia, where Soviet Russia's influence was growing, and Mongolia and Tibet gradually drifted apart (Chapter 8).

When the Bogd Khaan government was established in 1911, Namdan-choikhür and other Mongol princes from Kökenuur, which lay between Mongolia and Tibet and did not border directly on Outer Mongolia, set out for Ikh Khüree in the hope of playing a part in the new government. Namdanchoikhür, who appears in the Dalai Lama's biography under the name of Khu lug pa'i se, had first met the 13th Dalai Lama in Kökenuur towards

the end of the seventh month of the Tibetan calendar in 1904 when the Dalai Lama was en route from Tibet to Mongolia, and he had assisted the Dalai Lama during his journey until he left the bannerland on the 30th of the eighth month (D13N-ka 789-6–794-6). Namdanchoikhür continued to make appearances at the Dalai Lama’s court while the latter was staying at Kumbum from 1906 to 1909. In response to the Bogd Khaan government’s calls for support, there appeared some Kökenuur Mongols who pledged allegiance to the Bogd Khaan government and traveled all the way to Ikh Khüree, where they were conferred titles by the Bogd Khaan, even though their territory did not directly abut that of the Bogd Khaan government, and this could be regarded as one outcome of the sense of solidarity in the Tibetan Buddhist world that had emerged through the Dalai Lama’s stay among the Mongols. While submitting to the Bogd Khaan government, Namdanchoikhür remained in contact with the Dalai Lama, and for the Kökenuur Mongols it was the shared religion of Tibetan Buddhism that was more important than differences between the “nations” of “Mongolia” and “Tibet” (Chapter 9).

Notes

- 1 OSC: チ 06 04620 0019 0001.
- 2 Literally, Buddhism (*chos*) and government (*srid*). But since Buddhism is clearly considered to rank above government and constrain the actions of political leaders, I have interpreted it as “government by Buddhists” or “government based on Buddhism” and translated it as “Buddhist government.” For example, in the *Cayan teüke*, which has one of the earliest instantiations of this term, it is stated that the king of a country should administer the affairs of state in accordance with the teachings of the Dharma king and guide the people in the observation of the ten virtues (*dge ba bcu*), basic precepts of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and the Yuan dynasty, when Khubilai was a devout follower of the Tibetan monk Phakpa (’Phags pa), is described as an ideal age (Ishihama 2001: 201–225).
- 3 Mon. Yeke küriy-e, Tib. Da khral, Ch. Kulun, and known as Urga by Occidentals; the residence of the Jebtsundamba, corresponding to present-day Ulaanbaatar.
- 4 The site of Shangdu, the former summer capital of the Yuan dynasty.
- 5 These were the so-called ambans, Qing officials who came to be permanently stationed in Tibet (*zhuzang dachen*) (Yu 2004).

- 6 Whenever an embassy sent by a Mongol prince arrived in Lhasa to make an offering and prostrate themselves before the Dalai Lama, the Manchu resident in Lhasa would monitor their activities and report to the Qing court. These residents' reports sent to the Manchu court have been published in the form of collections such as the JMA and JZD.
- 7 Representative of this is the stele standing in one of the courtyards of Yonghe Palace, which is inscribed with the Qianlong emperor's "Pro-nouncement on Lamas" ("Lama shuo"), composed in 1797.
- 8 Agvanluvsanchoiijindanzanvanchigbalsambuu (Ngag dbang blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma bstan 'dzin dbang phyug, 1870–1924).
- 9 Details of prior research on individual topics can be found in the following chapters. Representative of previous research on Tibetan history from the perspective of international relations are Lamb 1966, 1986, and 1989, Singh 1988, and McKay 1997, dealing with the history of Anglo-Tibetan relations from the perspective of Britain; Shaumian 2000 and Andreev 2006, dealing with the history of Russo-Tibetan relations; and Feng 1996, dealing with the history of relations between Britain and the Qing in connection with Tibet from the perspective of China. There are, on the other hand, very few studies focusing on a Tibetan perspective, but they include Tamai 2001, discussing the subjective agency of the Tibetan government, and Sperling 2011, discussing the subjectivity of the 13th Dalai Lama during his stay at Mount Wutai. Studies focusing on the 8th Jebtsundamba of Mongolia include Tachibana 2011 and Batsaikhan 2009, 2011, and 2012.
- 10 According to Mannerheim's diary, on April 20, 1907, "Torghut-Kalmyk lama called at the Russian consulate at Qulja one day and stated his intention of visiting the Kalmyks in the neighborhood of Astrakhan.... Torghuts kept up a regular connection with these Kalmyks and that the Khan had not only assented to this, but wished it personally. He was very dissatisfied with Chinese rule...." Another statement by Kalmyk lama on June 25, 1907: "the superior of the lamasery, who was interested to hear of the Kalmyks in Russia. Both he and a couple of other lamas seemed to be keen that someone should visit their kinsmen on the banks of the Volga." A statement by the Torghut Saranov from the Caucasus after living for 7 years in Tibet, whom Mannerheim met at Mount Wutai on June 26, 1908: "He had succeeded in crossing the frontier between India and Tibet by giving out that he was a Chinese Torghut (Mannerheim 2008)."

- 11 This is mentioned in a report sent by Lyuba, the Russian consul in Urga, on April 14, 1905, to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RIT: no. 39).

CHAPTER ONE

*The emerging split between the Dalai
Lama and the Jebtsundamba*

*A confrontation between the universal and the local
church*

Yumiko Ishihama

An influx of pilgrims

In the summer of 1904, Lord Curzon (1859–1925), Viceroy of India, dispatched troops led by Colonel Younghusband (1863–1942) on the grounds that “We regard the so-called suzerainty of China over Tibet as a constitutional fiction—a political affectation which has only been maintained because of its convenience to both parties.”¹ Younghusband aimed at negotiating directly with the 13th Dalai Lama (1876–1933) about the implementation of the “Convention between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim



Figure 1-1 The 13th Dalai Lama painted in 1905

Courtesy of Vladimir Leonidovich Uspensky.

and Tibet" that had been concluded between Britain and China in 1890. The 13th Dalai Lama then left Lhasa for Mongolia with a small entourage seeking support from Russia.

In the late nineteenth century, the Dalai Lama followed an isolationist policy, in accordance with which any Westerner who tried to reach Lhasa was expelled outside Tibet's borders by local officials. But Tibet's self-imposed isolation increased the yearning of outsiders for the "God king" and his mysterious city of Lhasa all the more, and the Royal Geographical Society gave its gold medal even to some unsuccessful scientific expeditions to Lhasa, as a result of which people continued trying to reach Lhasa.

It was at the climax of this Tibet fever that the Dalai Lama happened to go in exile to Mongolia. Consequently, as soon as the international community learnt of the Dalai Lama's presence in Mongolia, many diplomats and travelers from Russia, France, the United States, Germany, and Japan traveled to Ikh Khüree (Urga), Kumbum Monastery, Mount Wutai, Beijing, and Kalimpong where the Dalai Lama stayed for periods of time between 1904 and 1912. The reports of these Western pilgrims and local officials tell us of the Dalai Lama's circumstances at the time.

But it was the Mongolian people who were the most delighted at the Dalai Lama's visit to Mongolia. As soon as they heard of his visit to the Khalkha Mongols, many hurried to the Dalai Lama's procession and traveled with it. When the Dalai Lama reached Ikh Khüree, where the Jebtsundamba (1870–1924) resided, all the Khalkha princes, but not the Jebtsundamba, welcomed the Dalai Lama in a grand manner. The Dalai Lama spent two winters in Tüsheet Khan Aimag, during which time he sent his most famous aide Agvan Dorzhiev (1854–1938) as an envoy to Russia and waited for the Russian tsar's reply.

Initially I. P. Nadarov, the governor of Trans-Baikal, had plans to invite the Dalai Lama to Russia as an anti-British measure and to establish a center of Tibetan Buddhism so as to curry favor with Russian Buddhists (RIT: no. 27), but Russia was forced to abandon this plan and settle its differences with Britain because of its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, etc. Having lost the support of Russia, the Dalai Lama left Mongolia for Kumbum Monastery in Kökenuur, where Tibet, Mongol, and China intersect.

During the Dalai Lama's stay in Ikh Khüree, jubilant people from all directions rushed to pay homage to the Dalai Lama. Kozlov, who had an audience with the Dalai Lama at Ikh Khüree in his capacity as a representative of the Russian Royal Geographical Society on July 5, 1905,² reports

that there were large numbers of pilgrims along the Kyakhta-Urga road, and Qing officials too had trouble managing the Buryat pilgrims flowing across the border toward Ikh Khüree.³

Kozlov states that the pilgrims came not only from Russia, but also from Inner Mongolia and from the Kökenuur Mongols and Alshaa Mongols, where the Qing dynasty restricted the movement of people. Kozlov also witnessed the Sönid's Zasag Junwang and head of Shiliin Gol Aimag⁴ "enjoying friendly relations with the Dalai Lama":



Figure 1-2 Sönid's Zasag Junwang

Courtesy of Russian Geographical Society, Saint Petersburg (F. 18, Op. 7).

Since the first days of my arrival in Urga, the Dalai Lama lived in the Tuul valley in an elegant golden yellow yurt, around which there were groups of white and gray yurts, which served as home for His Holiness's entourage. Generally speaking, the Dalai Lama's entourage kept a low profile, except for seven or eight merchants who traded in Tibetan fabrics, incense, candles, etc. They daily displayed their goods in the market in Urga.

What particularly drew the eyes of the observer was the sumptuous festive processions of Mongol princes, who often gave tens of thousands of rubles to monasteries and towns. Many princes and distant Mongols visited Urga for the first time. The most notable prince was the Sönid's

Zasag Junwang, who enjoyed friendly relations with the Dalai Lama. He had numerous conversations with His Holiness and took up residence near the Dalai Lama’s residence on the banks of the Tuul. As usual, the Junwang came in a large caravan with his entire family. (Kozlov 1907)

During his stay, Kozlov took a photograph of the Junwang’s family. Furthermore, the biography of the Dalai Lama mentions pilgrims from



Figure 1-3 Entourage of the 13th Dalai Lama (Lamen Khenpo, Kal-sang, and Solpön khenpo)

Courtesy of Russian Geographical Society, Saint Petersburg (F. 18, Op. 7).



Figure 1-4 Junwang’s wife and two daughters

Courtesy of Russian Geographical Society, Saint Petersburg (F. 18, Op. 7).

Dariganga, Khölönbuir, Baarin, etc. To sum up, the presence of the Dalai Lama removed the boundaries that had been demarcated by the Qing and Russia.

The Jebtsundamba's silence

In contrast to the jubilant masses, the 8th Jebtsundamba, the highest-ranking lama in Ikh Khüree, kept putting off his official visit to the Dalai Lama. Contemporary Westerners witnessed the Jebtsundamba's complicated situation caused by the Dalai Lama's popularity. For example, a secret telegram dated October 24, 1904, from P. M. Lessar, the Russian envoy in Beijing, to Lamsdorf, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, says:

His (i.e., the Dalai Lama's) arrival will attract many pilgrims and consequently a lot of money to Urga. But, on the other hand, it will attract many lamas from Tibet and cause the construction of new monasteries competing with existing ones, and in any case the position of Urga's Khutugtu will diminish. (RIT: no. 23)

In another example, a secret telegram dated January 7, 1905, from I. P. Nadarov, governor of Trans-Baikal, to E. I. Alekseyev, Admiral of the Far East, says: "Two thousand Buddhists flock from all sides to worship the Dalai Lama. The value of Ikh Khüree's Khutugtu has fallen" (RIT: no. 27). The same explanation was also given by Ernest Satow, the British envoy in Beijing (Tachibana 2011: 24).

Kozlov also described the Dalai Lama's overwhelming popularity and the Jebtsundamba's social withdrawal in some detail:

Thus, in the autumn of 1904 in Mongolia, a wonderful event happened: the Dalai Lama arrived in Urga—a sort of Mongolian Lhasa—in the northern part of this country and made a long stay. Strangely, however, the local Chinese-Mongolian authorities led by Bogd Gegen, on the basis of an order from Beijing "not to show excessive enthusiasm over the arrival of the Dalai Lama in Urga," did not show any enthusiasm. Especially Bogd Gegen, who do not respect the basic rules of decorum, did not meet the Dalai Lama. Moreover, he soon rejected His Holiness's offer to assume the position of head of one of the monasteries under his jurisdiction in Urga....

As time went by, relations between the Dalai Lama and Bogd Gegen grew worse. The discontent of the Urga Khutughtu did not know any limits, mainly because the people—Mongols, Buryats, Kalmyks—irresistibly sought to worship the Dalai Lama and filled his sacred Urga and its environs. Instead of declining, the prestige of the Dalai Lama rose, and Gandan Monastery (in Urga) where His Holiness was staying became very popular. Urga came alive. Worshipers converged day and night. Everyone was talking about the great Dalai Lama and Tibetans, but the locals seemed to have lost all interest (Kozlov 1907).

Some scholars, especially Mongolian scholars, have explored the possibility that the Dalai Lama and Jebtsundamba met each other and discussed the independence of Tibet and Mongol. This idea may have been inspired by the fact that the Mongolian declaration of independence in 1911, the Tibetan declaration of independence in 1913, and the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty of 1913 all happened shortly after the Dalai Lama’s stay in Mongolia (Batbayar 2012).

However, before discussing the possibility of their having met, we must first clarify the circumstances that prevented the Jebtsundamba from paying homage to the Dalai Lama in public. Accordingly, we will next consider the “throne issue,” which prevented the Jebtsundamba from meeting the Dalai Lama.

The throne issue

On February 3, 1905, Donkhor (sTong skor) Khutughtu and the Jebtsundamba’s treasurer (Shanzodba)⁵ sent a memorial to the Junwang Dorjpalam, the head and vice-general of Setsen Khan Aimag,⁶ in which they accused the Dalai Lama’s entourage of ill behavior. Since the Dalai Lama was worshiped as a bodhisattva, a perfect being free from any kinds of defects, if people found something wrong related to the Dalai Lama, they considered it to be the fault not of the Dalai Lama, but of his entourage or relatives. For instance, the Yongzheng emperor punished the 7th Dalai Lama’s father instead of the Dalai Lama himself, accusing him of having three ministers who were antagonistic toward the Qing dynasty during the civil war of 1727–28 (Petech 1972: 264–265). In short, an accusation by the Jebtsundamba’s treasurer against the Dalai Lama’s entourage was equivalent to the Jebtsundamba’s accusation against the Dalai Lama.

In the memorial, the “evil deeds” of the Dalai Lama’s entourage were enumerated. First, although the Jebtsundamba had done everything to receive the Dalai Lama, the Dalai Lama’s entourage and followers had whipped and injured the disciplinarian (*gebkui*)⁷ and vice lama (*ded lam-a*), who had been approved by the Qing emperor.

Secondly, when the Jebtsundamba tried to invite the Dalai Lama to the palace in order to pray for his longevity,⁸ the latter’s aides said, “If you do not make the Dalai Lama’s throne higher than your master Jebtsundamba’s, the Dalai Lama will not accept the Jebtsundamba’s invitation. If the ceremony is not performed, send the same amounts of silver as the ceremony costs” (DRM: no. 20, n. 6-5-6). As the ceremony for the Dalai Lama’s longevity was not performed, the Jebtsundamba sent the money as requested, and the Dalai Lama’s entourage sent an inauspicious white-colored woolen cloth in return.

Thirdly, when the Dalai Lama’s aide, the chant master (*umjed*),⁹ had fallen sick, the Dalai Lama’s entourage had secretly transported him to Eastern Ikh Khüree (Sira küriyen). After he died, they took his body away, destroying the eastern gate of Eastern Ikh Khüree in the process. It cost a lot of money to perform a purification ritual after such an inauspicious event.

After Shanzodba had enumerated the “evil deeds” of the Dalai Lama’s entourage, he broached the main issue, namely, that concerning the throne.

However high we held the Dalai Lama in esteem, his entourage behaved arbitrarily and stupidly, oppressed us, caused troubles one after another, and tormented us. If we keep on overlooking these misbehaviors, someday a major incident may occur that will trouble the minds of both the Dalai Lama and the Jebtsundamba. In addition to this, we are afraid that they will promptly change our traditional straight custom that has prevailed in this area. We would like to hear your opinion. Even though the Dalai Lama is a high-ranking lama, how much higher should his throne be made than the Jebtsundamba’s throne, which had already been prepared?

Please send this report immediately to the heads of the four aimags of Khalkha, the vice-general, and the assistant (*kebei*) in charge of this issue, investigate this matter, and decide how to stop these Tibetans’ domineering attitude and evil deeds whereby they oppress the local region, and how high the Dalai Lama’s throne should be or whether it should be the same height as the Jebtsundamba’s. Please send me a reply to these

inquiries as soon as possible so as not to provoke trouble and conflict. (DRM: n. 6-9-11)

The Jebtsundamba based his own legitimacy on the “traditional straight custom that has prevailed in this area” and blamed the Dalai Lama’s entourage for oppressing this custom, and he tried to make his throne’s height the same as that of the Dalai Lama.

This throne issue led to an incident in which in the third month of Guangxu 31 followers of the Jebtsundamba destroyed the Dalai Lama’s throne that had been placed inside the temple. This completely broke down the relationship between the two lamas.¹⁰ From the aforementioned treasurer’s allegations, we can know that the reason that the two lamas did not meet in public was that the Jebtsundamba did not consent to sit on a throne lower than that of the Dalai Lama because of his adherence to the “traditional custom” of the Khalkhas.

The Dalai Lama’s view

Next, let us examine the 13th Dalai Lama’s reaction to these allegations. There is a description of his stay in Ikh Khüree between two entries for the 1st and 6th days of the second month of the Wood-Serpent year (1905) in the biography of the 13th Dalai Lama:

The Government of Khalkha and the Government of Tibet (*dGa’ ldan pho brang*) are in the priest-patron relationship. The Omniscient Holder of the Lotus Flower¹¹ and successive Jebtsundambas are only in a master-disciple relationship. Therefore, all the Khalkha people came to greet, provided transportation, and pitched the yurts for rest and a bed [for His Holiness the Dalai Lama]. They seemed to be united as one because of their loyalty. His Holiness repaid them with much praise and gifts according to their status.

However, as the *bKa’ gdams glegs bam* says, “Alas! as a hen in a house maligns the Great Garuḍa who soars high in the sky, so does an angry man mock me, who fly in the sphere of primordial wisdom.” All people, high and low, regarded His Holiness as one worthy of worship and came to pay homage and seek advice on governance. As His Holiness’s reputation spread everywhere, the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu showed his displeasure in the manner of ordinary people in the age of sin. Pretending to be pious, he took heretical action, unbefitting temporal

and religious traditions, such as destroying His Holiness's throne and smoking in the presence of His Holiness.

The Jebtsundamba slandered the leader of the three regions (i.e., Dalai Lama) in various ways, just like a one-legged person from the land of Tsuta mocking someone with two legs. Because the Qing minister (Amban) residing in Ikh Khüree reported the Jebtsundamba's behavior to the Great Lord Appointed by Heaven (i.e., Qing emperor), the Emperor reprimanded the Four Khans of Khalkha, who with their subjects pleaded guilty and apologized one after another in the vicinity of Ikh Khüree. (D13N-ka: 823-6-825-1)

From the first paragraph, we learn that those affiliated to the Dalai Lama defined the relationship with the princes of Khalkha as one between a priest and his patrons and that with the Jebtsundamba as one between a master and his disciple. If one took this view, it was quite natural that the Dalai Lama's throne should be higher than that of the Jebtsundamba.

The expression "a one-legged person from the land of Tsuta mocking someone with two legs" is the quotation from chapter 3: 78 of the *Sa skya legs bshad*. In fact, this expression has a counterpart in the expression "Those who do (things) by a defective method despise those who do them by a perfect method. When he comes to the land of Cuta, the two-legged one is not considered a human being."¹² We can identify "a hen in a house" and "an angry man" with the Jebtsundamba and the Great Garuḍa in the sky and the person who flies in the sphere of primordial wisdom with the Dalai Lama, and "those who do (things) by a defective method" and "the one-legged people of Tsuta" with the Jebtsundamba and "those who do them by a perfect method" and "two-legged men" with the Dalai Lama.

It may also be noted that it can be inferred from the statement that the Jebtsundamba smoked (probably opium) "in the presence of His Holiness" that the Jebtsundamba and Dalai Lama met at least privately.

When we examine the Dalai Lama's perceptions in light of the historical facts, it becomes clear that these were not only the Dalai Lama's perceptions, but were also generally accepted at the time. For example, the 1st Jebtsundamba studied in Tibet and looked up to the 1st Panchen Lama and 5th Dalai Lama as his mentors. In addition, successive Jebtsundambas after the 3rd Jebtsundamba were discovered in Tibet and recognized by the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, whereafter they were sent to Mongolia and studied Buddhism under lamas sent from Lhasa. All these facts show that suc-

cessive Jebtsundambas were disciples of the Dalai Lama.

As is well known, during the Dalai Lama's sojourn in Mongolia, most of the Khalkha princes paid homage to him and offered him large amounts of alms, and so they were clearly patrons of the Dalai Lama. Thus, the Dalai Lama's perceptions can be confirmed by the historical facts. Furthermore, when one compares the Jebtsundamba with the Dalai Lama in terms of authority, the Dalai Lama surpassed that of the Jebtsundamba in matters of both temporal and religious, for the Dalai Lama was the religious and secular ruler of Tibet, whereas the Jebtsundamba was not even the ruler of Tüsheet Khan Aimag, one of the four aimags of Khalkha.

As for the incident of the Dalai Lama's aides whipping Khalkha lamas, mentioned in the treasurer's allegations, it was common practice in Tibet for the subordinates of nobles or the armed monks of high lamas to brandish a whip in order to control thronging crowds (Chapman 1938: 235–236, 357, 415, 421). It is a well-known fact that crowds of people converged on the Dalai Lama's procession, and so it is not surprising that the Dalai Lama's attendants would have used their whips to clear the way.

Therefore, it may be concluded that the perceptions of the Dalai Lama and the behavior of his entourage were generally accepted at the time, whereas the Jebtsundamba's perceptions seem to have been very limited and personal. Next, let us examine the reactions of third parties to this issue.

The reactions of observers to the throne issue

Judging from the Dalai Lama's biography, the throne issue ended with the four khans apologizing to the Dalai Lama after having been reprimanded by the Qing emperor. However, we must not forget that the Dalai Lama was not on good terms with the Qing emperor at the time.

When Colonel Younghusband invaded Tibet in 1904, the Dalai Lama, ignoring the Qing emperor's attempts to restrain him, fought with the British Indian army and then left for Mongolia without informing the Amban Youtai of his departure. As a result, Youtai became extremely angry and suggested that the emperor rescind the Dalai Lama's title that had been conferred by the Shunzhi emperor in 1653 and move the Panchen Lama to Lhasa to rule Tibet in lieu of the Dalai Lama. This proposal met with imperial approval and was implemented.¹³ Furthermore, the Qing emperor did not even know the whereabouts of the Dalai Lama until Lianshun, the Uliastai General, submitted a secret memorial dated December 13, 1904.¹⁴

In other words, relations between the Dalai Lama and the Qing emperor

had officially been suspended at the time. Therefore, the fact that the Qing emperor sided not with the Jebtsundamba but with the Dalai Lama in spite of their strained relationship shows that, however invidious the Qing emperor felt the actions of the Dalai Lama to be, he could not deny the superiority of the Dalai Lama to the Jebtsundamba.

Furthermore, even the princes of the four aimags of Khalkha, who were supposed to be the core supporters and closest neighbors of the Jebtsundamba, did not in fact accept the treasurer's allegations. After having conferred with the princes of Khalkha about the treasurer's allegations, Dondovjalavpalamdorj, the head of Tüsheet Khan Aimag,¹⁵ said:

This allegation does not seem to be important.... His Holiness the Dalai Lama is the foremost Lama in the world, while His Holiness Vajradhara Bogd Gegen (i.e., Jebtsundamba) is an amazing Lama. We, the people of Khalkha, have recognized and invited successive Jebtsundambas to the throne in order to spread the Yellow Tradition (i.e., Geluk teachings). As it is very difficult to decide on the height of the thrones of both lamas, we will refer this matter back to you. (DRM: no. 28, n. 6-2-3)

A. D. Khitrovo, the Russian frontier commissioner, in 1906 also sensed the Dalai Lama's overwhelming superiority to Jebtsundamba from the attitude of the princes of Khalkha:

How influential and popular the Dalai Lama is among the Mongol rulers can be judged from the fact that, despite the misunderstandings on the part of the Khutughtu of Urga (i.e., Jebtsundamba), the natural spiritual lord of all Mongols, the princes ignore the Khutughtu and take the side of the Dalai Lama. (RIT: no. 65)

The fact that even core adherents of the Jebtsundamba did not side with him is indicative of the Dalai Lama's superiority to the Jebtsundamba.

Another reason that the Qing emperor and Khalkha princes dealt circumspectly with the throne issue was that the question of the respective heights of the thrones of the Jebtsundamba and Dalai Lama had caused a serious conflict between Central Eurasia and the Qing dynasty in the seventeenth century. Namely, in 1686, when Tüsheet Khan and Zasagt Khan met in Khürenbelchir to negotiate peace, the 1st Jebtsundamba sat on a throne of the same height as that of the abbot of Ganden Monastery, who attended

the meeting on behalf of the Dalai Lama. Enraged at this, Galdan Boshugtu Khan, the king of the Dzungars and an enthusiastic devotee of the Dalai Lama, attacked Tüsheet Khan and the Jebtsundamba for their lack of respect for the Dalai Lama. This led to a full-scale war between Dzungaria and Khalkha that also embroiled the Qing dynasty. Therefore, it is probable that this historical incident made the Qing emperor and Khalkha princes deal carefully with this throne issue.

But it was not only the throne issue, but also the Jebtsundamba's transgressions that worsened his relations with the Dalai Lama. Next, we will ascertain the Jebtsundamba's transgressions and his justification for them.

The Jebtsundamba's transgressions and their justification

In sharp contrast to the Dalai Lama, whose saintly personality was hailed by many, including Western travelers, the Jebtsundamba, who drank alcohol and broke the vow of celibacy, had a rather complicated reputation. Kozlov criticized the Jebtsundamba's disorderly conduct as follows:

Judging from the words of local residents, Bogd Gegen did everything his own way. He does not consider the opinions of his worshipers and openly appears almost everywhere with his lover, to whom Mongolians jokingly refer as the "Goddess Tārā." The local saint (i.e., Jebtsundamba) spends his leisure time in various forms of entertainment: fishing, throwing darts, shooting from a gun with blank cartridges, incarcerating lamas who have committed crimes inside overturned cauldrons. And all the time during these diversions, and when taking walks and visiting the homes of Russians, he is always accompanied by the same "Goddess Tārā."

With regard to this matter, an old gray-haired Mongolian man replied to me and many others who are interested in Bogd Gegen's lifestyle, "It is meaningless for you to think that all these things are not good! On the contrary, they are good, and they just seem bad to you. You should not look upon a saint like Bogd Gegen in this way." For the same reason, Bogd Gegen was not criticized for his excessive drinking of European wines and champagne. Recently the taste of Urga's Khutugtu has changed from champagne to cognac. All this made the Great Dalai Lama all the more admirable because of his rectitude and chastity. (Kozlov 1907)

Qing officials sent from the capital Beijing, as well as Westerners like Kozlov, also had a bad impression of the Jebtsundamba. For example, in the same memorial dated the 12th of the third month of Guangxu 31 (April 16, 1905) which reported the Dalai Lama's request to have the Jebtsundamba deprived of the title conferred by the Qing because of his violation of the precept of celibacy, the Amban Yanzhi wrote, "Jebtsundamba is a fool. I cannot understand why the princes of Khalkha and *shabi* (Jebtsundamba's subjects) look up to the Jebtsundamba's teaching" (GZZ, vol. 116: no. 814).

Generally speaking, if a monk of the Geluk school lived with a woman, he would be expelled from the monastery. Drinking alcohol was also regarded as a serious monastic transgression. But it must be noted that there were some like "an old gray-haired Mongolian man" who had no doubt about the Jebtsundamba's holiness. They seem to have belonged to the same group of "locals who seemed to have lost all interest," referred to in the earlier quotation.

Even the princes of Khalkha, who apologized to the Dalai Lama over the throne issue, did not want to incur the displeasure of the Jebtsundamba. According to the Amban Yanzhi's memorial dated the 12th of the third month of Guangxu 31, the Khalkha princes expressed outright displeasure at the Dalai Lama's prolonged stay. In response to their complaints, Yanzhi suggested that the Dalai Lama ought to leave Ikh Khüree so as not to annoy the Jebtsundamba any further, writing that "if the Jebtsundamba became angry and left Ikh Khüree, all the princes would be upset, whereas, if the Dalai Lama leaves Tibet, the Panchen Lama can take his place."¹⁶ In spite of a profound misunderstanding of the political consciousness of Tibetan people, this testimony by Yanzhi shows that the Jebtsundamba had a certain amount of influence over the princes of Khalkha.

While many Mongolians, Westerners, and Qing officials were filled with feelings of discomfort regarding the Jebtsundamba's transgressions, why did the aforementioned old man and princes of Khalkha retain their regard for him? In this respect, the words of the old gray-haired man that "You should not look upon a saint like Bogd Gegen in this way" are suggestive.

There is a historical example of a monk who did not lose the devotion of followers in spite of his sexual misconduct. Because of his complicated childhood, the 6th Dalai Lama refused to receive the ordination as a monk from the Panchen Lama and even tried to return his layman's vows which he had already received. He led a wild life, making love with men and women

and drinking alcohol. Although the upper echelons of the monastic community were embarrassed by his conduct, most of the population of Tibet and Mongolia regarded it as a kind of sacred madness, saying, "The bedmate of Dalai Lama is a female partner of esoteric practices and the Enlightened one's action is not the way they look like" (Mullin 2001: 50–55; Desideri 2010: 245–246). It is true that there is the idea in the *Guhyasamāja-tantra* that an enlightened being can indulge in evil conduct such as sex and drinking alcohol as if they were pure deeds. But as the commentary states that "this sentence has provisional and definitive senses" (Tenzin Gyatso 1985: 350–351), in the context of definitive senses, such misbehavior was strictly prohibited in the Geluk School. Moreover, this 6th Dalai Lama did indeed cause confusion among Buddhists in Central Eurasia and Qing China. Considering these facts, it is no wonder that this idea was not abused after the 6th Dalai Lama.

However, the Jebtsundamba ventured to use this theory. He called the woman referred to by Kozlov as his "lover," not in jest but in all seriousness, "White Tārā,"¹⁷ a leading female deity, and in 1905 asked the Qing court to issue his "female Mongolian follower" with a title and credentials. Obviously, the Jebtsundamba intended to make the people believe that his lover was not a forbidden lover but a tantric partner, as the 6th Dalai Lama and his lovers were believed to be. This request was accepted, and the title "Erdene Setsen," meaning "Wise Jewel," was conferred on her. It was this woman, Dondogdulam, who would be enthroned as Jebtsundamba's wife in 1911.¹⁸

However, the fact that the Jebtsundamba called her just a "female Mongolian follower" in his memorial and did not openly refer to her as his wife shows that there existed the reality that a married monk was not officially accepted.

Conclusion

The major monasteries in Mongolia had been established by monks who had studied at the three main monasteries in Lhasa, and in their previous lives famous Mongolian incarnate lamas were believed to have been Indian and Tibetan saints and adepts. Therefore, for Mongolians the most popular pilgrimage destination was Lhasa and the most respected lama was the Dalai Lama, who ruled Tibet.

Consequently, as soon as it became known that the Dalai Lama had

come to Ikh Khüree in 1904, people gathered from all directions—from Inner Mongolia, from Buryatia and Kalmykia in Russia, and from Kōkenuur, Alshaa, Khölönbuir, and Dariganga. In other words, the Dalai Lama's stay in Mongolia spiritually and spatially made all Tibetan Buddhists unite as one people across national boundaries.

But this situation was problematic for the Jebtsundamba and princes of Khalkha, for they had espoused plans to enthrone the Jebtsundamba and declare Mongolian independence at some point in time. On the one hand, they were impressed by the power of religion, which operated regardless of borders. But on the other hand, they were worried about the poor reputation of the future king that had come about because of the existence of the impeccable Dalai Lama.

Needless to say, for people living outside Lhasa, their local lama was important in everyday life. But when the Dalai Lama came to their homeland, the local lama had to face a real test of strength as a religious figure. The reason that the Jebtsundamba refused to meet the Dalai Lama in public in 1905 seems to have been that he wished to avoid exposing his international position to the local population. In this same year the Jebtsundamba asked the Qing to issue a title and credentials for his lover. This request was probably made to justify his sexual relationship with her.

When the princes of Khalkha and the Jebtsundamba declared the independence of Mongolia in 1911, it was not a descendant of Chinggis Khan but the Jebtsundamba, born in Tibet, whom they accepted as their king. Since under the Qing banner system the descendants of Chinggis Khan were restricted in their movements and their authority was confined to their individual territories, the secular princes had lost the power to unify all Mongols. Therefore, if they wanted to unite the Mongolian population to the greatest possible extent, it was a realistic choice for them to enthrone a religious authority like the Jebtsundamba. They no doubt recalled the scenes in 1905 when many Mongolians came from across borders and gathered in Ikh Khüree to worship the Dalai Lama.

As we shall see in Chapter 5 of this book, on the day of his enthronement the Jebtsundamba, the king of Mongolia, was extolled as Cakrasaṃvara and Dondogdulam as a *dākinī*, the partner of Cakrasaṃvara. At this point, the union of the Jebtsundamba and Dondogdulam was officially announced. Thus, the incidents that occurred during the Dalai Lama's sojourn in Ikh Khüree had a direct influence on the independence of Mongolia in 1911.

Notes

- 1 FO 17: 1745 from Curzon et al. to Lord George F. Hamilton, January 8, 1903: 7–8.
- 2 Pyotr Kozlov (1863–1935), a Russian explorer who continued Nikolai Przhevalsky’s explorations in Tibet. Kozlov concluded his impressions of this audience with the Dalai Lama as follows: “This was the happiest day of all the days that I spent in Asia.” He had another audience with the Dalai Lama at Kumbum Monastery in 1909.
- 3 Guangxu 31/3/12 (April 16, 1905), QDX: no. 108.
- 4 Namjilwanchig (rNam rgyal dbang phyug). In Tongzhi 2 (1863) he succeeded to the position of Junwang and in Guangxu 29 (1894) became the head of Shiliin Gol Aimag (Bao 1995: 404). He is famous as the father of De Wang (1902–1966), the leader of an autonomy movement in Inner Mongolia.
- 5 Shanzodba is a transcription of Tib. *phyag mdzod pa*, a monastery’s financial officer. The post of Jebtsundamba’s treasurer was established by the Qing in the first year of Yongzheng’s reign (1723) and was filled by fifteen nobles until the end of the Qing empire (Babao 2010: 48–50).
- 6 In Guangxu 10 (1884) he succeeded to the title of Toruyin Junwang, in Guangxu 15 (1889) he was working at the Gate of Heavenly Purity (Qianqingmen) in Beijing, and in Guangxu 24 (1898) he assumed the position of head of Setsen Khan Aimag (Bao 1995: 586).
- 7 Tib. *dge bskos*, a monk in charge of monastic rules.
- 8 Tib. *brtan bzhugs*, a ceremony in which the disciple and patron of a high lama prays for his longevity.
- 9 Tib. *dbu mdzad*, the chant master at a Buddhist service.
- 10 Yanzhi’s memorial, dated Guangxu 31/3/12 (April 16, 1905), GZZ, vol. 116: no. 814; QDX: no. 108. Yanzhi was an Amban residing in Ikh Khüree, in charge of affairs there from the eleventh month of Guangxu 30 to the tenth month of Xuantong 1 (Wei 1977: 758).
- 11 “Holder of the Lotus Flower” (*phyag na padmo*) signifies the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, but here refers to the Dalai Lama, who was regarded as an incarnation of Avalokiteśvara (Ishihama 2015).
- 12 *cho ga nyams par byed pa rnams, cho ga tshang bar byed la brnyas, tsu ta’i yul du phyin pa na, rkang gnyis pa la mir mi brtsi* (Bosson 1966: 54, 216).
- 13 Document dated Guangxu 30/7/11 (August 21, 1904), QCZ, vol. 1,

Yutai zoudu, vol. 1: 14. Cf. Jagou 2009. However, the people of Tibet did not obey the Panchen Lama, who had no historical right to rule Tibet, and instead they obeyed the abbot of Ganden Monastery (*dga' ldan khri pa*), whom the Dalai Lama had appointed as his regent. In due course, the Amban Yutai was forced to confirm the abbot of Ganden Monastery as head of the Tibetan government (Document dated Guangxu 30/7/25 [August 6, 1904], YXZ vol. 4: 1466).

- 14 Document dated Guangxu 30/11/7 (December 13, 1904), QDX: no. 94.
- 15 Document dated Guangxu 31/2/10 (March 15, 1905). Dondovjalav-palamdorj succeeded to the position of Zasag, Taiji of the 1st degree, equal in rank to a Junwang, in Guangxu 5 and assumed the position of head of TüsHEET Khan Aimag in Guangxu 28 (1902) (Bao 1995: 519).
- 16 GZZ, vol. 116: no. 814; QDX: no. 108.
- 17 Cayan Dara in Mongolian, which means White Tārā.
- 18 Yanzhi's memorial dated Guangxu 31/9/10 (October 8, 1905), GZZ, vol. 115: no. 317.

CHAPTER TWO

*The exile and diplomacy of the 13th Dalai Lama (1904–1912)*¹*Tibet's encounters with the United States and Japan*

Ryosuke Kobayashi

During the Qing dynasty, Tibetan, Manchu, and Mongol leaders developed mutual relationships through their shared Tibetan Buddhist ideology (Ishihama 2001). However, after the 1911 Revolution in China, and following the declaration of independence by Mongolia, as well as the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, Tibet faced some difficult issues in building its foreign relations within the new international order. Recent research has shown that the 13th Dalai Lama tried to establish (in some cases, re-establish) connections with many countries, including Britain, Russia, Mongolia, Japan, and the United States. He was attempting to gain international support amid rising tensions with the Republic of China over the political status of Tibet. However, what has not been fully clarified is how the basis for his active diplomacy toward foreign countries was formed.

Many studies published in the People's Republic of China have emphasized that the issue of the "independence of Tibet" at the beginning of the twentieth century was caused by the maneuvering of imperialist countries such as Russia and Britain to divide China's territory (Zhou 1997; Wang 2003; Wang 2011: 245). On the other hand, many scholars have analyzed modern Tibetan history within the context of the "Great Game," which was the rivalry between Britain and Russia over Central Asia that started in the nineteenth century (Lamb 1966; 1986; Mehra 1974; Singh 1988; Shaumian 2000). In both Chinese and Western academia, based mainly on Chinese or Western-language materials, the 13th Dalai Lama's diplomacy in this period is often overlooked.

The key events in studying this issue are the sojourns of the 13th Dalai

Lama in Mongolia, China, and India from 1904 to 1912. Through encounters with foreign dignitaries during his exile, the 13th Dalai Lama, who had never before been away from Tibet, developed his understanding of international society and of Tibet’s position in the world (Sperling 2011).

In this chapter, I would like to examine the 13th Dalai Lama’s diplomacy during his exile by focusing on his relationships with the United States and Japan, each of which had risen to the position of a new power in East Asia after the Spanish-American War (1898) and the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), respectively. Previous research has mainly focused on the 13th Dalai Lama’s relations with Britain and Russia, which had been the most significant Western powers with respect to Tibet since the late nineteenth century. However, we cannot overlook the fact that, in the early phase of his exile, Britain had no direct communication with the 13th Dalai Lama, and Russia too could not provide the support that he expected. This was precisely the first period when the 13th Dalai Lama encountered the United States and Japan. An analysis of the Dalai Lama’s interactions with the United States and Japan at the beginning of the twentieth century will allow us to examine how the Dalai Lama expanded his knowledge of the rest of the world in his exile.

Furthermore, we have to pay attention to the fact that the Dalai Lama encountered the United States and Japan through Tibetan specialists. William Woodville Rockhill (1854–1914), the U.S. Minister in Beijing and a famous Orientalist who specialized in Tibetan and Chinese studies and could speak Tibetan, built a close relationship with the Dalai Lama. Rockhill’s meeting with the Dalai Lama was the first contact between Tibetan leaders and the United States, and he gave the Dalai Lama advice on Tibet’s future direction (Varg 1952; Wimmel 2003; Meinheit 2011; 2012; Knaus 2012). Meanwhile, during this period Japanese Buddhists also began to pay attention to Tibet because of its preservation of Buddhist traditions. Some of them specialized in Tibetan Buddhism, visited Tibet, and learned the Tibetan language. At the same time, they built close relationships with the Dalai Lama while the Tibetan leader was in exile in China and attempted to mediate between Japan and Tibet.²

In this chapter, I will use primarily the following materials, which have not been fully examined before: correspondence between Rockhill and the 13th Dalai Lama written in English and Tibetan, mainly housed in the Houghton Library (Harvard University); the Dalai Lama’s letters to Japan; and Japanese records regarding Tibet and the Dalai Lama written by Japa-

nese monks. By examining these valuable materials, I will clarify how the Dalai Lama articulated the position of Tibet within the world in his own language, how foreign intellectuals specializing in Tibet affected the Dalai Lama's diplomacy, and how the international community dealt with the Tibetan issues.

First contacts with W. W. Rockhill and Teramoto Enga

The early life of Rockhill

Following the development of modern Buddhist studies in Europe during the nineteenth century, many European Orientalists started paying attention to Tibet as a repository of Buddhist texts lost during the decline of Buddhism in India (Lenoir 1999 [Imaeda, tr. 2012]). William Woodville Rockhill, known as the first American Tibetologist, was one of the scholars who learned modern Buddhist studies in Europe and became interested in Tibet, as well as in its Buddhist traditions and culture.

Rockhill was born in Philadelphia in 1854 and grew up with his mother Anna Dorothea after his father, Thomas C. Rockhill, a lawyer, died right after Anna gave birth to Rockhill. With the outbreak of the Civil War, the family moved to Paris when Rockhill was twelve years old, and he was educated at the École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr from 1871 to 1873. His interest in Tibet, the Tibetan language, and Tibetan Buddhism was first awakened by a famous account of travels in Tibet written by Evariste Régis Huc (Huc 1850). Having been inspired by this account, Rockhill started studying Tibetan at the Bibliothèque Nationale³ while receiving his regular education at St. Cyr (Varg 1952: 10–19; Wimmel 2003: 7–15).

After he came back to the United States in 1875, Rockhill wrote several articles and published two books, *Udānavarga* in 1883 and *The Life of the Buddha* in 1884. Even though he quickly achieved a good reputation in academic circles, he did not show any strong interest in acquiring an academic position in the United States. He tried to gain a government position in China so that he could have a chance to explore Tibet, and after securing such a position, set off for his new post as a legation attaché in Beijing in 1884. Furthermore, Rockhill gained an opportunity to learn colloquial Tibetan from a Tibetan monk in Beijing, where several Tibetan Buddhist temples had been established by the Qing emperors.⁴ Subsequently, he made two trips to Tibet together with a few companions in 1888–1889 and 1891–1892. Even though he was unable to reach Lhasa, Rockhill closely observed vari-

ous local communities in Amdo, Kham, and Inner Mongolia, utilizing his language skills in Tibetan and Chinese, and later published meticulous accounts of these two travels (Rockhill 1891; 1894).

In Rockhill’s accounts we cannot really find evidence of any activities that were strongly rooted in diplomatic or military concerns. This is in contrast to other travelers from Russia and Britain, who conducted intelligence activities (Ishihama 2016). It also indicates that the United States did not have a strong political and diplomatic interest in Inner Asia or even a significant presence in China before the Spanish-American War in 1898 (Takahashi 1999: 2–53).

While he was thoroughly researching academic works on Tibet and China, Rockhill gradually secured a foothold inside the U.S. government owing to his knowledge of China and experience with diplomacy in East Asia. In 1898, he became the Assistant Secretary of State under President William McKinley and Secretary of State John Hay. Around the same period, following the United States’ victory in the Spanish-American War, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States, and the Philippines became a strong foothold for the United States to enhance its presence in East Asia. As a result of this, the importance of the role played by Rockhill inside the administration also rapidly grew.

Owing to the fact that its advance into East Asia was later than that of



Figure 2-1 William Woodville Rockhill dressed in Tibetan costumes

Courtesy of National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington D.C. (right mnh_5720, left mnh_5332).

other Western powers, the United States felt that its commercial and political interests in China were limited by the other powers' larger spheres of influence in China. In 1899, Rockhill drafted a memorandum called the "Open Door Policy." It was issued on September 6 in the name of John Hay and became the principle underpinning U.S. diplomacy towards China during the early twentieth century. Hay also issued a second memorandum on the "Open Door Policy" in July 1900, which stated that the powers should support the territorial integrity of China. This statement about Chinese territory in the memorandum had been discussed by Rockhill when he drafted the first memorandum (Takahashi 1999: 66–69, 72–73). This American position affected Rockhill's policy towards Tibetan issues, as I will argue in the next section.

Tibet and Japanese monks

Around the same time as Rockhill was studying in Paris, modern Buddhist studies in Europe were receiving increasing attention from Japanese Buddhist circles.⁵ After an extensive anti-Buddhist movement initiated by the Meiji government in 1868 (known as *haibutsu kishaku* 廢佛毀釋), Japanese Buddhist elites, who were seeking a solution to the crisis facing Japanese Buddhism, attempted to reform Japanese Buddhism by studying modern Buddhist studies. By absorbing the findings of modern Buddhist studies in Europe, many Japanese Buddhists became interested in rare Buddhist scriptures in Tibet and in studying Tibetan Buddhism as a special form of esoteric Buddhism. Honganji 本願寺 temple, which was affiliated to Jōdo Shinshū 淨土真宗, the largest Buddhist sect in Japan, was deeply involved in the movement to approach Tibet to obtain Tibetan Buddhist scriptures.

Teramoto Enga 寺本婉雅 (1872–1940), a Japanese monk from Higashi Honganji 東本願寺 temple, the head temple of the Shinshū Ōtani-Sect 眞宗大谷派, one of the two main branches of Jōdo Shinshū, had extensive experience with Tibetan affairs on a practical level at the beginning of the twentieth century owing to his role as an intermediary in relations between Tibet and Japan.⁶ Immediately after the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1900), Teramoto, who served as an interpreter for the Japanese army stationed in Beijing, purchased the Tibetan Kangyur from the Yellow Temple (Huangsi) and both the Tibetan Kangyur and Tengyur from Zifuyuan temple in Beijing (Teramoto 1974: 299–301; Nanjō 1979: 272).

Teramoto also invited Akya Khutugthu (A kya ho thog thu), who was the reincarnation of the father of Tsongkhapa (Tsong kha pa) and abbot of Yong-



Figure 2-2 Teramoto Enga at Kumbum Monastery

Source: Tafel (1914: XVI).

hegong temple, to Japan from July to August 1901 (Kōmoto 2011).⁷ Teramoto visited Lhasa via Amdo in 1905 and returned to Japan by way of India. After a brief stay in Japan, he left in 1906 for Amdo again and studied at Kumbum (sKu 'bum) Monastery. He was granted an audience with the 13th Dalai Lama, who took refuge in Amdo from the end of 1906, as I will discuss in the next section.

Thus, the United States and Japan were the emerging powers in East Asia, and both Rockhill and Teramoto were strongly influenced by global trends in modern Buddhist studies and attempted to reach out to Tibet. In the next section, I will focus on how they built their relationships with the 13th Dalai Lama and how they became involved in the political issues of Tibet.

The 13th Dalai Lama's sojourn in Mongolia and his first contact with Rockhill

First, I would like to explain briefly the historical background to the Tibet-Japan relationship by focusing on the 13th Dalai Lama's first exile in Mongolia and China from 1904 to 1909 and his encounter with Japanese dignitaries.

Following the advance of the British Indian army into Lhasa in 1904, during which the British tried to establish direct communication with Tibet,

the Dalai Lama fled to Ikh Khüree in Mongolia to secure Russian assistance. The person who became an important intermediary between Tibet and Russia at that time was Agvan Dorzhiev (1854–1938), a Buryat-Mongolian assistant tutor of the Dalai Lama in debating practice who had won the Dalai Lama's trust (Ch. 3). Even though Dorzhiev continued to play a role as mediator between the Dalai Lama and Russia, he was unable to gain the assistance from Russia that he expected. Since he had lost beneficial diplomatic mileage with Russia, the Dalai Lama started searching for another country that would be able to protect Tibet from Britain, and the United States and Japan began to emerge as such nations in the eyes of the 13th Dalai Lama.

Previous biographies of Rockhill have pointed out that the first contact between Rockhill and the Dalai Lama came in the summer of 1905 from the Dalai Lama's side (Varg 1952; Wimmel 2003). However, from 1901 to 1902 Rockhill tried to contact the Dalai Lama through the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Waiwubu*) to assist in acquiring Tibetan Buddhist texts at the request of Emil Schlagintweit, the German Buddhist scholar.⁸ This was in response to the increasing demand for Tibetan Buddhist texts in Western academia following the establishment of modern Buddhist studies and also coincided with Teramoto's acquisition of the Tibetan Kangyur and Tengyur. In the end, Rockhill did not achieve this goal due to the British invasion of Lhasa in 1903–1904, which disrupted his plan. However, this project is a clear indication that a broad international network among Buddhist scholars and Orientalists was being formed during this period, and Rockhill, who had diplomatic channels in China, enhanced his presence in official circles in Beijing and his international reputation as a distinguished Tibetologist.

This network among international scholars of Buddhism ultimately played an important role in facilitating the relationship between Rockhill and the Dalai Lama when Rockhill gained the position of U.S. Minister in Beijing in the summer of 1905. F. I. Shcherbatskoy, a famous scholar of Buddhist studies and a professor at Saint Petersburg University, was residing in Ikh Khüree at the time and mediated between the Dalai Lama and Rockhill with the following letter to Rockhill.

I am here at Urga in scientific mission from the St. Petersburg Academy of Science and I have profited of the occasion of being presented to the Dalai Lama and taking some insight into his surrounding. During our conversation I noticed that the Dalai Lama had some very faint idea about your two journeys in Tibet, still he had no knowledge about

the existence of America and the United States. But it seems that the present circumstances have induced him to change his views as to the policy he must follow towards all foreigners. He asked me about the scholars, who studied and knew the Tibetan language and had an interest for the religion of his country. I, of course, mentioned your name and explained him your recent position also. Answering this the Dalai Lama expressed the wish of making your acquaintance and having scientific relations with you personally and with the learned societies of America; he was ready he said to help them in their studies in whatever he could. He asked me to inform you after this, his disposition. I answered that he could make it directly without any go-between, but he repeated his request. I promised to do according to his wish and this is the cause of my letter. (WRAP: 89, Shcherbatskoy to Rockhill, July 1905)

Through this correspondence with Shcherbatskoy, who had been asked by the Dalai Lama to introduce a Tibetan specialist to him, we can see that Rockhill was gaining a reputation as a Tibetologist and had an increasing presence in official circles in Beijing. Moreover, we can also see that the Dalai Lama, who had not known of the United States before this event, was expanding his knowledge about the rest of the world. The letter also shows that the Dalai Lama had been realizing the fact that there were many intellectuals who were drawn to Tibetan Buddhism in the western countries. While Western Orientalists were approaching Tibet, the Dalai Lama, in concert with this movement, was also searching for the opportunity to build relationships with Western countries apart from Russia. Along with the above letter written by Shcherbatskoy, the Dalai Lama also attached the following Tibetan letter to Rockhill:⁹

It is a joy to us that you are in good health and that you carry out your governmental duties regularly and well. We are highly pleased to hear that the governments of Russia and Japan (*ru su dang rer phing*) are terminating the war by concluding a treaty. I, the Dalai Lama, Chief of the entire Buddhist religion, have in the interest of Tibetan affairs arrived at Urga. [...] Now we have personally given detailed instructions concerning affairs of State to my household official (*don gcod gsol dpon*) and have sent him off to Beijing, instructing him thus: the judicial power of the Tibetan State should be safeguarded (*khrims 'go rang 'dzin*)¹⁰ and efforts should be made so that the affairs of the faith and living beings may

not fall under the evil sway of the British representative.

In this letter, the 13th Dalai Lama showed his deep antagonism towards the British. Even after the Younghusband mission had withdrawn its army from Lhasa, the 13th Dalai Lama still felt Britain was the primary threat to Tibet. Immediately after receiving the above letter from the Dalai Lama, however, Rockhill reported it to Ernest Mason Satow, the British Minister in Beijing, as seen here:

Mr. Rockhill told me that he replied to the Abbot that the United States had no interest in the matter, that the best plan would be to see the British Minister, who was known to be a just and reasonable man. This, however, the Abbot said was impossible. (FO17: 1755, Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne, August 24, 1905)

Rockhill was on the side of Britain as he contacted Satow and attempted to persuade the Tibetan envoy to negotiate with Satow in person. Rockhill, in alignment with the U.S. policy toward China, which guaranteed China's territorial integrity and recognized Tibet as "a part of the Chinese Dominion,"¹¹ also tried to keep Tibet under Qing authority. After this first contact between Rockhill and the Dalai Lama, Rockhill remained in contact with the Tibetan leader through letters and via his envoy until he met the Dalai Lama in person at Mount Wutai (Wutaishan) in 1908.

The encounter between the 13th Dalai Lama and Teramoto Enga in Amdo

It still remains unclear when the Dalai Lama began to contact Japanese agents while he was in exile. However, records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan reveal that Shimakawa Kisaburō 島川穀三郎, a Russian and Chinese interpreter at the Japanese Legation in Beijing, met the Dalai Lama's envoys from Ikh Khüree in March 1905 in the middle of the Russo-Japanese War.¹² Shimakawa emphasized that Japan had won a series of battles against Russia, and Russia was no longer a reliable country for Tibet; he added that Japan was happy to offer the Dalai Lama counsel in the future if the Tibetan leader needed it. It seems that the Dalai Lama began to recognize that Japan could be a potential supporter aside from Russia.

In the latter half of 1906, the Dalai Lama left Mongolia for Kumbum Monastery in Amdo. Teramoto's first meeting with the 13th Dalai Lama

happened after the Dalai Lama arrived in Kumbum, and he granted a first audience to Teramoto Enga around November 1906. Teramoto quickly won the trust of the Dalai Lama, and they met several times there until the start of 1908 (Teramoto 1974: 248).

Teramoto built a wide range of relationships within Japanese official circles in Beijing and Japan. On November 20, 1907, in letters to Count Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信, who was a former prime minister in provisional retirement at the time, Teramoto insisted that Japan needed to encourage the Dalai Lama to move to Mount Wutai and eventually to Beijing in order to build cordial relations with the Qing court (OSC: イ-14-B0298-0001).

According to Teramoto's letters to Ōkuma, Teramoto recognized that the Tibetan Buddhist community had been divided into two groups: a “pro-Qing group” and a “pro-Russia group” (ibid.; OSC: イ-14-B0298-0002).¹³ In the Dalai Lama's entourage, there were influential Pro-Russian figures such as Lamden Khenpo (Bla sman mkhan po bkras khang byams pa thub dbang, ?–1922), who was the Dalai Lama's doctor and close advisor,¹⁴ as well as Dorzhiev.

Teramoto thought that a Tibet-Russia rapprochement would lead to Russian penetration into Qing territory, and that it might result in a security crisis for Japan (OSC: イ-14-B0298-0001). According to his letter to Ōkuma on December 23, 1907, alarmed by the Dalai Lama's diplomacy towards Russia, Teramoto had the following discussion with the “Pro-Qing group”:

The pro-Qing group [under the Dalai Lama] said, “It would be a great happiness if we were able to change the Dalai Lama's mind, leaning as it does towards Russia, to share his fate with the royal family of the Manchus, following Japanese advice.” I (Teramoto) replied, “The most convenient measure would be [for us to urge the Dalai Lama] to build his friendship with influential Japanese Buddhists, and provide [him with] a motive to break off the relationship with Russia, as well as have a close relationship with Japan and the Qing owing to the harmonious religious relationship [between Tibet, the Qing, and Japan]. It might contribute not only to the interests of the Qing, but also to the peace of East Asia (*tōa no heiwa* 東亞の平和).” (OSC: イ-14-B0298-0002)

Teramoto took a position that was strongly influenced by “Asianism” and attempted to achieve an alliance between “Buddhist countries” in Asia—such as Japan, China, and Tibet—against the Russian empire, and called this

policy “*soro shinshin*” 疎露親清 (alienating Tibet from Russia and allying it with the Qing) (ibid.). Teramoto also asserted that this policy would be able to reduce Japan’s diplomatic burden due to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in 1902, which recognized Russia as the common enemy in East Asia.

The Dalai Lama at Mount Wutai and in Beijing

Meetings with Japanese official circles

In February 1908, the Dalai Lama decided to move from Amdo to Mount Wutai, a sacred place for Chinese Buddhism as well as for Tibetan Buddhism, where he stayed without strict surveillance by the Qing government from June to August 1908 (Table 2-1).

Teramoto met the Dalai Lama twice at Mount Wutai. He asserted that the Dalai Lama should establish a relationship with Japan, and even invited him to Japan (Teramoto 1974: 268). During the second audience on August 8, he arranged a formal meeting between the Dalai Lama and Ōtani Son’yu 大谷尊由, who represented his elder brother Ōtani Kōzui 大谷光瑞 (1876–1948), the 22nd abbot of Nishi Honganji 西本願寺 temple.¹⁵ They discussed the exchange of “students” or monks between Tibet and Japan (Shirasu 2012: 37–38).

Then, after the Dalai Lama moved to Beijing, Teramoto played a significant role in mediating between the Dalai Lama and Japanese diplomats such as Ijūin Hikokichi 伊集院彦吉, the Japanese Minister in Beijing. Since the Dalai Lama was under the surveillance of Qing officials, it is difficult to suppose that he was able to raise political issues in his meetings with Japanese dignitaries at the Yellow Temple, the Dalai Lama’s residence.¹⁶ However, the Dalai Lama’s attendants, such as Dorzhiev and Lamden Khenpo, discussed the future relationship between Tibet and Japan with Japanese officials and Teramoto (Teramoto 1974: 291). Thus, the Tibet-Japan relationship developed rapidly, and the Dalai Lama and Japanese diplomats mutually promoted political and cultural exchange in 1908.

However, during this period the Dalai Lama became increasingly mistrustful of the Qing court owing to its “New Policies” (*Xinzheng*), which were introduced by the Qing in order to transform the empire into a modern nation. Already in the summer of 1907, it seems that the Dalai Lama had noticed that Qing officials had started discussing the establishment of a new “province” in Tibet in order to put Tibet under the direct control of the

Qing,¹⁷ and he had growing anxieties that this policy might undermine his authority in Tibet.¹⁸ Even though Teramoto continued to encourage the Dalai Lama to distance himself from Russia and draw closer to the Qing court and Japan, the incongruities between the Qing and the Dalai Lama steadily increased because of the Qing’s radical reforms regarding Tibet.

The Dalai Lama also rapidly extended his diplomacy towards the Great Powers during his long-term stay at Mount Wutai and in Beijing, and he did not limit his diplomacy to the relationship with Japan. The Dalai Lama also sent Dorzhiev as his envoy to negotiate with certain diplomats such as I. IA. Korostovets, the new Russian Minister, J. N. Jordan, the British Minister, W. F. T. O’Connor, who had joined the Younghusband mission in 1904, and Rockhill (Tables 2-1, 2-2). In other words, although Japan occupied a certain position within the entire diplomacy of the Dalai Lama owing mainly to Teramoto’s remarkable efforts, the Dalai Lama was at the same time rapidly expanding his connections with a wide range of foreign dignitaries, and Japan could not predominate over those countries (Shinohara 2009: 14–16). As a result, plans for the 13th Dalai Lama to visit Japan ultimately did not materialize.

Table 2-1 The 13th Dalai Lama’s meetings at Mount Wutai, 1908¹⁹

Date	Name	Position/Affiliation
Around early April	Oloff	German military officer
June 2	Teramoto Enga	Higashi Honganji Temple
June 19 and 21	William Woodville Rockhill	U.S. Minister in China
June 26	Carl Gustaf Mannerheim	Russian military officer
July 5	Reginald Fleming Johnston	British District Officer in Weihaiwei
August 2 and 4	Ōtani Son’yu	Nishi Honganji Temple
August 2 and 4	Teramoto Enga	Higashi Honganji Temple
August	Henri Marie Gustave d’Ollone	French explorer and military officer

Table 2-2 The 13th Dalai Lama's meetings in Beijing, 1908²⁰

Date	Name	Position/Affiliation
October 6	William Woodville Rockhill	U.S. Minister in Beijing
October 12	Abe Moritarō 阿部守太郎	Japanese Legation Attaché in Beijing
October 15	Ivan IA. Korostovets	Russian Minister in Beijing
October 20	Sir John Newell Jordan	British Minister in China
October 21	Aoki Nobuzumi 青木宣純	Military Attaché to Japanese Legation
October 21	Matsui Iwane 松井石根	Military officer of Japanese Legation
November 2	William Woodville Rockhill	U.S. Minister in China
November 11	Kawashima Naniwa 川島浪速	Director of Police Academy in Beijing
November 21	Teramoto Enga	Higashi Honganji Temple
November 25	Maharaja Kumar, Sidkeong Tulku Namgyel	Prince of Sikkim
November 25	William Frederick Travers O'Connor	Military officer in India
December 4	George Ernest Morrison	Peking correspondent of <i>The Times</i>
December 14	Ijūin Hikokichi	Japanese Minister in China
December 17	William Woodville Rockhill	U.S. Minister in China
December 18	Nishida Kōichi 西田耕一 (with Teramoto)	Interpreter at the Japanese Legation
December 19	Berthold Laufer	Vice-Director of East Asian Division, Field Museum, Chicago
December 20	Teramoto Enga	Higashi Honganji Temple

Meetings with Rockhill

After the Dalai Lama left Lhasa in 1904, several important treaties relating to Tibetan issues were concluded by Britain: the Anglo-Chinese Convention in 1906, the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907, and the Trade Regulation in 1908. In all of these, negotiations were carried out without the Dalai Lama being consulted. In the first treaty in 1906, Britain and the Qing negotiated with each other about the contents of the Lhasa Convention, which had been concluded by Younghusband and the Tibetan government in Lhasa in 1904. The Qing attempted to replace the 1904 Convention with a new bilateral treaty with Britain, since it felt that Tibetan participation would damage Chinese authority. Furthermore, in the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907, made at the end of the "Great Game" in Central Asia between Russia and Britain, the two countries recognized Chinese "suzerainty" over Tibet. The two governments also stated in this treaty that "[Britain and Russia] engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese government" (Bell 1927: 289–291). Moreover, in the 1908 Trade Regulation, the Qing established broader powers and responsibilities over the India-Tibet border trade. Although the Tibetan representative, Tsarong Wanchug Gyelpo (Tsharong dbang byug rgyal po), also participated in these negotiations in Calcutta, his position was basically subject to the authority of the Chinese representative, Zhang Yintang.²¹ In other words, the British government rapidly made concessions on Tibetan issues to Russia and China through these treaties after the Younghusband mission withdrew from Lhasa in 1904. The Qing, on the other hand, owing to the growing sense of a crisis in its authority over Tibet, was attempting to establish its diplomatic power over this region.

How did the Dalai Lama react to these rapid changes in the international environment surrounding Tibet? In June 1908, the Dalai Lama had the opportunity to meet Rockhill at Mount Wutai. They talked with each other through interpreters,²² but Rockhill partly conducted his conversation in Tibetan, which impressed the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama asked Rockhill's advice on Tibet's relationship with India, particularly "the trade convention recently concluded concerning Tibet."²³ According to Rockhill's report to U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, he gave the Dalai Lama the following reply:

I spoke to him most earnestly of the desirability for him to establish close trade relations with India and cultivate friendly relations with neighboring states, but especially with India, his closest neighbor. I assured him that as regarded the trade convention he could rest assured that

the Indian Government would adhere strictly faithfully to the engagements made in it and that he need have no fear, if both parties lived up to the terms of their argument, that it would lead to ulterior complications. He then told me that he was most desirous to return to Tibet, but that he would not be driven back there by the Chinese; he would go when he was ready, not before.²⁴

Rockhill tried to persuade him to establish a relationship with Britain and to follow the new Trade Regulation signed in April 1908 by China and Britain regarding the India-Tibet border trade. According to Thomas W. Haskins' records, the Dalai Lama answered that "he had no objection to such trade, but the boundary question was important" (THP, Notes on a journey to Wutai Shan, 1908). In other words, this conversation with Rockhill indicates that, even though the Dalai Lama was still concerned about the boundary issue with Sikkim, which had caused the conflict with Britain in 1888, he began to change his previous attitude towards Britain and was inclined to agree to a trade relationship with British India.

The Dalai Lama, who came to realize that Tibet was entering a more difficult phase, asked Rockhill to remain in contact with him and give him further advice as a friend. Rockhill told him he would be much honored to do so, but carefully made it clear that there were limitations imposed by his official position as a diplomat (WRAP: 91, Rockhill to Roosevelt, June 30, 1908). The Dalai Lama and Rockhill were mutually pleased with their encounter, but Rockhill, whose mission as a diplomat was to preserve China's territorial integrity based on his "Open Door Policy," tried to urge the Dalai Lama to follow the existing international agreements regarding Tibet, which had been established by Russia, Britain, and the Qing.

The Dalai Lama and the Qing court

After arriving in Beijing in September 1908, the Dalai Lama resided at the Yellow Temple, but he immediately encountered harsh treatment by the Qing court, which attempted to treat him as a subordinate of the Qing. The first imperial audiences with the Qing emperor Guangxu and the empress dowager Cixi were scheduled for October 6. However, these had to be postponed because of ritual protocol, for the Dalai Lama refused to perform the "three genuflections and nine prostrations" (*sangui jiukou*) as ordered by the Qing court, since his predecessor, the 5th Dalai Lama, had not been required to do so when he visited Beijing and met with the Qing emperor Shunzhi

in 1653.²⁵ The Dalai Lama asked Rockhill to come to the Yellow Temple so that he could seek his counsel. Rockhill then had his first meeting with the Dalai Lama on October 6 since they had met at Mount Wutai four months earlier, and it was conducted without the presence of Chinese officials. Rockhill stated in his report to Roosevelt: "[the Dalai Lama] was evidently irritable, preoccupied and uncommunicative" because of this unacceptable requirement and humiliating treatment from the Qing court. (WRAP: 91, Rockhill to Roosevelt, November 8, 1908)

In addition to this tough requirement regarding protocol, the Qing court issued an official notice on October 9 to each foreign legation through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, designating the days and times for visiting the Dalai Lama. It also required any foreign representatives with whom he might wish to meet to be accompanied by Chinese officials.²⁶ Under this surveillance, while continuing to arrange official meetings at the Yellow Temple (Table 2-2), the Dalai Lama attempted to contact foreign diplomats through members of his entourage. He dispatched Dorzhiev to Rockhill to ask his advice on negotiations with the Qing court concerning their recent policies toward Tibet:

Dorjjeff told me that the Dalai Lama had heard said that the Chinese Government was making certain important changes in the internal administration of Tibet. He did not know their nature and extent. He wished to know whether in my opinion it were better for him to remain in Peking until the changes were made or return at once in Lhasa. **A.** He was without any of his advisors on temporal matters: he felt unable to cope with the questions which might be raised without their assistance, but he feared to go until the program of Tibetan reforms had been settled, for he apprehended that the Chinese Government sought to curtail the temporal power he and his predecessors had wielded from before the Manchus came to the Throne of China. **B.** I replied that whatever may have been the sovereign rights of the Dalai Lama before the present dynasty came to the throne, his present position, like that of his predecessors since the middle of the eighteenth century, was that of a vassal prince whose duties, rights and prerogatives had been fixed by the succeeding emperors. I understand from the Chinese public press that the Government contemplated an administrative reform of Tibet, the divisions of the country into regular administrative districts as in China proper.... [Dorjjeff] wished to place before the Emperor two points which he considered of paramount importance. The first was that the Yellow Church should be maintained in all its honors, **C.** the

second that the right should be given him to submit directly to the throne any memorials he might wish to make, after previous arrangement with the Chinese Amban (i.e., Minister Resident) in Lhasa and without passing as at present through the hands of the Viceroy of Szechuan and the Li-fan pu (Board of Dependencies), either of which might pigeon-hole them. (WRAP: 91, Rockhill to Roosevelt, November 8, 1908.)

If we look at sections **A** and **B**, we can see a fundamental discrepancy between the 13th Dalai Lama and Rockhill concerning the Dalai Lama's authority in Tibet. The Dalai Lama thought that successive Dalai Lamas had wielded substantial temporal power from before the Qing takeover of China in the mid-seventeenth century and that the Qing authorities were now trying to undermine this authority. Rockhill, on the other hand, recognized that the Dalai Lama's authority had been merely that of "a vassal prince" since the mid-eighteenth century.

If we look at section **C**, we can see that the Dalai Lama wanted to be allowed to have a direct relationship with the emperor by having access to him without going through Qing officials and offices. This shows that the Dalai Lama did not trust the Qing officials who had implemented the "New Policies" in eastern Tibet and Lhasa, and he was seeking a solution to improve relations between the Qing and Tibet through a direct connection between the Dalai Lama and the emperor. However, on November 3 the Qing court issued an imperial edict to the Dalai Lama, saying that the Dalai Lama must send memorials to the throne through the Amban (GXLS, Vol. 34: 239–240).²⁷ Rockhill recognized that this imperial edict "probably marks the end of the temporal power of the Dalai Lama."²⁸ On November 5, the Dalai Lama dispatched his attendant to Rockhill to discuss how to find a way out of this difficulty. However, Rockhill replied:

I said that I saw absolutely no way out of the difficulty; the Dalai Lama must submit to his sovereign's command. He had received many honors, his relations with India had been satisfactorily arranged by China, the interests of the Yellow Church were safe. He must take the bitter with the sweet, and the only suggestion I could make was that he should not delay too long complying with the wishes of the Chinese Government, as it might be misunderstood and lead to further complications.²⁹

Rockhill, whose primary mission as a U.S. diplomat was to preserve the

territorial integrity of China, strongly insisted that the Dalai Lama submit to the Qing court. Furthermore, he told the Russian Minister Korostovets and the British Minister J. Jordan about “all of my conversations with the Dalai Lama’s councilors.”³⁰ In other words, Rockhill not only did not have any motivation to secure the authority of the Dalai Lama, but also attempted to keep Tibet inside existing international agreements regarding Tibet, which had been made by Russia, Britain, and the Qing.

The Dalai Lama failed to gain commitments from foreign diplomats to provide assistance to Tibet. However, his interviews and communications with Rockhill at Mount Wutai and in Beijing, as well as those with other foreign dignitaries, helped him develop an understanding of international politics and Tibet’s place in the world. In particular, the Dalai Lama’s hostility towards Britain began to abate because of advice from Rockhill and meetings with British officials as well as the Sikkim Prince (IOR/L/P&S/10/92,



Figure 2-3 The 13th Dalai Lama’s photograph sent from the 13th Dalai Lama to Rockhill in 1910

Courtesy of Houghton Library, Harvard University (WRAP: MS Am2122, 99).

2826, O'Connor's memorandum on December 1, 1908). The Dalai Lama and Dorzhiev began to consider Britain a promising supporter of Tibet against China rather than as their enemy, as I will argue in the next section.

Exile in India and the *rang btsan* of Tibet

In February 1910, several months after the Dalai Lama's return from Beijing to Lhasa, the Chinese army, which the Qing government had dispatched in order to strengthen their control in Tibet, marched to Lhasa from Chengdu in Sichuan Province. The Dalai Lama and his entourage took flight to Darjeeling in India and lived there in exile with the permission of the British Indian authorities from February 1910 to the summer of 1912.

Even after the Dalai Lama took refuge in India for the second time, the Dalai Lama and Rockhill still had correspondence with each other. In September 1910, the Dalai Lama sent a letter to Rockhill, who was now the U.S. Ambassador in Saint Petersburg (Appendix A-1). This bilingual letter consists of one sheet of paper, with the Tibetan section handwritten on the left side and the English translation on the right side, and it is affixed with the Dalai Lama's seal. The record filed in WRAP (99) reveals that the correspondence was carried out with the "assistance" of Sir Charles Alfred Bell (1870–1945), who was Political Officer in Sikkim and responsible for dealing with the Dalai Lama during this period. Bell had some remarkable Sikkimese assistants who worked as translators between English and Tibetan, as is noted in Chapter 6; I speculate that the above translation of the letter was also produced by one of these assistants. In this letter, the Dalai Lama asked Rockhill to support Tibet "[in order that] the 'independence' of Tibet [in regard to its] religious and political power will exist as before" (*bod kyi bstan srid dbang byus sngar gnas rang btsan yong ba*). In contemporary Tibetan, *rang btsan* is translated to mean nothing but "independence" in English.³¹ Although the origin of this term is unclear, during the eighth and ninth centuries the kings of Tibet were referred to as *btsan po*, indicating that the word *btsan* is closely connected to the dominance of the sovereign. Researchers have already shown that, after the collapse of the Qing, the 13th Dalai Lama and his administration often used the term *rang btsan* to explain Tibet's relationship with China (FTC: OF18601; OF18617). It has not been clarified when Tibetans began using *rang btsan* to define their political status. However, as far as I know, this letter is the first example of the use of *rang btsan* in the 13th Dalai Lama's writings about Tibet's relationship with

Qing China. It is worth noting here that the letter to Rockhill clearly reveals that the 13th Dalai Lama had already characterized Tibet’s relationship with the Qing as *rang btsan* even before the 1911 Revolution.

We should pay attention to the fact that the Dalai Lama’s concept of *rang btsan* was quite different from other cases of “independence,” such as that of Mongolia, in which the country was understood to have a relationship with the Qing emperor based on a hierarchy.³² On November 26 of the same year (October 25 of the Iron-Dog year in the Tibetan calendar), in another letter (Appendix A-2) to Rockhill via a British linguist, Edward Denison Ross (1871–1940),³³ the Dalai Lama showed strong interest in Rockhill’s well-known article, “The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Emperors of China, 1644–1908” (*T’oung-Pao*, Series III, Vol. I, No. 1, 1910). He praised it as explaining to international society that “China and Tibet had been in a Priest-Patron relationship (*rgya bod sngar nas mchod yon ’brel lugs*)” and mentioned his plan to translate it into Tibetan (*bod yig tu bsgyur nas tshang mar bkram rtsis yod*). The words “*mchod yon*” referred to the relationship between the Dalai Lamas and the Qing emperors and meant that since the seventeenth century the Dalai Lamas had always been the highest authority in Tibet, the center of Tibetan Buddhism, and the role of the Qing emperors was to protect Buddhism. Therefore, the Dalai Lama believed that Tibet must restore or re-establish the *rang btsan* that Tibet had possessed before Qing officials unilaterally attempted to destroy “the Priest-Patron relationship” and take over the political and religious power of Tibet.³⁴ In other words, the 13th Dalai Lama never regarded his relationship with previous Qing emperors as a hierarchical one. Furthermore, he did not recognize a “China” (*rgya nag*) that encompassed the lands of both the Hans and the Tibetans.³⁵

We also must not, however, ignore the fact that the 13th Dalai Lama ultimately did not translate this article into Tibetan, and he never referred to it again as far as current research shows. The main narrative that Rockhill described in this article is that the relationship between the Qing and the Dalai Lama was one of equals at the time of the 5th Dalai Lama, but the authority of the Manchus increased at the end of the eighteenth century, and the Tibetan people had been satisfied with their “autonomy” under the Manchus (Rockhill 1910: 90). The gap between the Dalai Lama’s and Rockhill’s understanding of Tibet’s historical relations with China could not be reconciled. It seems that the Dalai Lama’s admiration of Rockhill’s article was not based on a careful examination of its content, but reflects rather the Dalai Lama’s own understanding of the history of Tibet (Kobayashi 2017:

142–145).

Nevertheless, it is significant that the Dalai Lama encountered accounts of Tibetan history born of modern academic studies and attempted to share them inside Tibet through translation. In other words, the Dalai Lama, who experienced interactions with Western Orientalists as well as conflict with the Qing, began to realize that he needed to explain his understanding of Tibetan history as he saw it.

Even though the Dalai Lama failed to gain support from the U.S. government through Rockhill, it is truly remarkable that the Dalai Lama articulated the historical relationship between China and Tibet and the political status of Tibet by using the terms *mchod yon* and *rang btsan*. In other words, we can conclude that the 13th Dalai Lama's relationship with the United States was an integral part of his diplomatic strategy around the time of the collapse of the Qing dynasty.

The 13th Dalai Lama's diplomacy towards Japan

Aoki Bunkyō, Tada Tōkan, and Tsawa Tritul

Teramoto's project to invite the Dalai Lama to Japan had not succeeded when he left Beijing for Lhasa in December 1908. However, the Dalai Lama quite actively tried to establish a relationship with Japan after he took refuge in Darjeeling. On the basis of the agreement reached in Beijing in 1908 about the exchange of students between Japan and Tibet, Ōtani Kōzui sent his disciples Aoki Bunkyō 青木文教 (1886–1956) and Tada Tōkan 多田等觀 (1890–1960) to Lhasa via India. Aoki first met the Dalai Lama in March 1910 in India to give him a letter from Ōtani Kōzui, right after the Dalai Lama had taken refuge there, and developed a close relationship with the Dalai Lama before his long-term stay in Lhasa from the start of 1913 to the start of 1916 (Shirasu 2012: 104–107; Kōmoto 2013: 58–131). Tada followed suit in 1912 and studied at Sera (Se ra) Monastery in Lhasa from around the end of 1913 to the beginning of 1923 (Kōmoto 2012: 70–97).

On the Tibetan side, prior to the Japanese students' departure for India, the 13th Dalai Lama had dispatched Tsha ba sprul sku ngag dbang blo bzang (1880–1957), otherwise known as Tsawa Tritul in Japan, and his two attendants to Japan in 1911, and Aoki temporarily returned to Japan together with Tsawa Tritul. In Japanese materials, he was often referred to as a “foreign student” (*ryūgakusei* 留學生) from Tibet (Aoki 1920: 12). As this term implies, he did in fact study Japanese in Kobe during his short stay in Japan



Figure 2-4 Aoki Bunkyō

Source: Aoki (1920).

until January 1912, and Tada chaperoned him while learning the Tibetan language (Tada 2009: 19).

However, Tsawa Tritul was no mere “student.” He was, in fact, a distinguished monk who had received the highest scholarly degree, *Geshe Lharampa*, at the age of twenty-one after completing his prestigious Buddhist education at Sera Monastery in Lhasa (Ko shol grags pa ’byung gnas 1992: 1375–1376). He gained the confidence of the Dalai Lama and accompanied the Tibetan leader to Ikh Khüree, Mongolia, in 1904. According to Tada Tōkan’s memoirs, it seems that Tsawa Tritul was expected not only to study the Japanese language, but also to carry out missions personally entrusted to him by the Dalai Lama as a diplomat of Tibet (Tada 2009: 19).

It is worth noting that, after Tsawa Tritul was sent to Japan, during the next couple of years the Dalai Lama dispatched Dorzhiev to Mongolia and Russia and also sent Lungshar Dorjé Tseggyal (Lung shar rDo rje tshe rgyal, 1881–ca.1940), a Tibetan aristocrat who had won the Dalai Lama’s trust, to Britain (Ch. 6). Lungshar, along with his diplomatic duties, acted as a chaperon to the Tibetan students who were sent to London for an education, one of the modernization projects that the Dalai Lama initiated in this period. Dorzhiev and Lungshar communicated with the governments of these countries regarding Tibetan issues. These delegations showcase the Dalai Lama’s

diplomatic efforts to establish relations with foreign countries in this period.

Tibetan letters to Japan in the Aoki Bunkyō archive

The Xinhai Revolution in October 1911 and the following collapse of the Qing dynasty in February 1912 offered the 13th Dalai Lama a window to seek an opportunity to expel the Chinese army from Lhasa and return there.

We can gain a glimpse of the Dalai Lama's policy toward Japan during his exile in India from 1910 to 1913 by examining the Tibetan documents in the Aoki Bunkyō Archive (ABA). I shall focus in particular on two letters from this collection that articulate Tibet's political views and diplomatic relations between Tibet and Japan (Appendix B-1 and B-2), and I have attached transcriptions and translations of these letters in the appendices to this chapter.

First, Lamden Khenpo sent a letter from Darjeeling to Aoki in 1911, around the time when Aoki reached India, in response to a letter from Aoki (Appendix B-1).³⁶ It consists of one sheet of paper and is written in cursive script, with no seal affixed. Lamden Khenpo writes, "As for the postponement of dispatching an envoy to you, not only have Russia and Britain signed a treaty on the Tibet issue before, but also recently [the Dalai Lama and the Chief Minister] have been living in the British territory, and it could cause the British to be suspicious and cautious...." This letter indicates that the 13th Dalai Lama had a plan to send another envoy in addition to Tsawa Tritul, but he temporarily canceled it, mainly because of his concerns about the relationship with British India. Even though the Dalai Lama and his followers were in India under the protection of the British government, they had lost substantial diplomatic mileage with Britain because of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the letter clearly mentions that Japan would be one of the important countries able to support Tibetan "independence." It says, "[if] each strong country, including you (Japan), having conferred with each other, does not give up its concern for whatever good measures there are, as before, such that the independence (*sger btsan*)³⁷ of religious and political power in Tibet comes about, allow [us] to repay the kindness [of the countries] later." Lamden Khenpo's expectation that foreign powers would cooperate with each other to support the "independence" of Tibet is consistent with the contents of the Dalai Lama's letters to Britain and Russia (Chapter 6). In other words, Tibet attempted not only to build bilateral relationships with these countries, but also to form a multilateral coalition in the struggle against China.

In addition to this letter to Aoki, the ABA includes a letter written in 1913 by the 13th Dalai Lama to the Japanese emperor via Aoki during the reign of the Emperor Taishō 大正 (r. 1912–1926)³⁸ (Appendix B-2). It consists of one sheet of paper, is written in an elegant hand, and is affixed with the Dalai Lama’s seal (*tā la’i bla ma’i tham ka rgyal*) in Phakpa (’Phags pa) script.³⁹

This letter emphasizes that both Tibet and Japan are Buddhist countries, demonstrates the Dalai Lama’s appreciation of the emperor and of Honganji temple for its contribution to Buddhism, and expresses his hopes for friendship. This description of Japan as a “Buddhist” country indicates that the Dalai Lama had developed his image of Japan through his interaction with Honganji monks, as well as through information about Japan provided by them. On the other hand, we cannot overlook the fact that the Dalai Lama’s letter was not a response to the Asianism that Teramoto embraced. As far as I know, there are no Tibetan materials suggesting that the Dalai Lama sought a coalition of “Asian countries” or that he identified Tibet as a part of “Asia” or “East Asia.”⁴⁰ The Dalai Lama recognized China as a primary threat to Tibet around the 1911 Revolution, and Asianism, which promoted unification of East Asia against Western powers, might have worked against his interests.

Again, the Dalai Lama explained that Tibet was struggling with China in Eastern Tibet (Chamdo and Drayab) and asked Japan to exert its influence on China for the withdrawal of the Chinese army and to bring *rang btsan* to Tibet.⁴¹ When the Dalai Lama composed this letter, Tibet was about to participate in the conference in Simla, India, to negotiate with China by accepting the mediation of the British. This letter also referred to the Tibetan delegation, mentioning that Shatra Paljor Dorjé (bShad sgra dpal ’byor rdo rje) was the plenipotentiary. While the Tibetan army was attempting to expel the Sichuan army from Lhasa in 1912, the Chinese military launched another campaign against Eastern Tibet from Chengdu in the summer of 1912, an imminent threat to the Tibetan government, and the border dispute there eventually became the most controversial question at the Simla Conference of 1913–1914. Even though he does not make a detailed request in his letter, the Dalai Lama might have expected to gain Japan’s diplomatic or even possibly military pressure on China to defend Eastern Tibet and Lhasa from Chinese military advances.

Japanese reaction to the letters

The Dalai Lama’s efforts to enlist Japan’s support for Tibet were, ultimately, not successful in this period. Even though I have not discovered any replies

from Japan to the above two Tibetan letters of Lamen Khenpo and the Dalai Lama, the following Japanese materials indicate that the Japanese government had no intention to meet the Dalai Lama's requests.

After the 1911 Revolution broke out, the Japanese government received a letter and a statue of the Buddha that had been housed in the Potala Palace, and these were sent from the Dalai Lama to the Emperor Meiji 明治 in April 1912 through Shibata Yōjirō 柴田要治郎, the acting General Consul in Calcutta. However, Uchida Yasuya 内田康哉, the Japanese Foreign Minister, refused to present them to the emperor, most likely because he was concerned that the acceptance of the letter and gifts from the Dalai Lama would conflict with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance renewed in 1905 and re-extended in 1911, which obliged Japan to defend British India if it faced a security threat.⁴²

In addition to this, according to Shibata's report to Uchida, Shibata received a visit on May 12, 1912, from a Tibetan envoy called *Niijan* ニイジャン, who was "a merchant officially in service to the government" (*goyō shōnin* 御用商人), "managing the government's financial issues and providing advice to the government on important state affairs" (DAMFA, 1-4-1: Vol. 1, May 14, 1912, Shibata to Uchida). I am certain that he was Panda Nyima Gyeltsen (sPang mda' Nyi ma rgyal tshan), commonly known as Nyigyal and an influential merchant from the Kham region.⁴³ He escorted the Dalai Lama with his armed subordinates when the Tibetan leader went into exile in Darjeeling.⁴⁴ In his meeting with Shibata, he said that Tibet had decided to declare "independence," but it was seriously concerned about retaliation from China. He asked Shibata if Japan could make Tibet its protectorate and sell arms to Tibet through Manchuria and Mongolia. He emphasized that Tibet was desperately lacking weapons to counter Chinese advances into Tibet and also complained that Britain and Russia could not support the Tibetan military because of the restrictions imposed by the agreement between the two governments.

Shibata expressed his concern that making Tibet a protected state under Japan might contradict Japan's non-intervention policy toward the revolution in China, as well as its alliance with Britain; likewise, providing arms and ammunition also could violate the neutral position of Japan, even though Shibata did not deny the possibility that "private companies" might commit to an arms trade with Tibet (DAMFA, 1-4-1: Vol. 1, May 14, 1912, Shibata to Uchida). Uchida, on May 17, declined the requests from Nyima Gyeltsen in confidential documents to Ijūin, the Minister in Beijing (DAMFA, 1-4-1: Vol. 1, May 17, 1912). The Japanese government's foreign policy approach toward China during the 1911 Revolution was in step with

other powers such as Britain and Russia,⁴⁵ and so it was very difficult for the Japanese government to provide Tibet with diplomatic and military support without the endorsement of these neighboring powers.

Conclusion

When people talk about modern Tibetan history, there is a conventional stereotype: Tibet closed itself off from the world and was isolated from the international community in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, as I have examined in this chapter, the 13th Dalai Lama was deeply involved in international affairs and was not ignorant of the rest of the world. The Dalai Lama eventually failed to obtain aid from the United States and Japan at the time of the 1911 Revolution. However, through communication with foreign diplomats, scholars, and monks such as Teramoto and Rockhill, who were familiar with Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan language, the Dalai Lama developed his understanding of international relations surrounding Tibet and attempted to establish foreign relations with these countries.

Rockhill and Teramoto urged the Dalai Lama to establish an amicable relationship with the Qing, even though they each had quite different motives: Rockhill was a U.S. diplomat and worked to keep Tibet under Chinese control, while Teramoto was highly motivated by Asianism—based on Buddhism being practiced in common in China, Japan, and Tibet—against Russia. In particular, through an analysis of conversations between Rockhill and the Dalai Lama, we cannot see any common ground between them but rather discrepancies regarding the political status of Tibet and their understanding of Tibet’s historical relationship with the Qing. In other words, not only Russia and Britain, but also Japan and the United States tried to keep Tibet within the territory of the Qing. This contradicts the notion that “Tibetan independence” at the time of the 1911 Revolution was caused by imperialist countries, as is often supposed.

The Dalai Lama, however, did not necessarily listen to the advice of Rockhill and Teramoto. In fact, he himself chose to assert *rang btsan* to recover his authority, which the Qing was trying to undermine through its “New Policies.” He also developed his diplomacy toward foreign countries and sent his envoys according to the specificities of each country: monks such as Tsa-wa Tritul and Dorzhiev to the “Buddhist countries” of Japan, Mongolia, and Russia, and finally the secular aristocrat Lungshar to Britain, as I will discuss in Chapter 6. All of these policies constituted important components of the

Dalai Lama's entire strategy to participate in the international community.

Notes

- 1 This title was inspired by the article “The Thirteenth Dalai Lama at Wutai Shan: Exile and Diplomacy,” by Prof. Elliot Sperling (Sperling 2011). This chapter is a combination of my previous article, “The Tibet-Japan Relations in the Era of the 1911 Revolution: Tibetan Letters from the Aoki Bunkyo Archive” in Iwao and Ikeda 2018 with a newly written section regarding U.S.-Tibet relations.
- 2 Hyer 1960 & 2003 and Berry 1995 are important works based on the English and Japanese materials. Recent studies have made great strides in illuminating Japanese involvement in Tibetan issues during the first half of the twentieth century by using a wide range of valuable Japanese records. See Qing 2005, Shinohara 2009, Kōmoto 2012 & 2013, and Shirasu 2011 & 2012.
- 3 Rockhill studied Tibetan with both Henri Léon Feer and Philippe Édouard Foucaux, who published the text *Grammaire de langue Tibétaine* (Paris, 1858).
- 4 The monk who taught Rockhill colloquial Tibetan in Beijing was “Bu Lama,” who was from Goman College (gSer khog dga' ldan dam chos gling) in Amdo (Rockhill 1891: 97). Naquin 2000: 584–591 has examined the development of Tibetan Buddhist temples in Beijing during the Qing period.
- 5 On the relationship between the Japanese Buddhist reform movement and Buddhist studies in Europe after the Meiji Restoration, see Shimoda 2006: 201–207.
- 6 The most recent studies of Teramoto's engagement in Tibet issues are by Shinohara 2009, Okuyama 2011, and Shirasu 2012. Furthermore, Miyake Shin'ichirō and Kōmoto Yasuko have recently been conducting remarkable research on Teramoto's original diary and records that have not been examined in previous research (Miyake 2008; Kōmoto 2014). They shed new light on Teramoto's life as a devout Buddhist and argue for a re-thinking of researchers' typical description of Teramoto as a “politically minded” person (Hyer 2003: 72).
- 7 Successive reincarnations of Akya Khutugthu were appointed to high-ranking positions in the hierarchy of Tibetan Buddhist monks in Dolon Nor and Beijing by the Qing court, starting in the eighteenth century

(Ikejiri 2013: 202–205).

- 8 Rockhill and Schlagintweit sent a Tibetan letter drafted by Sarat Chandra Das to the 13th Dalai Lama through the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; see Schlagintweit 1904 and Kobayashi 2017: 132–135.
- 9 Quoted from English translation by Baron Alexander Staël von Holstein (1877–1937) (WRAP: 87), but have made some changes in accordance with the original Tibetan document and have inserted the original Tibetan in parentheses for some important phrases.
- 10 What is noteworthy in this letter is that, with regard to the restoration of his political power in Tibet against British influence, the Dalai Lama does not use *rang btsan* or *rang dbang*, which would often signify “independence” from the Chinese occupation around the time of the 1911 Revolution, as I will argue in the next section.
- 11 For example, the Department of State, through Joseph Choate, the U.S. Ambassador in London, expressed serious concern to the British Foreign Office about the advance of Younghusband’s mission to Lhasa, which could influence the political status of Tibet as “a part of the Chinese Dominion.” BDOW, No. 297, Lansdowne to Durand, June 29, 1904.
- 12 DAMFA, Series 1, Category 4, Section 1, Full set of documents on negotiations between Britain and the Qing about Tibet, Vol. 1 (JACAR: Ref. B03041187100: 131–137). Shimakawa mastered Chinese in Beijing and Russian in Saint Petersburg. He became a specialist on Sino-Russian relations and was appointed interpreter for the Beijing legation on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War (Kuzū 1935: 200–211). The meeting was held at the residence of Kawashima Naniwa, who was director of the Beijing Police Academy.
- 13 The political factions among Tibetan Buddhist monks, such as “Pro-Qing” and “Pro-Russia,” are merely based on Teramoto’s own observations, and the actual situation within the Dalai Lama’s entourage will need further research.
- 14 Lamen Khenpo was an outstanding scholar who made contributions to the development of medicine in Tibet in the early twentieth century and served as personal doctor to the Dalai Lama from 1897. He accompanied the Dalai Lama while he was in exile in Mongolia, China, and India from 1904 to 1912 (Ko shol grags pa ’byung gnas 1992: 111–113).
- 15 The 13th Dalai Lama’s biography briefly records that “a high-ranking Japanese Lama” (*rephing bla ma che ba*) had an audience with the Dalai Lama at Mount Wutai in the fourth month of the Earth-Monkey

- year. Judging from the period in question, this most likely refers to Teramoto's first audience with the Dalai Lama at Mount Wutai on June 2. However it is possible that the "high-ranking Japanese Lama" may refer to Ōtani Son'yu despite the fact that the actual date of his meeting was much later. See DL13N-kha: 181.
- 16 The Qing court issued an official notice on October 9 to each foreign legation through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which required any foreign representatives with whom the Dalai Lama might wish to meet to be accompanied by Chinese officials (WRAP, 91, Rockhill to Roosevelt, November 8, 1908). According to the Qing record concerning the meeting between the Dalai Lama and Ijūin, Ijūin mentioned his future expectation that the Dalai Lama would accept Japanese students to study Buddhism in Tibet, and the Dalai Lama briefly said, "I will consider and deal with it when the time comes." WD, 02-16-007-02-074, Guangxu 34/11/21 (December 14, 1908).
 - 17 According to Teramoto, the Dalai Lama had received news that the Qing was planning to establish a new "viceroys" in Tibet. OSC, 1-14-B0298-0001, Teramoto to Ōkuma, November 20, 1907. This is probably a reference to discussions inside the Qing government regarding the establishment of a new province in Tibet. Cen Chunxuan, Viceroy of Liangguang, proposed this policy on Guangxu 33/4/2 (May 13, 1907), QCBD: 921–926.
 - 18 Ibid.; WRAP: 91, Rockhill to Roosevelt, November 8, 1908.
 - 19 I have referred to the following materials: WRAP: 91, Rockhill to Roosevelt, June 30, 1908; D'Ollone 1912: 305–307; Irving 1919: 155–158; O'Connor 1931: 121–129; Teramoto 1974; Sperling 2011; Shirasu 2012; Miele 2015; PAAA: Peking II, 36, Barfus to Rex, April 22, 1908. I am grateful to Koike Motomu for providing this Oloff's report.
 - 20 I have referred to the following materials: O'Connor 1931; NZDB; WRAP: 91, Rockhill to Roosevelt, November 8, 1908; ZMWD, 2-16-007-01; Zhualuo 2016. This table does not cover all the people whom the Dalai Lama received at the Yellow Temple, and NZDB reveals that he met many dignitaries from a wide range of countries such as France, Austria, Germany, Belgium, and Portugal. Here I merely mention Americans and Japanese who met the Dalai Lama and some dignitaries from Russia and the British Empire, which were influential regarding Tibet.
 - 21 FO93/23/26, Regulation: Trade in Tibet, April 20, 1908. Through a comparative analysis of the Chinese, English, and Tibetan texts of this treaty, we can see that the Tibetan version was merely a translation from

the Chinese version.

- 22 Thomas W. Haskins, who was appointed Assistant Chinese Secretary to the American Legation in Peking, and a Tibetan monk, a member of the Dalai Lama’s entourage, who understood the Chinese language, translated the conversation between Rockhill and the Dalai Lama. WRAP: 91, Rockhill to Roosevelt, June 30, 1908.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 See Jagou 2009: 358–364. Further research is needed to determine whether in the end the Dalai Lama would kneel (*gui*) or prostrate himself (*kou*). The biography of the 13th Dalai Lama does not mention anything about this “kowtow” issue with the Qing court, and it states only that the audiences and ceremonies were carried out amicably. D13LN-Kha: 104a–108b.
- 26 Afterwards, records concerning meetings between the Dalai Lama and foreign dignitaries were reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See ZMWD, 2-16-007-01.
- 27 The Dalai Lama repeatedly asked to be permitted to have direct contact with the court (QDX: 170–171, memorial from Lifanbu, Guangxu 34/11/02, November 25, 1908). This request met with strong opposition from the Amban (QSDDX: 182–183, Lianyu to Lifanbu, Guangxu 34/11/19, December 12, 1908). There are no records that the Qing court recognized the Dalai Lama’s right to send memorials to the court. However, the 13th Dalai Lama’s biography mentions that the Emperor and Empress eventually permitted him to do so (D13N-Kha: 119–120). Thus, further verification is required as there is some incongruity between Qing records and Tibetan materials.
- 28 WRAP: 91, Rockhill to Roosevelt, November 8, 1908. In the same edict, the Qing court newly conferred a downgraded title. According to Ishihama (Ch. 4), the 13th Dalai Lama used this new title in several religious rituals in 1909, but he stopped using it after taking refuge in Darjeeling in 1910.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 The translator, who was most likely a Sikkimese assistant of Bell, did not use “independence” in his English translation (see English translation by the British Official in Appendix A-1, A-2). I discuss this in Chapter 6, examining correspondence between the British government

and the Dalai Lama.

- 32 In Mongolia, a region often mentioned in conjunction with Tibet as a key example of ethnic conflict with the Qing at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Bogd Khaan government, which was established mainly by princes from Khalkha, declared its “independence” from the Qing on December 1, 1911. After claiming their independence from the Qing, the Mongolian princes, who had previously enthroned successive Qing emperors as “Khaans” since the late seventeenth century, established their own administration and enthroned their own new Emperor (Bogd Khaan), the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu. See Nakami 1986.
- 33 This letter is also a bilingual letter like the previous letter (Appendix A-1). Ross was an eminent orientalist who was well-versed in various Asian languages such as Turkic, Sanskrit, and Tibetan. He lived in Calcutta from 1901 to 1914 and had interaction with the Dalai Lama while he was in exile in Darjeeling. See Galambos 2011.
- 34 In this letter, the Dalai Lama wrote, “recently, Chinese officials inside and outside [Tibet], just as a motive [by] which a patron eats the property of his priest, in conspiracy to just desire to rob completely the religious and political power of Tibet, which is the foundation to elaborate the Emperor’s reign” (*nye lam nas rgya phyogs phyi nang blon rigs ngan mthun gyis yon bdag nas mchod gnas kyi rgyu dngos za sems bzhin gong ma’i chab srid rgyas pa’i rtsa ba bod kyi bstan srid dbang byus rtsa ’phrog byed ’dun...*). (See Appendix A-2)
- 35 We have to note that historical documents in the Tibetan language during this period do not refer to China as the “Middle Kingdom.” The Tibetan translation for “Han” or “China” was *rgya nag*, which refers to regimes controlling China proper and does not include Tibet. Furthermore, there is in this term no connotation of cultural superiority or inferiority or any concept of center-periphery between the Hans and the Tibetans.
- 36 According to this letter of Lamen Khenpo, Aoki offered the Tibetan government some policy suggestions, divided into several items, and these suggestions were circulated among the Dalai Lama and his entourage. The letter has not yet been discovered, and it requires further investigation.
- 37 *Sger btsan* is repeatedly seen in letters from Tibet to Russia in contexts similar to those of *rang btsan* (FTC, 103–105, OF18617).
- 38 ABA, 49. This valuable Tibetan record, originally housed in the library of the University of Tokyo together with other materials of Aoki, was briefly analyzed by Hyer 2003: n. 18. After these materials were trans-

- ferred to the National Museum of Ethnology and classified as the ABA, Kōmoto 2013: 117, 128 n. 9 included a digital image of the letter and a Japanese translation by Tsumagari Shin'ichi in her book.
- 39 ABA, 48 is an envelope that contains the Tibetan letter to the Emperor. It says “[the original Tibetan letter] lent by the Imperial Household Office.” This may mean that the Dalai Lama’s letter was sent to the Imperial Household Office once, and later “lent” or returned by the office to Aoki (Kōmoto 2013: 128 n. 9).
 - 40 When and how the Tibetan people became aware of the concept of “Asia” and began to recognize Tibet as one of its countries or regions needs further study. The penetration of “Asia” as a geographical or geopolitical notion among Japanese intellectuals since the eighteenth century has been concisely examined by Yamamuro Shin'ichi (Yamamuro 2001: 31–53, 580–593).
 - 41 Aoki translated this *rang btsan* as *jishu dokuritsu* 自主獨立 in Japanese, which means “independence” (ABA, 16).
 - 42 On the second and third Anglo-Japanese Alliances, see Teramoto 1999: 53–115, 499–526; Chiba 2008: 159–163, 219–227. Shirasu has carefully examined the Japanese and English translated versions of the letter and points to the possibility that the original Tibetan documents are still housed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, something that requires further investigation (Shirasu 2011: 363–364). However, this does not mean that there was no correspondence between the Dalai Lama and the Imperial Household in Japan. According to Aoki’s account, when the Emperor Meiji passed away, the Dalai Lama sent a telegram of condolence to the Imperial Household via Ōtani Kōzui on August 7, 1912, and the Imperial Household also sent back correspondence to the Dalai Lama through Honganji temple (Aoki 1920: 22, 31–32).
 - 43 Carole McGranahan has concisely explained the growth of the Pandatsang family (sPa mda’ tshang), a Tibetan merchant family in Kham, including Nyima Gyaltzen (McGranahan 2002: 105–112).
 - 44 NAI, Foreign Department, Secret-External, Proceedings, June 1910, Nos. 276–550, Part A, No. 480, Achoons Sering, Traffic Mohurir to W. M. Crawford, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, February 25, 1910.
 - 45 Among policy-makers in the Japanese government, this policy was almost identical to that toward other regions apart from Tibet, including Manchuria, in which Japan had a vital interest. At one stage, the Office of the General Staff (*sanbō honbu* 参謀本部) was planning to place “Manchuria and Mongolia (*Man-Mō* 滿蒙)” under the protection of Japan, but this was not approved by the government. See Nakami 2013: 113–124.

CHAPTER THREE

Reigniting communication in the Tibetan Buddhist world

The Kalmyk pilgrimages in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

Takehiko Inoue

Introduction

This chapter explores the impacts of the pilgrimages made by the Kalmyk Buddhists in the 1870s and 1910s. The Kalmyks, who formed part of the Oirats, were largely composed of the Torghuts, Dörböts, Khoshuds, and Buzavs and many followed the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism. They dwelled in the Lower Volga region in the European part of Russia, where they had gradually migrated from Dzungaria in Central Asia in the first half of the seventeenth century. Even after reaching the Lower Volga steppe, however, the Kalmyks continued to visit Lhasa in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Khodarkovsky 1992). Nevertheless, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, this pilgrimage to Tibet was no longer easy to accomplish as the Kalmyk khans came into conflict with the neighboring Dzungar Khanate and could no longer safely send their deputies through Central Asia. Moreover, the Russian government often refused to allow Kalmyk pilgrims to pass through Russian Siberia. In 1771 most of the Kalmyks departed for Dzungaria in a bid to escape the control of the Russian government and establish a new government. However, en route they came under fierce attack from the neighboring Cossacks, Bashkirs, and Kazakhs and suffered catastrophic losses in terms of human life and damage to property. As a result, they had no other option but to pledge allegiance to the Qianlong emperor of the Qing dynasty (Kurapov 2007). Meanwhile, those Kalmyks who had remained in Russia strengthened their allegiance to the Russian emperors, and their Buddhist monks prayed for the well-being of the House of Romanov. However, the movements of Buddhist pilgrims

between the Volga steppe and Tibet ceased for over a century, with the final Kalmyk pilgrimage taking place in 1755–1757.

As Arash Bormanshinov, an American Kalmyk scholar, has explained, there were two stages in the resumption of pilgrimages. The first stage was the experience of visiting Ikh Khüree in Mongolia, one of the key centers in Tibetan Buddhism, and the second stage was a journey made to Lhasa in 1891, following the success of the pilgrimage to Ikh Khüree. The Kalmyks who resumed making pilgrimages were the Don Kalmyks, also known as the Buzavs, who served the Cossacks in the Russian military. Among them, four monks—Roman Manzhikov, Prin Tsedenov, Sharab Lubsan, and Dambo Ul'ianov—set out for Tibet in 1877 (Bormanshinov 1998:7–8). The accumulation of wealth from the livestock industry and advances in transportation were factors that made it possible for pilgrimages to resume, news of which soon spread throughout the Kalmyks, and subsequently Kalmyk Buddhists finally began to make pilgrimages once more. Furthermore, in 1891, an Astrakhan Kalmyk Buddhist monk named Baaza-bagshi Menkedzhuev went on a pilgrimage to Lhasa, Tibet, 135 years after the last pilgrimage by Kalmyks people to Lhasa. But what impact did his pilgrimage have on the Buddhist world, and what developments ensued as a result?

As a consequence of this 1891 pilgrimage, Tibetans, Mongols (and possibly even Buryats) *rediscovered* the Kalmyk Buddhists of European Russia, which lay far beyond the borders of Tibet and Mongolia. The Kalmyk pilgrims encountered co-believers in Tibetan Buddhism at the sacred sites of Ikh Khüree and Lhasa, and, as a result, Tibetans, Mongols, and Buryats espoused the wish to visit the Kalmyk steppe to impart their advanced expertise in Tibetan Buddhism. These new visitors in turn caused some upheaval and had various impacts among the Kalmyks and even among the Russian local authorities, while the reignited communication between Kalmyk and Tibetan Buddhists beyond the Russian empire resolved a situation in which the former had been isolated for about a century. Thus, there re-emerged a larger Buddhist cultural sphere, spread across Central Eurasia.

As for the background regarding the Russian government, it was once the case that scholars of Russian imperial history focused on the repressive and authoritarian tendencies of the Russian government in its policies toward non-Orthodox religions. However, in the past twenty years many scholars have considered the religious policies of the Russian empire to have been more "tolerant" or to have entailed the more constructive application of religious institutions so as to effectively control a multi-religious so-

ciety (Crews 2006; Dolbilov 2010; Werth 2014). As pointed out by Nikolai Tsyrempilov, a leading Buryat researcher, the Russian government patronized Buryat Buddhist monks, and therefore Tibetan Buddhism spread more readily than before among the Buryats in the Fore- and Trans-Baikal regions under the rule of imperial Russia (Tsyrempilov 2013a). In the nineteenth century some Russian officials and scholars gradually began to consider Tibetan Buddhism to be useful to accomplish their aims in East Asia. Therefore, the desire among Kalmyk Buddhists to make a pilgrimage to Lhasa was no longer met with significant barriers.

The works of Bormanshinov (1992; 1998) have provided a full picture of the Kalmyk pilgrimages, whereas we will examine complementary information in archival materials in order to gain an understanding of the social circumstances of the resumed pilgrimages. To review this transformation into and interaction with the larger Tibetan Buddhist world and its significance, this chapter first provides some background on Don Kalmyk society in which Kalmyk pilgrimages were resumed in 1877. The chapter then clarifies the background to the pilgrimage of Menkedzhuev, who visited Lhasa in 1891, the first time such an expedition had been undertaken since the mid-eighteenth century. Moreover, it is also important to look carefully at the two-way impacts of his pilgrimage on the Tibetan Buddhist world, namely, the Kalmyk travels to Tibet and Tibetan travels to the Kalmyk steppe. Thirdly, the chapter discusses the influence of the expedition to Tibet by the Don Kalmyk officer Naran Ulanov in 1904.

This chapter is based on archival materials from the National Archive of the Republic of Kalmykia (NARK) in Elista, the State Archive of Astrakhan Oblast' (GAAO) in Astrakhan, the State Archive of Rostov Oblast' (GARO) in Rostov-on-Don, the State Archive of Irkutsk Oblast' (GAIO) in Irkutsk, the Russian State Military-Historical Archive (RGVIA) in Moscow, the Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA), the Russian Geographical Society (RGO), the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IVR RAN), and the Manuscripts Division of the Russian National Library (OR RNB) in Saint-Petersburg.

The revival of pilgrimages among Kalmyks in 1877

...., during the last 30–40 years, profound changes have occurred in the way of life and psychology of the Don Kalmyks, which advantageously distinguished them from their kinsmen living in the Astrakhan and Stav-

ropol provinces. (Ul'ianov 1913: 3)

These are the words of Dambo Ul'ianov (1844–1913), a Buddhist monk from the Don Kalmyks, in late Tsarist Russia. Ul'ianov traveled twice to Ikh Khüree and once to Lhasa, and his words reflect the significant transformation that occurred among the Don Kalmyks from around the 1870s.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Kalmyks on the steppe of Southern Russia were divided mainly into two groups. The majority of Kalmyks (mainly Dörböts, Torgnuts, and Khoshuds) were under the control of Astrakhan province (*guberniia*) and Stavropol province, while the other Kalmyks (Buzavs) were officially incorporated into the Don Cossack Host in 1806 and served in the military with Cossack soldiers. The latter Kalmyks were called Don Kalmyks. These Don Kalmyks were permitted to breed livestock around the Lower Don River. In 1835 the Don Administration allocated some pasture lands to the Kalmyks, while at the same time firmly controlling the range of movement by Kalmyk pastoral people (Maksimov 2016).

It was considered that the new Russian vertical political structure would gradually build a new self-consciousness among the Don Kalmyks, distinct from that of the other Kalmyks in Astrakhan and Stavropol provinces. The new legal regulations in 1835 encouraged the Don Kalmyk pastoral people to adopt a more sedentary way of life, and as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century many had livestock houses. Moreover, the new legal regulations imposed on the Kalmyks the duties of providing forage stock for winter and cereal cropping. Nevertheless, despite the policy of sedentarization and the gradual reduction of their pastoral grasslands, the Kalmyks enjoyed self-government until the 1870s (GARO. F. 46. Op. 1. D. 800).

As noted by the aforementioned Dambo Ul'ianov, the 1870s constituted a turning point for the Don Kalmyks. In 1873, the judicial system of Don Kalmyk society was incorporated into the general Novocherkassk judicial district. With regard to administrative organization, they were registered in the *zemstvo* (an organ of rural self-governance in the Russian empire) of the 1st Don district in 1876 (Maksimov 2016). In terms of religious beliefs, meanwhile, a new active leader of the Kalmyk Buddhist community emerged. This was Arkad Chubarov (1840–1894), who was elected Lama of the Don Kalmyks in 1873, and his service in religious administration continued until his death in 1894. Chubarov promoted Russian-style education among young Kalmyks. He had personal contact with Grand Duke Nikolai

Nikolaevich (1856–1929), a grandson of Nikolai I, in 1875. As an example of their friendship, the Grand Duke ordered a set of the Tibetan Buddhist canon (Kangyur) for the Russian Embassy in Beijing, which he presented to Lama Chubarov in 1884 (RGIA. F. 821. Op. 133. D. 404; Bormanshinov 1991: 11).

In 1877, the high-ranking monk Roman Manzhikov (?–1878), who was an uncle of Arkad Chubarov, went on a pilgrimage to Tibet together with three other monks, namely, Prin Tsendenov (a relative of Manzhikov), Sharab Lubsan, and Dambo Ul'ianov (DOV 1878: 3). This was the first time in more than a century that any Kalmyks had tried to make the pilgrimage to Tibet, or even Mongolia. Ultimately, however, the Russian local authorities did not allow Roman Manzhikov and his followers to pass through the gate of Kyakhta at that time, and these monks were unable to reach Mongolia and Tibet. In the following year, 1878, the aforementioned Prin Tsendenov and Dambo Ul'ianov, who had been followers in Manzhikov's first pilgrimage, succeeded in reaching Ikh Khüree in Mongolia. There, they met the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutughtu, and Ul'ianov studied Buddhism and medicine (Bormanshinov 1998).

The success of Ul'ianov and Tsendenov in reaching Ikh Khüree had a considerable impact not only on the Don Kalmyk Buddhist community, but also on the neighboring Kalmyks in Astrakhan and Stavropol provinces. Alexei M. Pozdnev, a famous contemporary scholar of Mongolian and Buddhist studies, noted that there had not been any pilgrimages to Ikh Khüree by the Kalmyks prior to 1880. As a result of the success of Tsendenov and Ul'ianov, between four and ten Kalmyk Buddhists began to make the pilgrimage to Ikh Khüree every year (Pozdnev 1896: 563–564). The pilgrims brought back various Buddhist ritual implements and texts to the Kalmyk steppe. For example, Tseren-Bal'dzhir Dugarov, the widow of Tseren-Ubushi Dugarov, returned from her pilgrimage in 1880 with more than one thousand five hundred Buddha statues, four sets of the Kangyur, two sets of the Tengyur, many Buddhist altar fittings, and Buddhist writings. Tseren-Ubushi Dugarov was from a Kalmyk noble (*noyon*) of Kharakhus *ulus*, and during his lifetime he had profited handsomely from horse breeding (Pozdnev 1897: 122).

Background factors in the Don Kalmyks' resumption of pilgrimages before the Astrakhan Kalmyks, who formed the majority of Kalmyks, were as follows. First, the Lama of the Don Kalmyks exercised more political influence on the administration than the Lama of the Astrakhan Kalmyks. The Lama of the Don Kalmyks was also allowed to work more independently

and developed contacts with the top elites of the Russian army (Bormanshinov 1991). Secondly, the Don Kalmyks experienced the upsurge in pilgrimages that occurred among the neighboring Muslims and Russian Orthodox Christians: during the nineteenth century, the number of Orthodox pilgrims to Jerusalem and Muslim pilgrims to Mecca (Hajj) had been increasing annually (Brower 1996; Brokgauz and Efron 1897: 643–645). Thirdly, the Don Kalmyks bred horses to supply the Russian army, and the Don Kalmyk district became a leading horse-breeding area in the Don Cossack Host in the 1870s. Kim P. Shovunov explains that the number of horses bred per person among the Don Kalmyks was the highest in the whole of the Russian empire (Shovunov 1992: 180–193). Furthermore, the Don Kalmyks also achieved success in cattle and sheep breeding for the Russian meat market. They could spend large sums of money on their pilgrimages. Finally, several conditions favorable for pilgrimages were put in place. The Kyakhta trade was transformed from the 1850s to early 1860s, and it became easier to cross the border into the Qing empire (Grumm-Grzhimailo 1896: 118).¹ In 1874, the Russian government simplified the issuing of passports to Russian subjects who wished to visit China and Mongolia (GAIO. F. 24. Op. 11/3. D. 75). In 1877, the government also made it obligatory to possess a Mongolian translated version of the passport (GAIO. F. 24. Op. 11/2. D. 117), and this was no obstacle for the Kalmyks.

Thus, there were several reasons that the Don Kalmyks resumed their pilgrimages to Buddhist sacred places. The revival of the pilgrimage to Ikh Khüree led to pilgrimages to Lhasa, which was special for Tibetan Buddhists. Thus, the Tibetans eventually *rediscovered* the Kalmyk pilgrims and their yearning for Tibetan holiness from far-off European Russia.

The invitation of Agvan Dorzhiev to the Kalmyk steppe

As has been noted by previous researchers, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Kalmyk Buddhists continually made visits to and from Lhasa and became members of the "Tibetan Buddhist world," with the Dalai Lama at its pinnacle (Ishihama 2001). However, as mentioned, in 1771 the majority of Kalmyk people moved to Dzungaria, their fatherland in Central Asia, and eventually pledged allegiance to the Qing emperors. The Russian government did not allow the rest of the Kalmyk people in the Russian empire to visit Tibet through the Qing empire, and therefore the Kalmyks were outside the "Tibetan Buddhist world" for a long time.

About a century later, this smaller “Tibetan Buddhist world” without the Kalmyk Buddhists in Russia included them once again at the end of the nineteenth century. With regard to reasons for the revival of this larger “Tibetan Buddhist world,” prior research has highlighted the role of Agvan Dorzhiev (Shaumian 2000; Andreev 2003). Dorzhiev was certainly the most important figure in the history of Buddhist followers in Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and, as John Snelling notes, “Dorzhiev’s decision to visit the Kalmyks may have been in part at least inspired by a Kalmyk lama named Baza Bakshi (Baza Menkedzhuev) whom he had met some years previously in Lhasa” (Snelling 1993: 57). Here, Snelling uses the tentative “may.” However, as we will see in Dorzhiev’s own testimony, which is held in the National Archive of the Republic of Kalmykia (Elista), his visit to the Kalmyk steppe was, in fact, due to an invitation by the Kalmyk monk.

Baaza Menkedzhuev (Mönköjuev, 1846–1903) was a high-ranking monk in Dundu temple of Baga Dörböt *ulus* on the Kalmyk steppe. Although he was from the Kalmyk estate of commoners (*prostoliudiny*), there were several monks from his family. Menkedzhuev was a scholar-monk and was also familiar with Tibetan medicine. He went on a pilgrimage with two followers between 1891 and 1894. Tseren-David Tundutov (1860–1907), the Dörböt *noyon*, that is, a ruling Kalmyk noble, begged Menkedzhuev to visit Lhasa and pray there, for the *noyon* Tundutov himself, the *ulus*, and the public (*noyan nutug oloni tölöö*) (Pozdneev 1897: 2). Menkedzhuev researched the last pilgrimage by Donduk Dashi khan (Donrob Arshi khan) in 1755 (1756) in both oral accounts and books in the library at Dundu temple and found that the last pilgrimage had taken six months to complete. However, details of the pilgrimage, including the route to Tibet, were not specified. Therefore, Menkedzhuev followed the route by way of Siberia. His pilgrimage was facilitated by economic success in livestock breeding in Baga Dörböt *ulus*, in particular the breeding of horses for the Russian military, and the development of river steamship lines. Menkedzhuev traveled to Lhasa, where he met the 13th Dalai Lama, and after his return home in 1895, he became abbot of Dundu temple.

In spring of 1898, Agvan Dorzhiev unexpectedly visited the Kalmyk steppe. Dorzhiev was the greatest Buryat monk, having attained the highest title of a Tibetan scholar (Professor of Buddhist Metaphysics, or Tsanit Khenpo) in Lhasa, and he was also one of the 13th Dalai Lama’s teachers. He was best known as a bridge-builder between the Russian and Tibetan

governments (RGVIA. F. 165. Op. 1. D. 5304a). Dorzhiev explained the reason for his visit to the Kalmyk steppe in the presence of the Russian local officials. According to his explanation, a Kalmyk monk of Dundu temple of the Baga Dörböt *ulus*, whom Dorzhiev had met in Lhasa, had invited him to the Kalmyk steppe (NARK. F. 9. Op. 2. D. 77). This Kalmyk monk can be identified as Baaza-bagshi Menkedzhuev, the monk who had resumed Kalmyk pilgrimages to Lhasa.

Dorzhiev received an enthusiastic response from the Kalmyk Buddhists of the Kalmyk steppe, and their enthusiasm was so great as to create strong fear amongst the Russian local authorities. As a result, the Astrakhan governor Mikhail A. Gazenkampf (1843–1913) issued a secret order to expel Dorzhiev from the Kalmyk steppe and to observe both his activities and the response to them among the Kalmyk Buddhists. However, apprehensions grew among low-level officials concerning an unexpected dangerous and out-of-control situation that might be caused by expelling Dorzhiev, and they anxiously asked for Dorzhiev to be given a free hand. Eventually, Dorzhiev was allowed to travel freely around the Kalmyk steppe. He changed the large sums of cash donated by Kalmyk followers into gold blocks and returned to Tibet (NARK. F. 9. Op. 2. D. 77).

The travels of Dorzhiev on the Kalmyk steppe led to another Kalmyk pilgrimage to Tibet. Ovsh M. Norzunov (Ovche Narzounof, 1874?–1920s?) is well known as one of the first photographers of Lhasa. He was born into the family of a Kalmyk lesser noble *zayisang* of Iki Dörböt *ulus* in Stavropol province. He studied Russian in local schools and worked as a translator in local judicial organizations. When Norzunov consulted Dordzha Bad'minov, a colleague who was a Buddhist monk, about visiting Mongolia and Tibet, Dorzhiev was visiting the Kalmyks in Iki Dörböt *ulus*. Norzunov wrote about his meeting with Dorzhiev in a document that is kept in the archives of the Russian Geographical Society:

When I (Norzunov) sit down, Dorzhiev asks (*sic*) me, "What is your name? How old are you? How many are in your family? What is your intention? Do you live comfortably?" I answered him with details of my life as described above and added that I have a mother, a grandmother, a wife, and a 2-year-old son.

Dorzhiev asks (*sic*), "Will you leave your family behind?" I answer again, "I have cousins on my mother's side who will keep an eye on my family." Dorzhiev said, "Your goal of worshipping at holy places

and looking at secular life is good. You know, I have come from Lhasa, having received three years leave from the Dalai Lama, to visit my relatives. As it happens, I need someone, and so I will take you with me. Your money will then be sufficient for you to worship [at holy places].” I (Norzunov) thanked them for their compassion and asked, “When will we get ready for the journey?” They (Dorzhiev and his follower Buryat Dyrgyl) said, “[We] will go to Paris and come back after two months, so get ready then.” The next day, Hambo Lama (Dorzhiev) set out by train. (RGO 90: Op. 1. D. 42. L. 5a–6b)

Norzunov and Dorzhiev departed for Siberia at the end of July 1898 and arrived in Ikh Khüree in September. There Dorzhiev sent Norzunov with five boxes of gifts for the Dalai Lama. Together with two monks, one of whom was Purdash Dzhungruiev (Norzunov writes “Burdash Dzhongruiev”), a Kalmyk from Astrakhan province, Norzunov headed for Tibet in October. They traveled in winter to avoid the risk of robbers. They arrived in Lhasa on March 27, 1899, and met the Dalai Lama on April 3. At their meeting the Dalai Lama gave Norzunov a letter for Dorzhiev and sent him back to Ikh Khüree by sea. Norzunov crossed the Tibetan border and boarded a steamship in Calcutta for Beijing. He reached Ikh Khüree on July 23 (RGO 90: Op. 1. D. 42. L. 40–55b). Thus, as a consequence of visiting the Kalmyk steppe, Dorzhiev found a loyal assistant in Norzunov, who could speak both Kalmyk (a Mongolic language) and Russian and move more freely around Eurasia.

Many other monks from Tibet, Mongolia, and even Buryatia began to visit the Kalmyk steppe. Some monks wanted to make a quick trip on their way to hot-spring treatment in Caucasia, while one group tried to carry six metal Buddha statues weighing several hundred kilograms. The numbers participating in Kalmyk pilgrimages increased, and some even studied in Mongolia and Tibet. Furthermore, in the spring of 1906—that is, after Tsar Nikolai II’s Decree on Religious Tolerance (April 17, 1905)—Dorzhiev, together with Tibetan and Buryat monks, started to establish a Buddhist college (*tsannid chöra*) with a Tibetan educational system and accommodation for monks and students at Amta-Burgusta in Baga Dörböt *ulus* on the Kalmyk steppe. The Buddhist college on the Kalmyk steppe was completed in 1908, with the permission of the Astrakhan governor. Moreover, in 1912 Badma Bovaev (1880–1917), a Kalmyk Geshe Lharampa who trained in the Gomang Department of Drepung Monastery in Tibet, assumed the head of

the Buddhist college (AV IVR RAN. F. 28. Op. 1. D. 37; Dordzhieva 2001: 18–19). Thus, the Kalmyk Buddhist community was integrated into the Tibetan Buddhist world.

Naran Ulanov's expedition to Lhasa in 1904

Naran Ulanov's expedition (January 14, 1904–April 1906) is well known from previous works by A. Andreev, A. Bormanshinov, and others (Bormanshinov 1992; Andreev 1997; Schorkowitz 2001: 281; Bakaeva and Chemidova 2010). His secret mission to Tibet failed to acquire the sought-after information, largely because Ulanov himself died of an endemic disease en route. Nevertheless, his colleagues continued on to Lhasa before returning to Russia.

Naran Ulanov (1867–1904) was a member of the Buzavs, that is, the Don Kalmyks who were registered in the Cossack estates, and served as a Cossack Junior Esaul (*Pod'esaul*, equivalent to Kapitan) in the First Don Cossack regiment of Generalissimo Aleksandr Suvorov, Count of Rymnitsky and Prince of Italy, in Moscow. In 1901, he was sent to Saint Petersburg as an interpreter for the Tibetan delegation. Ulanov himself explained that this work led him to develop a great deal of interest in Tibet (RGVIA. F. 401. Op. 5/929. D. 124). On this point, Andreev points out that Ulanov might already have seen Agvan Dorzhiev in 1898 (Andreev 1997: 28).

Ulanov applied to the General Staff to be dispatched to Lhasa, and the General Staff began to train him so that he could be a useful surveyor in Tibet. On August 5, 1902, Ulanov was enrolled into the Main Directorate of the General Staff as a free student for the 1902–03 school calendar at Nikolai Academy of the General Staff. In connection with the training plan for Ulanov and his expedition, Peter P. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii (1827–1914), a famous Russian geographer who managed the Imperial Russian Geographical Society for a long time and supported many expeditions to Inner Asia made by Nikolai M. Przheval'skii (1839–1888), Peter K. Kozlov (1862–1935), and others, wrote that it was necessary to study Tibet from all aspects and search for a route between Tibet and Central Asia. Moreover, Semenov-Tian-Shanskii explained that it made the expedition more meaningful that the Kalmyks were both Asian people and Buddhists (RGVIA. F. 447. Op. 1. D. 77. L. 2).

Interestingly, the famous Buddhologist Sergei F. Ol'denburg (1863–1934) engaged in training Ulanov. Ulanov met the young Buryat scholars Bazar B.

Baradiin (1878–1937) and Tsyben Zh. Zhamtsarano (1881–1942), another famous Buddhologist Fedor I. Scherbatskoi (1866–1942), and others in the group associated with Ol'denburg. Under the guidance of Ol'denburg, Ulanov studied the geography, history, ethnography, and travel writings of Central Asia, especially Tibet. The linguist and Orientalist Vladislav L. Kotvich (1872–1944) gave Ulanov a Tibetan grammar by Isaak Jakob Schmidt and taught him Mongolian. The famous explorer Petr Kozlov directly influenced Ulanov and gave him much advice about the expedition to Tibet (Dmitriev 2013: 51). Nevertheless, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that the training of Ulanov as an explorer was neither systematic nor consistent. In fact, the brief training that Ulanov received could not even compare to that received by the Buryat scholars and explorers Gombojab Ts. Tsybikov (1873–1930), Bazar Baradiin, and Tsyben Zhamtsarano (Tolz 2011).² Moreover, Ulanov was far less sophisticated than the indigenous explorers of British India (Raj 2007: 223–234).

The General Staff were desperate for information about Tibet in the politically tense atmosphere between Great Britain and Tibet. Andreev (Andreyev) expresses the opinion that “This route was commonly used in the past by Kalmyk (Oirat) Buddhists, who were now (since the 1890s) seeking to revive their lost connection with Tibet” (Andreev 2003: 42). In this regard, the handwritten map (non-numbered sheet between L. 19 and L. 20) in the Russian State Military-Historical Archive shows two routes. The first is the very route through Khorgos to Lhasa that Andreev describes, while the second is probably the return route from Lhasa through Kashgar and back to Russian Central Asia. Therefore, one of the objectives of Ulanov's expedition was to explore the two routes in Central Asia (RGVIA. F. 447. Op. 1. D. 77).

Aleksei Kuropatkin, the Minister of War, received information about the highly strained situation in Tibet and decided to send Ulanov and his supporter Dambo Ul'ianov, who had already been to Ikh Khüree twice. To do so, Kuropatkin temporarily dismissed Ulanov from military service owing to “family circumstances.” On January 14, 1904, Tsar Nikolai II hastily canceled his schedule and had an audience with the two Kalmyks in complete secrecy. Kuropatkin demanded that the General Staff completely conceal all information about the meeting, especially from the newspapers (RGVIA. F. 447. Op. 1. D. 77. L. 25–27b).

The date of departure was February 6, 1904. Ulanov, Ul'ianov, and Lidzhi Sharapov, who was from same kin, travelled to Baku by railway and

then crossed the Caspian Sea to Krasnovodsk (present-day Turkmenbashi) by steamboat. They then proceeded to Tashkent by railway. Ulanov rode by horse to Khorgos and passed through customs. They exchanged Russian rubles for Chinese taels and rented horses. However, their route was obstructed by a winter storm, and Ulanov died of an endemic disease in the vicinity of Karasahr in October 1904. Ul'ianov and the remaining members of the party finally succeeded in reaching Lhasa in June 1905, by which time the 13th Dalai Lama had already fled to Ikh Khüree in Mongolia. Having lost their leader Ulanov, who had received training as an explorer, the remaining Kalmyks in the expedition were unable to acquire the "beneficial" information that the Ministry of War and Imperial Russian Geographical Society had demanded. However, the experience of the pilgrimage to Lhasa encouraged the Don Kalmyk Buddhist monk Dambo Ul'ianov to write a book entitled *The Prophecies of the Buddha about the House of Romanov and a Short Essay on My Journey to Tibet in 1904–1905*, which was published in Saint Petersburg in 1913. This book would be an ideological milestone for Kalmyk Buddhist monks in the Russian empire (Ul'ianov 1913).

What happened to the integrated Tibetan Buddhist world after these Kalmyk pilgrimages? The reignited interaction among Tibetan Buddhists was maintained until about 1930. New materials in the State Archive of Astrakhan Province may suggest another possibility.

On August 6, 1914, the Astrakhan Governor Ivan N. Sokolovskii (1858–1917) received a telegram from the Ministry of Internal Affairs explaining that Chinese traders were suspected of engaging in espionage for Germany, which had declared war on Russia on August 1. At this point, Sokolovskii issued an order to the local police that they check all "Chinese" traders in the Astrakhan province, as a result of which more than seventy Chinese traders in Astrakhan were detained and investigated. Among them, a Chinese trader from Shanxi province³ was detained beside the Volga River in Chernoiar district (in present-day Volgograd province) on August 27, 1914. He stayed at Manlan temple of Baga Dörböt *ulus* on the Kalmyk steppe on July 20, 1914, and had the following belongings in his possession:

Money – 551 rubles 72 kopeks; Notebook – 1; Metal watches with chain – 1; Bronze statues of *Burkhan* [Buddha] – 1; Images of *Burkhan* on paper (60 × 90 cm) – 75; Images of *Burkhan* on quarto (45 × 30 cm) – 112; Images of *Burkhan* on paper (*polulista*) – 75; Images of *Burkhan* on pieces of paper – 15; Small packs of medicine – 3; Steel balls – 1;

These Chinese traders received passports from the Central Diplomatic Board of the Heilongjiang Railway at Harbin and travelled to Astrakhan via Kyakhta (GAAO. F. 1. Op. 2. D. 1381). Thus, the resumption of pilgrimages also influenced the market for Buddhist statues and thangkas.

Conclusion

There are three main points to this chapter. The first is that the Don Kalmyks, who formed a small branch of the Kalmyks, had a significant impact on Kalmyk Buddhist communities as a whole. The “first” pilgrimage by Dambo Ul’ianov to Ikh Khüree prompted a new movement in the overall Kalmyk society.

Secondly, the pilgrimage by the Kalmyk monk Menkedzhuev paved the way for reignited Buddhist interaction in Central Eurasia. As a result of his pilgrimage, Tibetan Buddhists *rediscovered* the Kalmyk Buddhists, and the latter were integrated once again into the Tibetan Buddhist world. Agvan Dorzhiev influenced Kalmyk society in many ways. He invited many young Kalmyk Buddhists to Tibet. One such person was Obshe Norzunov, who first made his name in photography in Tibet (RGO. R. 90. Op. 1. D. 42). Another was Geshe Wangyal (1901–1983), who could not return home during the time of the USSR and subsequently contributed to the spread of Buddhism in America.

Thirdly, the new historical materials in Astrakhan suggest that this integration of the larger Tibetan Buddhist world possibly allowed the Kalmyk Buddhists to connect with the market for Buddhist ritual implements in China on the eve of World War I. Traders in these implements from Harbin and Shanxi provinces in China *discovered* the Kalmyk Buddhists in European Russia. This topic may be of interest for new research on the history of communication among Buddhists in Eurasia.

Previous researchers of the history of Buddhist followers in the Russian empire, myself included, have concentrated on Mongolian-speaking Buddhists in the Russian empire, that is, the Buryats and Kalmyks. This chapter suggests that it is necessary not only to explore in greater depth topics related to the Buryats and Kalmyks, but also to turn our attention beyond the Russian empire. As Dambo Ul’ianov wrote, “our eyes” spontaneously turn “to Asia as the cradle of Buddhism” (Ul’ianov 1913). The revival of Kalmyk pilgrimages was led by a strong yearning to move from the periphery to the

center.

Notes

- 1 In 1871 the Russian government considered the need to send to Siberia a Kalmyk translator, especially a Kalmyk monk who was literate in Kalmyk and could speak Russian, to facilitate border trade and be prepared for unforeseeable circumstances in the border region. However, the need was deemed to be less than urgent (RGVIA. F. 400. Op.1 D. 275).
- 2 Kozlov recommended that Ulanov go to the Pulkovo Astronomical Observatory to study astronomy and master the art of photography. However, the Pulkovo Astronomical Observatory pointed out that Ulanov lacked a basic knowledge and understanding of astronomy, and was unwilling to take on the training of Ulanov (RGVIA. F. 447. Op. 1. D. 77. L. 24–24b).
- 3 The trader might have something to do with Wutaishan, which was a large Buddhist sacred site in Shanxi province (Charleux 2015). However, this is an issue for the future.

CHAPTER FOUR

Parting with the Qing emperor and taking a new title

Yumiko Ishihama

On February 13, 1913, soon after the 13th Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa from British India, where he had been in exile since 1910, he issued a famous proclamation to all people residing in Tibet, including monks, laymen, and foreign ambassadors. The gist of the preamble was as follows: “The relationship between the Qing emperor and the Dalai Lama is a patron-priest relationship based on the Buddhist faith. But in recent years the Han Chinese army from Sichuan and Yunnan provinces has invaded Eastern Tibet and finally occupied Lhasa. By the force of bad karma, the Qing dynasty has fallen and the Han Chinese army occupying Tibet was expelled. Now you people should fulfil the following obligations....” This proclamation has been called “Declaration of Independence” by Tsipton Shakabpa, a former Chief Accountant of the Tibetan government,¹ and many people have thought that the Dalai Lama parted ways with China as a result of this declaration after the collapse of the Qing dynasty.

However, in 1909, four years before this proclamation, the 13th Dalai Lama had officially broken off relations with the Qing dynasty by assuming a new title in place of the title that had been conferred by the Shunzhi emperor in 1653, and in 1913 he stopped performing the New Year prayers for the longevity of the Chinese emperor and the prosperity of his government. We can confirm his historical break with the Qing by examining changes in the way in which the 13th Dalai Lama referred to himself and to the Qing emperor.

Some good information on changes in the Dalai Lama’s attitude toward the Qing emperor and his government can be gleaned from some writings in his collected works. First of all, the collected eulogies annually offered

to Palden Lhamo (dPal lhan lha mo),² the tutelary deity of successive Dalai Lamas, in D13S-ti³ is the most useful, since each eulogy includes the date of its composition. The collected *rtsa tshig* (decrees) in D13S-ji, collected *bsngo smon* (dedication prayers) in D13S-nyi, and collected records of the consecration of statues, scriptures, and stupas in D13S-phi are also informative. The last in particular are the most useful after the collected eulogies, since most of the prayers bear a date.

In this chapter, by examining examples of designations used in these works, we will shed light on changes in the Dalai Lama’s attitude toward the Chinese government.

Changes in the Dalai Lama’s self-designations

As is well known, in the early Qing dynasty the Shunzhi emperor invited the 5th Dalai Lama to Beijing in 1652, paid his respects to him, and conferred a title on him when he returned to Tibet in 1653. In Chinese this title was *Xitian dashan zizaifo suoling tianxia shijiao putong Wachila Danla Dalai Lama*, and in Tibetan it was *Nub kyi lha gnas ches dge ba bde bar gnas pa’i sangs rgyas bka’ lung gnam ’og gi skye ’gro thams cad bstan pa gcig tu gyur ba ’gyur med rdo rje ’chang rgya mtsho’i bla ma*, which means “By the Edict of Buddha, Who is Most Virtuously and Peacefully Residing in the Divine Realm in the West: Unchanging Vajradhara Ocean⁴ Lama Who United All the People in the World Under One Doctrine.” This wording of the Tibetan title can be found in an edict written in 1678 on the wall of the Potala Palace affixed with the 5th Dalai Lama’s handprint⁵ and in the 5th Dalai Lama’s autobiography (D5N-1: 209a6–b1). It is probable that the Tibetan title was translated literally from the Chinese title, since it is difficult to make sense of it by itself without comparing it with the Chinese title.

The first part of this title—*Xitian dashan zizaifo suoling tianxia shijiao*—is the same as the title conferred by the Yongle emperor on the 5th Karmapa Deshin Shekpa (De bzhin gshegs pa) in 1405 (Ishihama 2015: 180), while the final part, corresponding to “Vajradhara Dalai Lama,” is the same as the title Altan Khan offered to Sönam Gyatso, who was later known as the 3rd Dalai Lama.⁶ This would suggest that the Shunzhi emperor intended to continue the relationship that the Ming emperors and Mongol princes had with the Dalai Lama.

When Altan Khan offered Sönam Gyatso the title “Vajradhara Dalai Lama” together with a golden seal, the Dalai Lama also conferred on Altan

Khan the title of *Cakravarti* King, which signified a universal Buddhist king, together with a silver seal (Ishihama 2011: 47–48). It is obvious from the materials of the seals that the Dalai Lama was more revered than Altan Khan, but the mutual exchange of titles would suggest a certain parity between the two parties. On the other hand, the Shunzhi emperor's unilateral conferral of a title on the Dalai Lama might imply that the Dalai Lama was inferior to the Qing emperor.

In this connection, the 13th Dalai Lama made the interesting comment that when the 5th Dalai Lama visited Beijing in 1652–1653, the Dalai Lama and Qing emperor exchanged titles with each other and respected each other as patron and priest. In concrete terms, the Dalai Lama gave the Shunzhi emperor the title “Mañjuśrī Great Emperor, Appointed by Heaven,” while the Shunzhi emperor conferred on the Dalai Lama the title *Nub phyogs mchog tu dge ba'i zhing gi rgyal bstan yongs rdzogs gyi bdag po badzra dhara tā la'i bla ma*.⁷ If this claim were supported by contemporary sources, the meeting of the 5th Dalai Lama and Shunzhi emperor in 1652 ought to be regarded not just as a ceremony based on Sinocentric thought that made the Dalai Lama a neighboring ruler subordinate to the Chinese emperor, but also as a Buddhist ceremony that made the Qing emperor a patron of the Dalai Lama.

By way of reference, it may be noted that later, in the eleventh month of Kangxi 29 (1690), the 5th Dalai Lama tried to offer the Qing emperor the title of “Most Sacred Mañjuśrī Khan Who Loves All Sentient Beings, Establishes the Law, and Propagates Virtue” on the pretext of celebrating the Qing victory over Galdan Boshugtu Khan in the battle of Ulan Butung.⁸ In spite of being turned down by the Qing emperor, this offer suggests the possibility that the 5th Dalai Lama had conferred a title on the Shunzhi emperor earlier in 1653.

Table 4-1 gives a word-for-word comparison of the Chinese, Tibetan, Mongolian, and Manchu versions of the 1653 title. On the basis of this table, a comparison of the Tibetan and Chinese titles makes it clear that there is no Chinese equivalent of the word *bka' lung*, meaning “edict.” The absence of this word greatly changes the meaning of the title. If we follow the Tibetan version, which includes the word “edict,” it is not the Qing emperor but Buddha in the west who endows the Dalai Lama with the authority to unify Buddhists throughout the world. If, on the other hand, we follow the Chinese version without the word “edict,” the Vajradhara Dalai Lama and Buddha in the west appear to be on a par with each other and the agent en-

Table 4-1 Titles of the Dalai Lama in Chinese, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Manchu

1	Chinese in 1653 edict	Chinese	1. xi 西	2. tian 天	3. da 大	4. shan 善	5. zizai 自在	6. fo 仏
2	Mongolian in 1653 and 1657 edict	QDH: 10; XLD: 35-1	1. baragun	2. etegedlin	3. ülenji	4. sayin	5. amurulang tu	6. burqan u/i
3	Tibetan in 1653 and 1678 edict	DSN-1, 209a6-bl; Zhongguo xizang budalagong guanlichu 2000: no. 46, line 2	1. nub kyi	2. lha gnas	3. che	4. dge ba	5. bde bar gnas pa'i	6. sangs rgyas
4	Tibetan in 1657 draft edict	XLD: 35-2	1. nub	2. phyogs	4. rab tu	5. bde ba'i		
5	Mongolian in 1724 seal	XLD, no. 71	1. örün-e	2. jüg ün	3. yeke	4. öljetii	5. erketii	6. burqan u
6	Tibetan in 1724 seal	XLD, no. 71	1. nub	2. phyogs	3. mehog tu	4. dge ba'i zhing gi	6. dbang	5. rgyal
7	Manchurian in 1724 seal	QDH: 54	1. wargi	2. abkai	3. amba	4. sain	5. jingara	6. focihi i
	7. suoling 所領	8. tianxia 天下	9. shi 釋	10. jiao 教	11. putong 普通	12. wachila danla 瓦赤拉旦喇	13. dalai 達賴	14. lama 喇嘛
	10. ergilegsen	7. deleketi deki	8. burqan u	9. surayuli yi	11. qamuy i medegci	12. wajir-a dar-a	13. dalai	14. lam-a
7. bka' lung	10. gcig tu gvur pa	8. gnam 'og gi skye 'gro thams cad		9. bstan pa	11. gyur med	12. rdo rje 'chang	13. ryga msho'i	14. bla ma
	10. giso bor byed pa	3. sa steng kun la	6. sangs rgyas kyi	9. bstan pa'i bya ba	11. thad mkhyen pa	12. vajra dha ra	13. ta la'i	14. bla ma
6, 5. orun	10. ergilegci	7. deleketi deki-u	8. burqan u	9. shasin i	11. qamuy i medegci	12. wacira-a dar-a	13. dalai	14. blam-a
	10. bdag po	7. sa steng gyi	8. rgyal	9. bstan yongs kyi	11. thams cad mkhyen pa	12. badzra dhi'ara	13. 'ra la'i	14. bla ma
		7. abkai fejergi	8. focihi i	9. tacilhiyan be	10. aliha eiten be saca	11. wajira dara	12. dalai	13. lama

dowing the authority is the conferrer of this title, namely, the Qing emperor.

If one follows the Tibetan translation, some may question whether Buddha, who was born around 500 B.C., could have granted the 5th Dalai Lama the authority to unify Buddhists in the seventeenth century. In response to this question, there is a famous legend attributed to the *Za ma tog bkod pa'i mdo*.⁹ According to this legend, just before Buddha entered into nirvana, his disciples pleaded with him not to die because the Snowy Land (i.e., Tibet) had not yet been converted to Buddha's teaching, whereupon Buddha replied, "The bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara will convert the Snowy Land." Since the 5th Dalai Lama was already renowned as an incarnation of the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara in the seventeenth century, it would have been accepted by many people that the Dalai Lama presided over Buddhism in the Snowy Land by order of Buddha. In short, the title does make sense.

A new translation by the Kangxi emperor

In 1720, after many twists and turns, the Kangxi emperor sent a combined Qing-Kökenuur Mongol army to Lhasa to support the enthronement of the 7th Dalai Lama, and at the New Year ceremony of the Wood-Dragon Year (1724) the emperor conferred on the 7th Dalai Lama a newly cast golden seal. This seal was inscribed with a new translation of the Tibetan title of the 5th Dalai Lama that had been conferred by the Shunzhi emperor, namely, "Victorious King Living in the Supreme Virtuous Paradise in the West, Mas-



Figure 4-1 The 1724 title dedicated to the 7th Dalai Lama by the Qing emperor

Source: Ou (1991: 59).

ter of All Buddhist Doctrine on Earth, Omniscient One, Vajradhara Dalai Lama's seal."¹⁰ This new translation was used until the end of the nineteenth century.

When the new translation is compared with the old translation, it is evident that the word "edict" is missing in the new translation, and as a result the authority for the title was attributed not to Buddha in the west, but to the Qing emperor.¹¹ On the basis of these facts, let us now examine the way in which the 13th Dalai Lama referred to the title deriving from Qing emperors at turning points in his relationship with the Qing emperor.

Table 4-2 lists in chronological order the self-designations used by the 13th Dalai Lama in his various writings. It is obvious that immediately after his enthronement in 1895 he used the authority of the Qing emperor to consolidate his power. In examples 1–6, the Dalai Lama issued edicts to his subjects using Shunzhi's original title in the new translation. In particular, in examples 3–7 the title is preceded by the words "by the edict of the Great Emperor."

In fact, in his enthronement year the Dalai Lama proudly proclaimed that he had entered into a relationship with "the Lord of Jambudvīpa and Kalpa, by Heaven Appointed, Brahma on Earth" (i.e., Qing emperor), as priest and patron, just like the sun and the moon in the sky, and in response to his worldview the Qing emperor authorized him as "a master of all the teachings of Buddha and as the crown ornament of samsara and nirvana," offering him a golden edict and a jade seal as tokens of respect.¹²

However, in 1904, when the British army led by Colonel Younghusband invaded Lhasa and the Dalai Lama headed for Mongolia asking for Russian support, the relationship between the Dalai Lama and Qing emperor deteriorated rapidly. The Qing deprived the Dalai Lama of the above title, accusing him of having left Tibet without the emperor's permission, and installed the Panchen Lama in the Dalai Lama's place.¹³

Four years later the Dalai Lama headed for Beijing to negotiate the status of Tibet, especially to seek the withdrawal of Chinese troops who had burned and plundered monasteries in Eastern Tibet. In November 1908, the 13th Dalai Lama made an offering for the Empress Dowager's longevity on her birthday. According to the diary of Teramoto Enga, a Japanese monk and agent, aides of the 13th Dalai Lama visited the Japanese Legation in Beijing to ask whether they ought to protest against the downgraded treatment of the Dalai Lama by the Chinese court compared with the 5th Dalai Lama's treatment in 1652. Teramoto persuaded them not to make a complaint about

Table 4-2 Dalai Lama's self-designations and the authority behind them

Year of conferral	Dalai Lama's self-designation	Conferrer	Source
1 1653	Old translation of Shunzhi's title	Buddha	see Table 4-1: no. 3
2 1724	New translation of Shunzhi's title	Emperor	see Table 4-1: no. 7
3 <i>sa khyi</i> (1898)	New translation of Shunzhi's title	Emperor	13th Dalai Lama's edict to all Tibetan people (D13S-ji: 297-7)
4 <i>sgyur byed</i> (1899)	New translation of Shunzhi's title	Emperor	13th Dalai Lama's edict to all Tibetan people (D13S-ji: 272-1-2)
5 <i>sa phag</i> (1899)	New translation of Shunzhi's title		13th Dalai Lama's edict to Sera Monastery (D13S-ji: 367-6-368-1)
6 <i>lcags glang</i> (1901)	New translation of Shunzhi's title	Emperor	Regulations written by 13th Dalai Lama for Chensal Monastery (D13S-chi: 265-1-2)
7 <i>sa bya</i> (1909)	Old translation of Shunzhi's title and title offered by Guangxu in 1909	Emperor	Regulations written by 13th Dalai Lama for Kumbum Monastery (D13S-ji: 310-6-311-1)
8 <i>sa bya</i> (1909)	1909 title offered by Tibetan gods and people	Buddha	13th Dalai Lama's golden seal offered by Tibetan gods and people in 1909 (Ou 1991: 64)
9 1909?	1909 title offered by Tibetan gods and people	Buddha	Preface of Padmaraka Garland (D13S-ti: 595-7-596-1)
10 1909?	1909 title offered by Tibetan gods and people	Buddha	Biography of 13th Dalai Lama (D13N-kha: 174-1-2)
11 <i>chu glang</i> (1913)	1909 title offered by Tibetan gods and people	Buddha	13th Dalai Lama's edict to all Tibetan people (Shakabpa 1976: 219-220; Goldstein 1989: 60-61)
12 <i>bag med</i> (1913/4)	1909 title offered by Tibetan gods and people	Buddha	13th Dalai Lama's edict to all Tibetan people (D13S-ji: 285-6-7)
13 <i>chu po spre</i> (1932)	1909 title offered by Tibetan gods and people	Buddha	13th Dalai Lama's edict to all Tibetan people (D13S-ji: 332-1-2)

the Qing government's attitude because of the need to maintain unity in the Buddhist world (see Chapter 2; Teramoto 1974: 289–291).

But difficulties continued for the Dalai Lama and his entourage. The Qing court conferred on the 13th Dalai Lama at Kumbum Monastery a title that had been downgraded from that of the 5th Dalai Lama. It is worth noting that the derogatory words "*cheng shun zan hua*", which mean "Faithful and Obedient to the Emperor's Edification," were added to the new title, while the honorific title "Master of Buddhist Doctrine on Earth" (*suoling tianxia shijiao*) was removed.

How did the 13th Dalai Lama react to this insulting title? There is a good example showing his self-designation at this point. He drew up the monastic regulations for Kumbum Monastery during his stay there in 1909, and in these regulations he used two titles (Table 4-2, no. 7). One was the original title conferred by the Shunzhi emperor in 1653 in the old translation, while the other included the title he had just received from the Guangxu emperor, namely, "By the edict of the Emperor, *cheng shun zan hua*, Man of Great Compassion, Buddha Dalai Lama."¹⁴ It should be noted that the Sinocentric part of the title was not translated into Tibetan, but was transliterated in Tibetan script (D13S-ji: 310-6–311-1).

Why did the Dalai Lama use the old and new titles together? When considered in light of the facts to be mentioned below, there can be no doubt that the Dalai Lama detested the new title conferred by the Manchu emperor in 1909. But he could not express his dissatisfaction explicitly, since he had to pass through the eastern part of Tibet, which was occupied by the Chinese army. He therefore had to act carefully lest Qing officials notice his rebellious spirit.

The Dalai Lama's use of the title conferred by Shunzhi in the old translation, which attributed the source of the Dalai Lama's authority not to the Qing emperor but to Buddha, shows an implicit criticism of the government of the Guangxu emperor and Empress Dowager, who undervalued the present Dalai Lama, and his use of the new title conferred by Guangxu in 1909 without translating the Sinocentric words into Tibetan would have been a way of preventing the Tibetan people from becoming aware of the title's derogatory meaning.

On the 11th of the eleventh month in the Earth-Bird year, as soon as he returned to the throne in the Potala Palace for the first time in five years, a golden seal inscribed with a new title was offered to the 13th Dalai Lama by the gods and people of Tibet (Table 4-2, no. 8; D13N-kha: 173-4–174-4).




Figure 4-2 The 1909 title offered to the 13th Dalai Lama by the gods and people of Tibet

Source: Ou (1991: 65).

This title read: “By the edict of Buddha in the holy land (i.e., India): Victorious King, Lord of the Three Worlds, Master of All Buddhist Doctrine on Earth at All Times, Omniscient One, Unchanging, Vajradhara Ocean Lama, Prince of the Wish-Fulfilling Gem, Respected by Gods and Humans.”¹⁵ This new title was inscribed on the golden seal in three scripts, namely, Lantsa, Tibetan, and Phakpa (’Phags pa).

It is obvious that the aim of accepting this new title was to sever relations with the Chinese emperor. When the Dalai Lama turned down the title offered by Yuan Shikai at the end of 1912, he candidly stated, “My authority is not bestowed by China” (Teichman 1922: 17–18; Kobayashi 2012: 327). From 1913, the Dalai Lama came to use this new title beginning with the words “by the edict of Buddha in the holy land (i.e., India)” instead of “by the edict of the Qing emperor.”¹⁶

The 14th Dalai Lama has also explained the meaning of the 1909 title in an explication of the proclamations of 1913 as follows:

When the Tibetan people were driving the Chinese army out of Tibet, the 13th Dalai Lama returned from India and proclaimed, “Tibet is an independent country.” This declaration was affixed with a golden seal that had not been presented by the Chinese emperor, who had been the patron of successive Dalai Lamas, but was conferred by Tibetan gods and humans. Afterwards the 13th Dalai Lama changed the formula at the head of documents from the former “by the edict of the Chinese emperor, the

Dalai Lama...” to “by the edict of Buddha, Master of All Buddhist Doctrines.” (bsTan ’dzin rgya mtsho 1965: 82–83)

These testimonies confirm that the Dalai Lama’s proclamation of a new title was meant to sever ties with the Qing emperor.

It is also worth noting that, when the scripts of the old and new seals are compared, the Chinese and Manchu scripts are missing from the new seal, whereas the Lantsa script has been added. That the Manchu and Chinese scripts used by the Qing dynasty’s ruling class were replaced by the Lantsa script of Indian origin comports perfectly with the fact that the 13th Dalai Lama switched his source of authority from the Qing emperor to Buddha in India.

After having received the new title and seal, the Dalai Lama offered impressions of this seal with eulogies to more than thirty historical places and statues in Central Tibet, including, for example, the two famous statues of Śākyamuni in Trulnang and Ramoche (Ra mo che) temples. Twenty-three eulogies written at this time were brought together in a single work called the *Padmaraka Garland*.¹⁷ In the preface to this work, the Dalai Lama described only the ideal relationship between patron and priest and did not refer to the deteriorating relationship with the Qing emperor (D13S-ti: 595-1–3).

The twenty-three eulogies in the *Padmaraka Garland* are far more numerous than the eulogies composed on the occasion of his enthronement in 1895 or during his pilgrimage to the sacred lake Lhamoi Latso (lHa mo’i bla mtsho) in 1900. This shows that the Dalai Lama regarded the bestowal of this title as the most important event in his life.

Changes in references to the Tibetan and Chinese governments by the Dalai Lama

Next, we will examine how the Dalai Lama changed the designations of the Tibetan and Qing governments at crucial junctures when the Qing government conferred the derogatory title on the Dalai Lama in 1909 and was overthrown in 1911.

Every New Year, the Dalai Lama had recited a eulogy in front of the lHa mo gsung byon ma¹⁸, the painting of his protector deity Palden Lhamo, praying for the benefit of Buddhism and sentient beings. The eulogy offered to this deity was written in the same format every year from 1899 to 1933,

and so we can observe changes in the Dalai Lama's wording under the same conditions.

These eulogies have a common structure. First there is a prayer for the prosperity of Buddhism and the happiness of sentient beings in general, followed by prayers more specifically for the growth of the Geluk school, for the longevity of the Dalai Lama and other high lamas and the extinguishment of bad circumstances for them, for the prosperity of patrons, for the flourishing of the Tibetan government, which combined temporal and religious powers, and for the longevity of the Qing emperor, and lastly there is a prayer for peace in all kingdoms, especially for the Tibetan people. While the eulogies have this basic structure in common, the wording changed gradually year by year.

Table 4-3 gives examples of the designations of the Tibetan and Chinese governments taken from the *Collected Eulogies*. As these eulogies were recited while offering five-colored (white, yellow, red, blue, and green) ceremonial scarves (*kha btags*), each eulogy consists of five parts corresponding to the five colors.

On the basis of the examples in Table 4-3, we can identify the following references to the Qing emperor: "Appointed by Heaven" (*gnam bskos*),¹⁹ "Brahma on earth" (*sa yi tshangs pa, tshangs pa*),²⁰ "King of China,"²¹ and "He Who Turns the Wheel of Power" (*stobs kyis 'khor bsgyur, stobs kyis mnga' dbang sgyur ba*).

The Tibetan government, on the other hand, is referred to as "Tusita Palace victorious in all directions" (*dga' ldan pho brang phyogs las rnam rgyal*) and "Palace of one hundred joys" (*dga' ba brgya phrag ldan pa pho brang*). Its modifiers are "combining the religious and the secular" or simply "religion and the secular" (*chos srid or lugs zung*), "the ancient custom of three ancestral religious kings" (*chos rgyal or mes kyi gna' srol*) and "four abundances" (*sde bzhi'i dpal 'byor*).²²

It must be noted that the Dalai Lama never prayed for the longevity of the Qing emperor and the prosperity of the Qing government without praying for that of the Ganden Palace (*dGa' ldan pho brang*), or Tibetan government. In nos. 3, 9, 11, 16, 19–27, and 39 in Table 4-3, the prosperity of both governments is praised in the same line, while in nos. 6, 8, 12–15, 18, 28–29, 32, 35 and 40 their prosperity is praised in parallel lines. In contrast, the Dalai lama prayed for the prosperity of the Ganden Palace alone in nos. 5, 7, 10, 17, 30–31, 33–34, 36–37 and 41–68.

No. 38 is the sole exception in which a prayer is offered for the king's²³

Table 4-3 Changes in wording in prayers for the Tibetan and Chinese governments

	Year	Object of offering	Passages related to Tibetan and Chinese governments (Words in bold refer to the Chinese emperor)	Source (D13S-ti)
1	1899	IHa mo gsung byon ma ²⁴		p. 544-1
2	1900	IHa mo gsung byon ma		p. 548-4
3	1900	Padmasambhava statue in Yer pa ²⁵	gnam bskos sa yi tshangs pa ’i chab srid dang, dga’ ba brgya phrag ldan pa’i chab srid bcas, mna’ srol rgyun lugs bzang lhun ’grub ngos,	p. 550-4
4	1900	Offerings 5–18 were made during a pilgrimage to Chos ’khor rgyal ²⁶		p. 552-7
5	1900	Tsong kha pa’s stupa in dGa’ ldan ²⁷	(Red) dga’ ba brgya ldan sde bzhi’i chab srid rnams, dbyar kyi chu gter ji bzhin yar ’gran shog.	p. 553-1
6	1900	dPal ldan lha mo in Chos ’khor rgyal	(Yellow) gnam bskos sa yi tshangs pa ’i sku tshe bsring, chab srid dge mtshan yar rgyas ’phrin las mdzod. (Blue) dga’ ba brgya ldan chab srid mnga’ thang rnams, sngon gyi bka’ dam ji bzhin g-yel med skyongs.	p. 556-7
7	1900	Chos ’byung shod rdor legs ²⁸	(Red) dga’ ba brgya ldan chab srid mna’ bo’i srol, lugs bzang mi nyams sor chud yun gnas mdzod.	p. 560-2
8	1900	mKhas grub nor bzang statue in Rin chen sgang ²⁹	(Blue) gnam bskos sa yi tshangs pa ’i sku tshe brtan, chab srid mnga’ thang dbyar mtsho ltar ’phel shog. (Green) brgya ldan sde bzhi’i chab srid dpal yon rnams, bla nas blar ’phel che rgu’i dbus mthor shog.	p. 563-1
9	1900	Ma gcig lab sgron ma in Zangs ri mkhar dmar ³⁰	(Blue) gnam bskos tshangs pa ’i chab srid dang dga’ ldan, yon mchod chab srid zung ’brel mdza’ bshes shog.	p. 563-7
10	1900	Phag mo grub pa statue in gDan sa thil ³¹	(Blue) dga’ ba brgya ldan sde bzhi’i dge mtshan rgyun, tshangs pa’i ral klung ji bzhin chad med shog.	p. 564-5
11	1900	Four-faced Mahākāla in ’Brom stod gnyan mgon phug ³²	gnams bskos tshangs pa ’i sku tshe chab srid rgyas, brgya ldan chab srid sde bzhi yar zlar ’gran.	p. 565-4

Year	Object of offering	Passages related to Tibetan and Chinese governments (Words in bold refer to the Chinese emperor)	Source (D13S-ti)	
12	1900	Buddha Vairocana in Khra 'brug temple ³³	(Red) bskal pa'i mnga' bdag sku tshe lhun po yi , mched zlar brtan nas chab srid mthar rgyas shog. (Blue) dga' ba brgya ldan lugs brgya'i dpal yon kun, mi nyams dbyar mtsho'i dpal la co 'drir shog.	p. 566-1
13	1900	Śākyamuni statue in 'Phrul snang, Ra mo che and bSam yas ³⁴	(Yellow) gnam bskos rgyal po'i yon tan sku tshe 'phel, chab srid 'dod rgu'i gter chen gong 'phel ngos. (Blue) dga' ba brgya phrag ldan pa'i chab srid kyi, phun tshogs sde bzhi'i dpal yon mnga' thang tshogs,...	p. 567-1
14	1900	Vaiśravaṇa in bSam yas dkar me khang	(Red) gnam bskos tshangs pa'i dpal 'byor mnga' thang tshogs, mi 'dzad nam mkha' mdzod kyi dngos grub tsol. (Blue) dga' ba brgya ldan sde bzhi'i dpal yon rnams, rnam rgyal bang mdzod ji bzhin dngos grub tsol.	p. 568-5
15	1900	Six-armed Mahākāla in bDe chen gsang sngags mkhar ³⁵	(×White→Red) gnam bskos sa yi tshangs pa'i chab srid tshogs, mi mthun phyogs las rnam rgyal 'phrin las mdzod. (Blue) brgya ldan bstan srid lugs bzang mnga' thang dang, dpal 'byor legs brgya yun gnas 'phrin las mdzod.	p. 569-5
16	1900	Rang byon lnga ldan and Lokeśvara in Potala ³⁶	gnam bskos tshangs pa'i sku tshe chab srid dang, brgya ldan chab srid lhun po'i mched zlar brtan.	p. 570-6
17	1900	sKu lnga statue in gNas chung lcog ³⁷	dga' ba brgya ldan chab srid sde bzhi'i dpal, gong du spel la g-yar dam ji bzhin mdzod.	p. 571-5
18	1900	Four-armed Mahākāla in Mal dro kab tshal	(Yellow) gnam bskos tshangs pa'i sku tshe chab srid dang, mnga' thang legs tshogs nam mkha'i mthar rgyas shog. (Blue) dga' ba brgya ldan chab srid dpal yon rnams, mi nyams srid rtser sgren pa'i 'phrin las mdzod.	p. 572-3

Year		Object of offering	Passages related to Tibetan and Chinese governments (Words in bold refer to the Chinese emperor)	Source (D13S-ti)
19	1902	IHa mo gsung byon ma	(White) gnam bskos sa'i tshangs pa , dga' ba brgya phrag ldan pa'i chab srid bcas, mi nyams phyogs dus kun tu rab rgyas te,	p. 573-6
20	1903	IHa mo gsung byon ma	(Red) gnam bskos tsi na'i rje yi chab srid dang, dga' ba brgya phrag ldan pa'i chab srid bcas, sde bzhi'i dbu rmog btsan po gong 'phel ngos.	p. 576-3
21	1904	IHa mo gsung byon ma	(Red) gnam bskos tshangs pa'i sku tshe chab srid rgyas, dga' ba brgya ldan chab srid dbu rmog btsan.	p. 578-5
22	1904	Tsong kha pa's stupa in dGa' ldan	(Red) ci na'i rje bo rim byon sku tshe bstan (sic), mdzad 'phrin chab srid mnga' thang rgyas pa dang, dga' ba brgya phrag ldan pa'i lugs zung gi, chab srid dbu rmog btsan po yun du brtan.	p. 579-7
23	1905	IHa mo gsung byon ma	(Red) gnam bskos tshangs pa'i sku tshe chab srid brtan, dga' ba brgya ldan lugs bzang sde bzhi'i dpal, cha tsam mi nyams bla nas blar 'phel so.	p. 582-3
24	1906	IHa mo gsung byon ma	(Red) ci na'i rje bo'i sku tshe chab srid bstan (sic), brgya ldan lugs zung chab srid sde bzhi'i dpal, mna' bo'i srol bzang bla nas blar 'phel zhing.	p. 583-7
25	1906	Tsong kha pa's stupa in sKu 'bum ³⁸	(Red) sa yi tshangs pa'i tshe bsod rigs brgyud 'phel, chab srid 'khor los bsgyur bzhin kun tu dbang, dga' ba brgya phrag ldan pa'i lugs zung gi, mna' bo'i srol bzang sde bzhi'i dpal yon nams, gong du 'phel ba'i lugs gnyis 'bar gyur cig.	p. 586-5
26	1907	IHa mo gsung byon ma	(Red) stobs kyis 'khor bsgyur ci na'i rje bo yi, sku tshe chab srid mnga' thang lugs bzang 'phel, dga' ba'i dpal ldan brgya phrag chab srid kyi, sde bzhi'i dpal yon yar nas yar 'gran ngos.	p. 589-7
27	1908	IHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) stobs kyis mnga' dbang sgyur ba'i rtsi na'i rje'i , sku tshe chab srid mnga' thang mi 'gyur brtan, dga' ba'i dpal ldan lugs bzang stobs 'byor rgyas, bsam sbyor ngan pa'i pha rol bdud sde'i tshogs, mngon spyod drag pos thal bar brlag par mdzod.	p. 591-4

Year	Object of offering	Passages related to Tibetan and Chinese governments (Words in bold refer to the Chinese emperor)	Source (D13S-ti)
28	1909	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Red) gnam bskos tshangs pa 'i sku tshe chab srid brtan. p. 593-3
			(Blue) dga' brgya'i dpyid ldan lugs zung gdugs dkar po, chab srid sde bzhi'i dga' ston ba dan 'phyar.
29	1909	Śākyamuni statue in 'Phrul snang and Ra mo che temples ³⁹	(Red) bstan pa 'i yon mchod tsi na 'i rje , sku tshe yun brtan chab srid mnga' thang rgyas. p. 596-2
			(Blue) dga' ba brgya yi gna' srol kun rdzogs pa'i, sde zhi'i mnga' thang dpal 'bar chab srid cher ...
30	1909	Rang byon lnga ldan and Lokeśvara in Potala	(Red) dga' ba brgya phrag ldan pa'i chab srid kyi, gna' srol dbu rmog btsan po ches dar zhing, p. 598-6
31	1909	Tsong kha pa's stupa in dGa' ldan	(Red) dga' ba brgya phrag ldan pa'i chab srid kyi, sde bzhi'i dpal 'byor mnga' thang longs spyod rnams, ... gong 'bran shog. p. 601-1
32	1909	5th Dalai Lama's stupa ⁴⁰	(Yellow) gnam bskos rgyal po 'i sku tshe chab srid dar. p. 605-6
			(Blue) dga' brgya'i dpal 'bar sde bzhi'i chab srid btsan.
33	1909	Six-armed Mahākāla in Nor bu gling ka ⁴¹	(Red) dga' ba brgya ldan ba'i, pho brang chen po'i chab srid der, ma rung bdud kyis mi tshugs par, sde bzhi'i dpal yon yar rygas shog. p. 607-7
34	1909	Gro sdod in gNas chung	(Red) dga' ba brgya phrag ldan, chab srid srol bzang rgyal thabs che, rgyal phran kun gyi spyi bo ru, mngon par mdzes pa'i dpal thob shog. p. 612-7
35	1910	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Red) tsi na 'i rje bo 'i sku tshe brtan, sde bzhi'i dpal rabs chab srid mnga' thang rgyas. p. 614-4
			(Blue) dga' ba brgya phrag dpal 'bar ba, ... chab srid lugs bzang dkar 'jam gdugs dkar pos, chos 'bangs ci mchis bde dger ngal 'tsho shog.
36	1910	Boudhanath ⁴²	dga' brgya 'i dpal, mnga' ba'i chab srid btsan pa'i dpung, gna' bo'i lugs bzang khyon 'degshog. p. 616-3

	Year	Object of offering	Passages related to Tibetan and Chinese governments (Words in bold refer to the Chinese emperor)	Source (D13S-ti)
37	1910	Swayambhunath and sTag mo lus sbyin ⁴³	dga' brgya'i chab srid dbu rmog btsan po dang,	p. 617-1
38	1910	Swayambhunath	<i>sa yi bdag po</i> 'i bzhed don skong gyur cig.	p. 617-5
39	1911	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Red) <i>gnam bskos rje bo</i> 'i sku tshe chab srid 'phel, dga' ldan pho brang lugs zung btsan po'i khirms, ... sde bzhi'i dpal yon bla nas blar 'phel shog.	p. 619-4
40	1912	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Red) <i>ci na</i> 'i <i>rje bo</i> 'i sku tshe mnga' thang rgyas, gnam bskos dga' ba brgya ldan pho brang che'i, mes dpon gsum gyis srol btod chos srid khirms, ... mthunus stsol. (Blue) rgyal bstan de 'dzin dga' ldan chab srid de, chos 'byor dpal yon dar la 'gran mi bzod.	p. 621-3
41	1912	bsTan ma bcu gnyis ⁴⁴	gnam bskos dga' ba brgya ldan pa'i sde bzhi'i chab srid 'jig rten mes po'i mnga' thang ltar yar rgyas ngos,	p. 623-1
42	1912	Ye shes mgon po of sna rtse rdzong ⁴⁵	gnam bskos dga' ba brgya ldan pho brang che, lugs gnyis mes po'i chab srid gna' bo'i srol, sde bzhi'i dpal yon dar dang lhan cig tu ...	p. 623-6
43	1912	gZa' mchog rgyal po'i son in sTag lung ⁴⁶	dga' ba brgya phrag rtse pa'i pho brang 'di'i, lugs zung chab srid dge bcu'i khirms dar zhing,	p. 625-4
44	1912	Śākyamuni statue in bSam 'grub chos sding temple	(Blue) dga' ba brgya ldan pho brang 'dir, ... chab srid sde bzhi'i mnga' thang dpal 'bar bas,	p. 627-3
45	1913	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Red) gnam bskos dga' ba brgya'i, lugs zung chab srid mes dbon rnam gsum gyi, ... sde bzhi'i mnga' thang dbyar mtsho ltar bsnyegs shog.	p. 629-2
46	1914	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Red) gnam bskos dga' ba brgya ldan pho brang che'i, lugs zung dbu rmog btsan po bla mthor bsnyegs.	p. 631-2
47	1914	rGyal btsan in bSam yas Monastery	gnam bskos dga' brgya'i sde bzhi'i chab srid kyi, dbu rmog btsan dang mnga' thang bla mthor bsnyegs.	p. 632-7

Year	Object of offering	Passages related to Tibetan and Chinese governments (Words in bold refer to the Chinese emperor)	Source (D13S-ti)
48 1915	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Red) dga' ldan pho brang phyogs las mam rgyal zhes, gnam bskos lugs zung btsan po'i chab srid che.	p. 634-1
49 1916	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) dga' ba brgya phrag dpal ldan chab srid che'i, dbu rmog bla mtho lugs zung khrim btsan zhing,	p. 635-7
50 1916	Tsong kha pa's stupa in dGa' ldan	(Blue) dga' ba brgya phrag ldan pa'i chab srid kyi, sde bzhi'i dpal yon mes po'i lugs 'gran shog.	p. 638-2
51 1917	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) sde bzhi'i dpal mnga' dga' brgya'i chab srid cher, nyer 'tshe'i rgud tshogs kun zhi'i 'phrin las mdzod.	p. 639-5
52 1917	Three stupas in Nepal	gnam bskos dga' brgya'i lugs zung chab srid che, ... sde bzhi'i dbu rmog gtsan pos khyon kun dbang,	p. 641-5
53 1918	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) gnam bskos dga' ba brgya ldan lugs zung gi, sde bzhi'i chab srid dbu rmog btsan po nyid,	p. 643-3
54 1919	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) gnam bskos dga' brgya'i lugs zung chab srid che, ... sde bzhi'i mnga' thang longs spyod dbyar mtsho ltar,	p. 645-6
55 1920	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) gnam bskos dga' ba brgya phrag ldan pa yi, lugs zung sde bzhi'i chab srid mnga' thang la,	p. 647-7
56 1921	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) dga' ldan chab srid mes dbon mam gsum sogs, sa skyong rgyal po'i thugs bskyed ji bzhin du, sde bzhi'i mnga' thang bla nas blar 'phel shog.	p. 650-2
57 1922	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) gnam bskos dga' ba brgya ldan chab srid che.	p. 652-3
58 1923	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) gnam bskos dga' ba brgya ldan chab srid che'i, lugs bzang dbu rmog btsan po srid rtser bsnyegs.	p. 654-5
59 1924	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) gnam bskos dga' ba brgya ldan pa'i, lugs gnyis chab srid mnga' thang sde bzhi'i dpal,	p. 656-5
60 1925	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Red) gnam bskos dga' ba brgya ldan chab srid che'i, sde bzhi'i dbu rmog btsan po dgung du reg.	p. 658-4

	Year	Object of offering	Passages related to Tibetan and Chinese governments (Words in bold refer to the Chinese emperor)	Source (D13S-ti)
61	1926	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Red) gnam bskos dga' ba brgya ldan pho brang che'i, lugs zung chab srid dbu rmog dgung du reg.	p. 660-5
62	1927	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) dga' ba brgya phrag dpal ldan chab srid cher,	p. 662-6
63	1928	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) gnam bskos dga' ba brgya ldan chab srid cher, ... sde bzhi'i mnga' thang srid rtse'i dgung bsnyegs shog.	p. 665-1
64	1929	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) gnam bskos dga' ldan pho brang pa'i, chab srid lugs gnyis dgung mkhar 'deg pa la, ... chos ldan sde bzhi'i dpal yon rab 'bar shog.	p. 667-3
65	1930	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) gnam bskos dga' ba brgya ldan gyi, chab srid phun tshogs 'dod rgu'i gter chen pos,	p. 669-4
66	1931	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) gnam bskos dga' ba brgya ldan pa'i, chab srid dar gyi mdud pa mi lhod cing,	p. 671-5
67	1932	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) gnam bskos dga' brgya'i chab srid la, bsam sbyor log par 'khu ba'i dgra sde'i rigs, ming gi lhag mar thal bar brlag par mdzod.	p. 674-1
68	1933	lHa mo gsung byon ma	(Blue) gnam bskos dga' ba brgya ldan lugs zung gi, chab srid dbu 'phang btsan po bla mthor bsnyegs.	p. 676-3

prosperity without any reference to the Ganden Palace. However, this eulogy offered to a stupa in Nepal, consisting of only four lines, is too short to be sure whether or not this “king” is the Qing emperor.

Another point that merits attention is that the Dalai Lama always refers to the Qing government not as China, but as the government of the Qing emperor. This suggests that, from the point of view of the Dalai Lama, the relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Qing emperor was not between nations, but between individuals.

The greatest change in the Dalai Lama’s wording is that he stopped praying for the longevity of the Qing emperor and the prosperity of the Qing emperor’s government in 1913, when he issued the edict that severed the patron-priest relationship with the Qing emperor. After 1913, words and phrases that had been used to modify the Qing government, such as “By Heaven Appointed” (*gnam bskos*), came to be used for the Ganden Palace. The same change in wording can be confirmed in other eulogies such as those offered in the consecration of statues, scriptures, and stupas (D13S-phi).

Conclusion

The above may be summarized as follows. After his enthronement in 1895, the 13th Dalai Lama used the Qing emperors’ authority for a time to strengthen his political power. But after the Qing changed its stance, that is to say, after it deprived him of his title after his departure from Tibet in 1904, sent troops into Eastern Tibet in 1905 to claim “sovereignty” over Tibet, and conferred a downgraded title on him in 1909, the Dalai Lama decided to part ways with the Qing emperor. In 1909, the Dalai Lama abandoned the title of Chinese origin and proclaimed a new title, the authority of which was attributed not to the Qing emperor but to Buddha in India, and removed the Manchu and Chinese scripts from his seal. In short, it was in 1909, two years before the declaration of independence by Mongolia in 1911, that the Dalai Lama explicitly parted ways with the Qing emperor.

While the 13th Dalai Lama and Qing emperor had been on good terms, the Dalai Lama had recited eulogies annually at the New Year in which he prayed at the same time for the prosperity of the Ganden Palace and the Qing government. But after 1913, the Dalai Lama never referred to the title of Qing origin and stopped eulogizing the Qing emperor and his government. These facts suggest that the Dalai Lama never regarded the Tibetan and Qing governments as one entity. As many sources show, the Dalai Lama

regarded the relationship with the Qing emperor as one between a priest and his patron (*mchod yon*). Therefore, it is not surprising that he stopped praying for a Qing ruler who did not fulfil the duties of a Buddhist patron.

Notes

- 1 The Tibetan text of this proclamation is included in Shakabpa 1984: 246–248. In 2013, the centennial of this proclamation was celebrated in Dharamsala and New York.
- 2 Palden Lhamo is of the highest rank in the category of mundane (*'jigs rten pa*) deities in the Geluk school (Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1956: 22–37).
- 3 Each work in the collected works of the 13th Dalai Lama is numbered with a letter of the Tibetan alphabet.
- 4 *rgya mtsho* means “ocean,” which corresponds to *dalai* in Mongolian.
- 5 A photograph of the edict on the wall of the Potala Palace can be found in Zhongguo xizang budalagong guanlichu 2000: 46, 1.2.
- 6 According to the *Erdeni tunumul netetü yin sudur*, a contemporary Mongolian source, Altan Khan offered the title “*Vcir-a dar-a sayin coy tu buyan tu dalai*” together with a golden seal, and thereafter Sönam Gyatso is referred to in the same source as *Vcir-a dar-a dalai lam-a* (ES 226, 233, 236, 237, 240, 241, 246, 296, 306, 318, 331, 338, 341, 356, 375; Ishihama 2001: 140–141). Furthermore, extant seals attributed to the 3rd Dalai Lama in the Potala Palace are inscribed with the Sanskrit word *Vajradhara* (Ou 1991: 48).
- 7 The original text reads: *gong sa lnga pa chen pos kyang shun tsi dā las rgyal por, gnam bskos 'jam dbyangs gong ma bdag po chen po zhes dang, 'jam dbyangs gong ma bdag po chen po nas kyang, nub phyogs mchog tu dge ba'i zhing gi rgyal bstan yongs rdzogs gyi bdag po badzra dhara tā la'i bla ma zhes mchod yon phan tshun bkur res gus 'dud mchod yon gyi lar rgya bsam mi khyab pa'i ngo mtshar* (D13S-thi: 742–4–6).
- 8 This title was *Eiten ergengge be shar seme gosire, facufun be toktobure huturi be sligiyere, umesi enduringge manjusiri dergi han*, corresponding in Chinese to *Daci pudu xizheng xifu zhisheng shangcheng wenshu huangdi* (Pingding shuomo fanglüe 8: 44b–47a). Strictly speaking, the actual conferrer of this title was not the 5th Dalai Lama, but his regent Sangyé Gyatso (Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho), who concealed the 5th Dalai Lama's death.

- 9 Sangyé Gyatso, the 5th Dalai Lama's regent, quotes this legend from chapter 13 of the *Za ma tog bkod pa'i mdo* when describing the final years and death of the 5th Dalai Lama in his *'Dzam gling rgyan gcig*, written in 1697 (DGC: 81).
 - 10 *Nub phyogs mchog tu dge ba'i zhing gi rgyal dbang, sa steng gyi rgyal bstan yongs kyi bdag po, thams cad mkhyen pa badzra dh'ara tā la'i bla ma'i tham ga* (XLD: no. 71-1-3; Ou 1991: 57).
 - 11 As for the Mongolian translation, there are differences between the old and new translations. We can confirm two examples of the old translation from edicts dated Shunzhi 10/3/3 and Shunzhi 14/6/24, in which the title is given as *Barayun etegedün ülemji sayin amuyulang-tu burqan-u/i, delekei deki burqan-u suryayuli-yi ergilegsen, qamuy-i medegci wajir-a dar-a dalai lam-a* (QDH: 10-11; XLD: no. 35-1), which means "He Who Turns Buddha's Teachings on the Earth of the Supreme Virtuous Buddha's Paradise in the West, Omniscient One, Vajradhara Dalai Lama." As for the new translation, there is a famous example inscribed on the golden seal dedicated to the 7th Dalai Lama in 1723, namely, *Örүн-e жүг-үн yeke öljeitü erketü burqan-u orun. delekei deki-u burqan-u shasin-i ergilegci qamuy-i medegci wacir-a dar-a dalai blam-a yin tamay-a* (XLD: no. 71-1-3; Ou 1991: 57), which means "Virtuous and Powerful Buddha's Land in the West, He Who Turns Buddha's Teachings on Earth, Omniscient One, Vajradhara Dalai Lama." In Buddhism, "to preach" is expressed as "to turn the wheel of the dharma."
- In the old Mongolian translation, *u/i*, which expresses the genitive, is where the Mongolian equivalent of *bka' lung* should be. In the new Mongolian translation, the word *orun*, meaning "place," is where the Mongolian equivalent of *bka' lung* should be. In both cases, "Buddha" does not refer to the Dalai Lama, but to Buddha Śākyamuni who preached the doctrine in India.
- As for the Manchu translation, there is no example of the old translation as far as I know, but there is an example of the new translation inscribed on the golden seal, namely, *Wargi abkai amba sain jirgara focihi i abkai fejergi focihi i taihiyan be aliha eiten be saca wajira dara dalai lamai doron*. This Manchu translation tallies with the old Mongolian translation (see Table 4-1).
- 12 *'dzam gling bskal pa'i mnga' bdag gnam bskos sa yi tshangs pa dang mchod yon nyi zla zung du 'brel zhing, gser gyi 'ja' sa dang, nor bu'i tham kha sogs bla na bkur ba'i sri zhu'i lung las dang bcas sa steng*

- rgyal bstan yongs kyi bdag po srid zhi'i gtsug rgyan du dbang bskur ba* (D13S-ji: 274-2-3).
- 13 Bell 1946: 73; QDX: 89, Guangxu 30/7/11(August 21, 1904); Jagou 2009: 354–355.
 - 14 *Gong ma rgyal po'i lung gis hrin hrin tsan hot+wa nub phyogs snying rje chen po'i skyes bu sangs rgyas tā la'i bla ma* (D13S-ji: 310-6-311-1).
 - 15 *'Phags pa'i yul nas sangs rgyas kyi bka' lung rgyal dbang 'jig rten gsum mgon dus kun sa steng gi kun khyab rgyal bstan yongs la mnga' dbang bsgyur ba thams cad mkhyen pa 'gyur med rdo rje 'chang ryga mtsho'i bla ma lha mi yongs kyi spyi bos mchod pa'i yid bzhin dbang gi rgyal po'i phyag ryga* (Table 4-2: no. 9; D13S-ti: 595-7-596-1).
 - 16 There are slight differences between the three edicts and the text on the golden seal. In the case of Table 4-2: no. 11, the so-called “Declaration of Independence”, *gi kun khyab and lha mi ... phyag ryga are missing and la mnga' dbang bsgyur ba* has been replaced by *rdzogs kyi bdag po*. In the case of Table 4-2: nos. 12 and 13 in the Water-Monkey year (1932), *lha mi ... phyag ryga* is missing.
 - 17 The *Padmaraka Garland* is included in the *Collection of Prayers* (D13S-ti), but it is unclear where it ends. If it ends with the eulogy before the next year's New Year prayer, the *Padmaraka Garland* consists of twenty-three eulogies. Because there were instances in which one eulogy was offered to two objects, there were more than thirty sacred places where the 13th Dalai Lama offered impressions and eulogies.
 - 18 This painting, which went back to the time of the 2nd Dalai Lama, was the one that the 14th Dalai Lama took from his chamber on the day when he went into exile in India in 1959 (interview with the 14th Dalai Lama in Japan on November 19, 2013).
 - 19 Table 4-3: nos. 3, 6, 8–9, 11, 13–16, 18, 19–23, 28, 32, 39.
 - 20 Table 4-3: nos. 3, 8–11, 14–16, 18–19, 21, 23, 25, 28.
 - 21 Table 4-3: nos. 26, 27. China is transliterated as *Ci na*, *Tshi na* or *rTsi na*.
 - 22 *sde bzhi* is an abbreviated form of *phun tshogs sde bzhi*, which means “four abundances,” consisting of the flourishing of Buddha's teaching, economic prosperity, enjoyment of the five desirable qualities, and enlightenment.
 - 23 The word for “king” here is *sa yi bdag po*, meaning literally “lord of the land.”

- 24 This is the annual New Year prayer held in front of lHa mo gsung byon ma.
- 25 Zla ba phug in Yer pa (Brag yer pa) is known as a place where Padmasambhava, an 8th-century Indian Buddhist master and the mythical founder of the Nyingma school, practiced (Petech 1958: nn. 95–96).
- 26 Chos 'khor rgyal Monastery was built by the 2nd Dalai Lama in 1509 in the Me tog thang valley. Nearby is the lake lHa mo'i bla mtsho, where the spirit of dPal ldan lha mo is said to reside, and this sacred site was also blessed by the 2nd Dalai Lama (Petech 1958: n. 206).
- 27 Ganden Monastery, founded in 1409, was the only monastery established by Tsongkhapa, the founder of the Geluk school; he died here, and his body is enshrined in the Golden Stupa (Petech 1958: nn. 107–108).
- 28 Chos 'byung shod is the name of a place near Chos 'khor rgyal. rDor legs is an abbreviation of the name of the guardian deity rDo rje legs pa (Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1956: 164–169).
- 29 mKhas grub nor bzang rgya mtsho (1423–1513) received full ordination as a monk at Ganden Monastery at the age of 35. At the age of 37, he engaged in extensive meditation in Rin chen sgan for four years.
- 30 Zangs ri mkhar dmar was the residence of Ma gcig lab sgron ma, an 11th-century female practitioner (Petech 1958: 47–48, nn. 197–198).
- 31 gDan sa thil was built by Phag mo grub pa (1110–1170), who founded the Phakmodrupa Kagyü school in 1158 (Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1956: 47, nn. 194–195).
- 32 Brom stod is situated beside the sKyid chu river, east of Lhasa. It is known for the four-faced statue of Mahākāla in the cave of gNyan Lo tsā wa (Petech 1958: 43, nn. 100, 106). Regarding the four-faced Mahākāla, see Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1956: 60–62.
- 33 Khra 'brug temple was one of twelve temples built by Srong btsan sgam po to subdue *rākṣasīs* demonesses, symbolizing the wild nature of Tibet. Five Buddhas, of which the main deity is Vairocana, were enshrined at Khra 'brug (Petech 1958: nn. 237–239).
- 34 'Phrul snang temple was built by the Nepalese wife of Srong btsan sgam po and Ra mo che by his Chinese wife. bSam yas was the first monastery in Tibet, built in the eighth century by King Khri srong lde btsan and consecrated by Śāntarakṣita and Padmasambhava.
- 35 gSang sngags mkhar Monastery is in bDe chen rdzong, east of Lhasa and beside the sKyid chu river. Regarding the six-armed Mahākāla, see

- Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1956: 38–39.
- 36 Rang byung lnga ldan is a statue of an 11-faced Avalokiteśvara that appeared spontaneously from five substances, such as soil, from eight sites sacred to the Buddha (GSM:137). Lokeśvara in the Potala Palace is one of four Lokeśvara statues that appeared spontaneously from one log of sandalwood that had been dug up from sand in the South Sea (GSM:78–84).
- 37 gNas chung lcog is the residence of the State Oracle, who is possessed by the guardian spirit Pekar, near Drepung Monastery (Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1956: 444–454). The deities known as sKu lnga are five retainers of Pekar (Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1956: 107–115).
- 38 Kumbum Monastery was built in 1588 by the 3rd Dalai Lama to mark the birthplace of Tsongkhapa.
- 39 Passages 29–34 are from the *Padmaraka Garland*, the collected eulogies offered to lHa mo gsung byon ma on New Year’s Day.
- 40 This stupa, called ’Dzam gling rgyan gcig, which means “sole ornament of the southern continent,” was erected by the regent Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho in 1697 inside the Potala Palace.
- 41 Nor gling is an abbreviation of Nor bu gling ka, the summer palace of the Dalai Lamas.
- 42 Bya rung kha shor (Boudhanath) in Kathmandu is believed to have been built by previous incarnations of King Khri srong lde btsan, Padma-sambhava, and Śāntarakṣita.
- 43 sTag mo lus sbyin is present-day Namo Buddha outside Kathmandu, where in a previous life the Buddha Śākyamuni is said to have sacrificed himself to save hungry tigers.
- 44 brTan ma bcu gnyis is the goddess of the earth (Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1956: 181–198).
- 45 sNa rtse is sNa dkar rtse, a town beside Yamdrok Lake. Regarding Mahākāla of wisdom, see Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1956: 44–47.
- 46 gZa’ mchog is the planet Rāhu, which is said to cause eclipses of the sun and the moon (Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1956: 259).

CHAPTER FIVE

*The coronation of the Jebtsundamba
modeled on the Dalai Lama's enthronement*

Yumiko Ishihama

As soon as Sando 三多, the Amban stationed in Ikh Khüree, set about implementing the “New Policies,” which meant direct rule of Mongolia, in 1911, all the princes of Khalkha rebelled against the Qing dynasty. In July 1911, they dispatched an envoy to Saint Petersburg to seek Russia’s support for the independence of Mongol, and soon after the 1911 Revolution broke out in October 1911, they enthroned the 8th Jebtsundamba as “Bogd Khaan” (Holy Emperor), who exercised control over both religious and secular affairs, and proclaimed the independence of Mongolia to the international community. Considering that the princes had sent an envoy to Russia before the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution and that Russia had been reluctant to support Mongolian independence, it is clear that the direct cause of their turn to independence was not a “Russian conspiracy” but their antipathy toward the Qing’s “New Policies.”

Following the revolution in 1921, Khalkha Mongolia became a socialist country. During the period of socialist rule, the revolution in 1921 was extolled while the foregoing government of the Bogd Khaan established by monastic officials and feudal princes was disparaged and not discussed impartially. Since the Democratic Revolution of 1990, which led to the establishment of the Republic of Mongolia and overthrew the Mongolian People’s Republic, the Mongol nationalism that had been suppressed by the Soviet Union was unleashed and a re-appraisal of the Bogd Khaan government as a national revolution began (Tachibana 2011: 7–11).

In 2011, in particular, which corresponded to the centennial of the establishment of Bogd Khaan government, many conferences, large and small, were held to discuss the Bogd Khaan government and many research papers

were presented. Most of the research focused on international relations surrounding Mongolia and political aspects of the Bogd Khaan government, and there were very few studies dealing with the religious aspects of the Jebtsundamba.

As Nyam-Ochir has pointed out, the reason that the state ceremonies of the Bogd Khaan government have been little understood is, in the one hand, the result of brainwashing by socialist ideology that denied the value of religion and, on the other hand, it requires great competence in Tibetology and knowledge of Buddhism to study the traditions and a state rite that combined secular and religious affairs (Nyam-Ochir 2012: 286).

As is well known, the position of Jebtsundamba had been passed down by rebirth based on the theory of reincarnation originating in Tibet. The 1st Jebtsundamba (1635–1723) was the son of Tüsheets Khan, a descendant of Chinggis Khan who studied in Tibet under the guidance of the 5th Dalai Lama and the 1st Panchen Lama. While the 1st and 2nd Jebtsundambas were found in the Tüsheets Khan family, from the 3rd Jebtsundamba they were selected from among Tibetan people because of the Qing dynasty’s fear that the Chinggis Khan’s bloodline would combine with incarnate lamas to inspire Mongol nationalism. In short, the 3rd and subsequent Jebtsundambas were ethnic Tibetans. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 8th Jebtsundamba’s enthronement ceremony was performed in the style of the accession ceremonies of high lamas in the world of Tibetan Buddhism, and that his kingship followed the Bodhisattva King theory established by the 5th Dalai Lama in the seventeenth century and prevalent not only in Tibet but also in Mongolia and Manchuria (Ishihama 2001: 72–76).¹ In this chapter we will discuss first the enthronement ceremony of the Jebtsundamba held on December 29, 1911;² next, the two enthronement ceremonies of the Dalai Lama held in 1895 and 1909; thirdly, commonalities between the two; and lastly the kingship of the Jebtsundamba.

The enthronement ceremony of the Jebtsundamba

First, I will describe the process of the Jebtsundamba’s enthronement ceremony. The enthronement ceremony was held on the 9th day of the middle month of winter (the eleventh month in the Tibetan calendar) in the White-Pig year of the 15th *rab byung* (December 29, 1911),³ which was an auspicious day selected by an astrologer. An enormous yellow state yurt was erected for the occasion.

The Jebtsundamba and his wife were carried in a yellow palanquin borne by eight lama guards (*kiya*) to the state yurt⁴ along a road covered with yellow silk cloth. *Noyons*, the head cook (*soivon*), and the lord chamberlain (*donir*)⁵ accompanied the palanquin, which was followed by a man holding a parasol made of a peacock's tail feathers and two men holding parasols adorned with golden dragons. The palanquin was preceded by the lord chamberlain and two secular *noyons* bearing swords in red sheathes. Four *noyon* attendants respectfully accompanied the palanquin on both sides. According to the Russian merchant Narakov, the procession was preceded by a man bearing incense (Batsaikhan 2011: 132).

The other lamas and *noyons* lined up in the east and west sides of the state yurt with incense in their hands. Erdene Setsen Noyon, carrying a peacock parasol, led the Jebtsundamba into the state yurt. The inner *khutughtus*, *kubilgans*, lord chamberlain, and nobles above the rank of *noyon* and *zasag* followed the Jebtsundamba into the yurt. Everyone else stood in line outside the yurt.

When the Jebtsundamba mounted the "lion throne" inside the yurt, the lamas and *noyons* prostrated themselves, and then tea was offered (Batsaikhan 2011: 136, 194). The "lion throne" (Tib. *seng khri*) is Buddha's throne on which four lions are carved. Just as other animals remain silent when a lion roars, so too do Buddha's teachings subdue the arguments of others. Thus, Buddha was likened to a lion and his seat was called the "lion throne."

Next, the *noyons* and lamas went up to the throne one by one, offered their presents, and prostrated themselves in front of the throne. Da Lama Tserenchimed, the first minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Bogd Khaan government, knelt down in front of the throne, offered up a yellow scarf and a white scarf, and recited a eulogy, saying, "May the government stabilize, harder than rock and more transparent than crystal, and may your virtue resound all over the world."

Scarves, called *kha btags* in Tibetan and *hadag* in Mongolian, were offered to the Jebtsundamba and his wife. Among Tibetan Buddhists, offering a *kha btags* indicates respect on the part of the giver for the recipient. The yellow scarf would have been offered to the Jebtsundamba and the white one to his wife. This must have been because the Jebtsundamba was a monk of the Geluk school, also known as the Yellow Hat sect, while his wife had been compared to the bodhisattva White Tārā.⁶

From the eulogy,⁷ Duke Chagdarjav (Phyag rdor skyabs)⁸ offered to the

Bogd Khaan and his wife seals inscribed with their titles (Batsaikhan 2011: 212–213). The silver and turquoise seals of the Jebtsundamba bore the following inscription: “Seal of the ruler of the government combining secular and religious affairs, sunlight, and sacred king” (*śasin törü-yi qouslan bariyici naran gereltü boyda qayan-u tamay-a*). The silver seal of his wife bore the following inscription: “Seal of the developer of the government combining secular and religious affairs, mother of the state, and *ḍākini*” (*śasin törü-yi qouslan örünigülgči ulus-un eke dagini-yin tamay-a*).

Next, the Imperial Prince (Qinwang) Khanddorj (mKha’ ’gro rdo rje)⁹ and Duke Namsrai (rNam sras)¹⁰ offered cups and Sain Noyon Khan Namnansüren (rNam snang srung)¹¹ and Jiangjun Beise Gombosüren (mGon po srung)¹² offered their credentials. Tüsheet Khan Dashnyam (bKra shis nyi ma)¹³ and Setsen Khan Navaanneren (Ngag dbang dge legs)¹⁴ offered a maṇḍala, Nomun Khan Puntsag (Phun tshogs) and Vice mKhan po Sodnomdarjaa (bSod nams dar rgyas) offered a Buddha statue, Manjushir Khutughtu Tserendorj (Tshe ring rdo rje) and Jalkhanz Khutughtu Damdinbazar (rTa mgrin vajra) offered a sacred scripture, and Nomun Khan Jigmeddorj (’Jigs med rdo rje) and Erdene mkhan po Luvsantserendagvadogmi (Blo bzang tshe ring grags pa thogs med) offered a stupa.

The reason that each offering was presented by two people was probably that each offering was made separately to the Jebtsundamba and his wife. The maṇḍala, Buddha statue, sacred scripture, and stupa are collectively called “maṇḍala and three supports” (Tib. *maṇḍala rten gsum*) and are symbolic gifts offered by worshipers to a high-ranking lama at the time of his enthronement (bsTan ’dzin rgya mtsho 1965: 29–30). The maṇḍala, consisting of a circular base with five protuberances, symbolizes the entire world, namely, Mt. Sumeru surrounded by four continents, while the “three supports” symbolize Buddha’s body, speech, and mind respectively.

Next, the treasurers (*phyag mdzod pa*) Badamdorj (Padma rdo rje) and Mergen mkhan po Dembereldash (bsTan pa’i bkra shis) offered the “seven royal possessions.”¹⁵ The Great Junwang Gombosüren (mGon po srung)¹⁶ and Mergen wang Anand-Ochir¹⁷ offered “that which fulfills ten thousand years” and prostrated themselves. According to the *Abhidharmakośa*,¹⁸ the “seven royal possessions,” symbols of a prosperous empire, are said to come into existence when a *Cakravarti* King, or universal king who can conquer the whole world without any weapons, is born into the world. Although we cannot identify “that which fulfills ten thousand years,” it may correspond to the “eight auspicious symbols”¹⁹ and “eight auspicious articles”²⁰ among the

items used at the Jebtsundamba's enthronement ceremony that are currently held by the Palace Museum (Batsaikhan 2011: 220).

Next, the Bogd Khaan issued his first edict, in which he began by stating that the decree was issued by "the Sunshine-like Bogd Khaan Who Causes Buddhism to Flourish and Sentient Beings to Delight, Master of the Mongol State Honored by Many, and He Who Presides over a Government Combining Secular and Religious Affairs."²¹ In this edict, the ministers and vice ministers of five ministries of the new government were proclaimed (Batsaikhan 2011: 141–144). After the reading of the first edict, all subjects prostrated themselves and were given the seals of their respective positions.

The words "Who Causes Buddhism to Flourish and Sentient Beings to Delight" describe the purpose of the life of a bodhisattva, the ideal being in Mahāyāna Buddhism. This phrase could be found in many prayers and texts, such as the dedication prayer of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* recited daily by Tibetan Buddhists.

"Honored by Many" refers to Mahasammata,²² the first king in the human world according to the *Abhidharmakośa*. Phakpa ('Phags pa), the imperial preceptor of Khubilai Khaan in the thirteenth century, explains Mahasammata in his *Very Clear Knowables* (*Shes bya rab gsal*), a commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa*, in the following manner: When human beings came to have egos, they fought with each other for land. A man of virtue was chosen to resolve the disputes and was called "Honored by Many," and he was the ancestor of the royal lineage of India.²³ Since this work was translated into Chinese during Khubilai's reign and later into Mongolian, the term Mahasammata has been known in Mongolia since the thirteenth century.

Let us now return to the description of the ceremony. Next, a meal was provided, and then the Jebtsundamba, his entourage, and inner head cook were invited to the assembly hall and participated in a longevity ceremony for the Jebtsundamba.²⁴

To sum up, first the subjects asked the Jebtsundamba and his wife to mount the throne, and then they offered them symbolic presents one after another, starting from those of the highest rank. Lastly, a prayer for "stability of life" (*brtan bzhuḡs*) was offered so that the Bogd Khaan government might continue for as long as possible. Next, let us consider the earlier enthronement ceremonies of the 13th Dalai Lama.

The enthronement ceremonies of the 13th Dalai Lama

There were two enthronement ceremonies of the 13th Dalai Lama on which the 8th Jebtsundamba seems to have modeled his own enthronement ceremony. One was his inauguration as secular ruler, held on the 8th of the eighth month of the Wood-Sheep year (1895), and the other was the ceremony for receiving the new title conferred by humans and gods in Tibet, held on the 11th of the eleventh month of the Earth-Bird year (1909). Since the latter was held hastily when Lhasa was about to be occupied by the Qing army, we will analyze the former, held in 1895.

After the destined infant had been recognized as the Dalai Lama, the regent administered secular affairs on behalf of the Dalai Lama until he came of age. In the case of the 13th Dalai Lama, his inauguration as secular ruler was held in 1895. Before his actual accession, his subjects had made two requests for him to ascend the throne, the first in the Water-Dragon year (1892) and the second in the Wood-Horse year (1894), both of which were turned down. In 1895, he finally accepted the request, and the ceremony was held when he was nineteen years of age. We can ascertain the ceremonial procedures on the basis of the biography of the 13th Dalai Lama.

In the eighth month of the Wood-Sheep year, when his subjects made the third request for His Holiness to assume religious and secular duties, the Dalai Lama ordered them to ask the oracle in Néchung (gNas chung)²⁵ whether or not his inauguration would benefit sentient beings and Buddhism (D13N-ka: 508-1–509-3). The oracle blessed the enthronement of the Dalai Lama (D13N-ka: 509-3–510-3). Furthermore, the Qing emperor encouraged his enthronement, saying, "You have come of age, have completed the curriculum of Buddhist studies, and have become no different from your predecessors. I send this emissary to hail you as master of religion and politics, who guide all sentient beings living in the direction where the sun sets to benefit and happiness. Buddha Vajradhara!" (D13N-ka: 510-3–511-2)

Thus, the ceremony began at daybreak on the 8th of the eighth month of the Wood-Sheep year when the array of stars formed an auspicious pattern. Two tutor lamas, the official abbot (*spyi khyab mkhan po*), and the three heads of attendant monks (*gsol gzims mchod gsum*), namely, the head cook, the lord chamberlain, and the master of ceremonies, offered the Dalai Lama the silk scarf of audience in his bedroom (D13N-ka:

512-4-6). The throne was placed in the hall of the White Palace called "Perfection of Samsara and Nirvana" (*srid zhi phun tshogs*), and the turquoise credential and seal and the golden credential and seal were placed on a table covered with yellow silk brocade. (D13N-ka: 512-6-513-2)

As soon as the sun rose, the Dalai Lama walked along a path that had been purified with incense and covered with white cloth to the accompaniment of music and sat on the throne supported by eight lions. (D13N-ka: 513-4-5)

Chinese officials, including the Amban who had been dispatched by the Qing court and was stationed in Lhasa,²⁶ offered silk scarves to the Dalai Lama and took their seats. Since it was in 1909 that the Dalai Lama rejected the Qing emperor's authority, the Amban had been present at this first inauguration ceremony.

To the lyrics of eulogies recited by the inner chant master (*dbyang bzang ma*),²⁷ the head of ornaments (*rgyan khri pa*) offered the "eight auspicious symbols" and "eight auspicious articles" (*bkra shis pa'i rtags rdzas*)²⁸ one after another. (D13N-ka: 513-5-514-1)

The tutor lama²⁹ asked the Dalai Lama to administer the affairs of state, and the Tibetan government displayed extravagantly the "three supports" (Buddha statue, scriptures, and stupa), "seven royal possessions," "white conch shell coiled to the right," "garments and daily necessities," and "treasures such as gold, silver, and silk cloth." Not imaginary, but actual clouds of offerings (*mchod sprin*) were piled in front of the Dalai Lama. (D13N-ka: 514-1-2)

The oracle of Néchung shrine, possessed by a Dharma protector, also offered "a maṇḍala and three supports," "the eight auspicious symbols," and "the eight auspicious articles" one after another to the lyrics of eulogies and prophesied future events. (D13N-ka: 514-2-4)

The ex-regent Khutugtu,³⁰ two tutor lamas, ministers, civil officers in general, leaders (*tsho chen*), *khutugtus*, *gongs*, *zasags*, monastic officials, three secular officers, namely, paymaster, provincial commander, and treasury officer (*phog mda' rtsis*), the officers of Namgyal (rNam rgyal) college,³¹ and the secretaries (*yig mkhan*) of China, Tibet, and Nepal presented clouds of offerings according to their status. (D13N-ka: 514-4-6) Then, governing counselors, incarnation lamas, professors, and officers from Sera, Drepung, and Ganden Monasteries, etc., paid homage and offered silk scarves. The Dalai Lama gave blessings to them all, and everyone enjoyed a feast combining the temporal and the spiritual.

(D13N-ka: 514-6–515-2)

On the 9th of the eighth month, the Dalai Lama went around the sacred places inside the Potala Palace and Trulnang and Ramoche temples to pay homage. (D13N-ka: 515-6–516-2)

From the 11th of the eighth month, many presents related to the celebrations and long-life ceremony were constantly presented to the Dalai Lama in the appearance of a king wearing a monk's robes from monasteries and villages throughout Tibet belonging to the Geluk, Sakya, and Drukpa schools. With Tsagan Khutughtu taking the part of patron, Namgyal college performed the longevity ceremony of White Tārā for the Dalai Lama. (D13N-ka: 516-2–6)

Similarities between the two ceremonies

I will now summarize the similarities between the two ceremonies.

- Both ceremonies were held on auspicious days that were astrologically chosen.
- The road along which the person to be enthroned proceeded was purified with incense and covered with cloth. Monks and lay people lined both sides of the road.
- Attendant monks such as the head cook, secretary, and chant master played important roles in overseeing the ceremony, while other monks and secular nobles and officials participated in the ceremony as worshippers. In the case of the Jebtsundamba, Da Lama Tserenchimed, a former attendant monk of the Jebtsundamba and the first minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, read out the eulogy and the first edict issued by the Jebtsundamba.
- The person to be enthroned was seated on a "lion throne," i.e., Buddha's throne.
- Subjects offered a new title and seals to the person who had just been enthroned.
- Both ceremonies in 1909 and 1911 were held with the aim of repudiating Qing influence over their respective countries. By omitting the Chinese and Manchu translations from the seals and deleting words related to the Qing from the new titles, they advocated their independence at home and abroad.
- The candidate was entreated not only by people, but also by gods. In the

case of the Dalai Lama, the oracle possessed by the Dharma protector of Néchung shrine urged him to be enthroned, while in the case of the Jebtsundamba Brahma's prophesy was quoted in the eulogy (Nyam-Ochir 2012: 295–296).

- Both candidates assumed the position of head of a government combining secular and religious affairs. While the Dalai Lamas had been well known as the spritual and political leaders of Tibet since the seventeenth century, it was only in 1911 that the Jebtsundamba became such ruler.
- At the start of the ceremony, subjects offered their Holy Emperor “the maṇḍala with three supports” and “seven royal possessions” as symbols of a prosperous empire and “eight auspicious symbols” and “eight auspicious articles” as symbols of auspiciousness. In the case of the Jebtsundamba, offerings such as a camel's nose ring and “nine white tributes,” rooted in the traditions of Mongolian nomads, were added.
- Subjects prostrated themselves and offered gifts in front of the throne one after another, starting from those of high rank.
- A prayer service for longevity was performed as the closing ceremony.

To sum up, the enthronement ceremonies of the Jebtsundamba and Dalai Lama have many similar points in both their ritual procedures and sacred utensils. It is therefore obvious that the Jebtsundamba modeled his enthronement ceremony on the earlier enthronement ceremonies of the Dalai Lama.

The kingship of the Jebtsundamba

In this section, I will clarify the nature of the kingship of the Jebtsundamba by considering references to the Jebtsundamba and his wife in the first edict and the eulogy³² read out during the enthronement ceremony and comparing them with similar references to the Dalai Lama and the Qing emperor.

The eulogy that was recited during the presentation of state seals consists of two parts: “Auspicious melodic voice offering the king's seal” for the Jebtsundamba (GKB: *rgyal tham mnga' gsol bkra shis dbyangs snyan*) and “Lute's melody announcing the edict” for his wife (JGL: *'ja' sa snyan sgron rgyud mangs glu dbyangs*). Both parts have the same structure as follows:

- An opening verse praying for their longevity with the blessing of Buddha of longevity.

- The declaration of the true natures of the Jebtsundamba and his wife, namely, Cakrasaṃvara and Ḍākinī, quoting the words of the Panchen Lama and Tsarchen Losal Gyatso (Tshar chen blo gsal rgya mtsho)³³ respectively.
- The announcement of the full names of the Jebtsundamba and his wife.
- A quotation from the words of the oracle possessed by a deity, blessing their bright future.
- A request for their enthronement as rulers of a government combining secular and religious affairs in Khalkha.
- A prayer for their infinite longevity for the growth of Buddhism and for the protection of their subjects.
- The narration of the presentation of the seals and auspicious offerings by the dignitaries of Khalkha.

Table 5-1 shows the references to the Jebtsundamba and his wife extracted from the state seal (Batsaikhan 2011: 212–213), first edict (ibid.: 141–144), etc. They can be classified into two categories, the mundane (emperor’s) aspect and the supramundane (Buddha’s or bodhisattva’s) aspect, and the latter may be further divided into the exoteric and esoteric.

This table shows that while “Vajradhara” had been used for the Jebtsundamba and “White Tārā” for his wife in various documents before their enthronement, titles having overtones of king and queen, such as “ruler of secular and religious affairs,” “Bogd Khaan,” and “State Mother,” and the esoteric title “Cakrasaṃvara” and his consort “Ḍākinī” came to be used after 1911³⁴.

It is also worth noting that at the time of the Jebtsundamba’s enthronement in 1911 the designations “Vajradhara” and “ruler of secular and religious affairs” were established as references to the Dalai Lama, and that “Bogd Khaan” and “Cakravarti King” were often applied to the Qing emperor.³⁵

Based on these facts, it may be concluded that the kingship of the Jebtsundamba would have been created by combining two types of kingship, namely, that of the Dalai Lama and the Qing emperor. Next, I will elucidate the two theories underpinning the kingship of the Jebtsundamba, the theory of a Bodhisattva King in exoteric Buddhism and that of a Buddha and his consort (*yab yum*) in esoteric Buddhism.

Table 5-1 The reference to the Jebtsundamba and his wife

Designation		Source
Jebtsundamba	Mundane	Ruler of secular and religious affairs
		Batsaikhan (2011) 139; state seal; first edict; GKB 4r, 8v; JGL 8r, 9r
		Bogd Khaan
		first edict; JGL 9r
Supramundane		Cakravartī King
		GKB 4r
	exoteric	Bodhisattva Ākāśagarbha
		GKB 3v
Dondogdulam		Vajradhara (Mo. Ocirdara)
	esoteric	DRM: no. 28, n. 6-2-3
		Cakrasaṃvara
		GKB 3v
	exoteric	State Mother
		Batsaikhan (2011) 138; state seal; JGL 8r
		Dākinī and its equivalents
		JGL 3r
	esoteric	White Tārā
		Batsaikhan (2011) 140; GZZ: document dated Guangxu 31/9/10

The Bodhisattva King

According to the *Abhidharmakośa*, the *cakravarti* (“wheel-turning king”)³⁶ is an ideal king who rules the world not by force of arms but by virtue, and in Mahāyāna Buddhism the bodhisattva is an altruistic practitioner who chooses to remain in samsara to save all sentient beings. These two concepts, *cakravarti* and bodhisattva, were unified by the thought of the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, a representative Mahāyāna sūtra, which says, “The bodhisattva assumes the appearance of a *cakravarti* to save sentient beings and lead them to the ten virtues.” On the basis of this doctrine, in areas where Mahāyāna Buddhism prevailed a king who supported the monastic community was often regarded as a bodhisattva who had been incarnated as a *cakravarti* (Ishihama 2011: 8–18).

For example, the 5th Dalai Lama was known as a *Cakravarti* King who was an incarnation of the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, the essence of Buddha’s compassion, while the Qing emperor was worshiped as a *Cakravarti* King who was an incarnation of the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, the essence of Buddha’s wisdom (Ishihama 2011: 71–106, 186–190, 275). On the basis of these precedents, the Jebtsundamba and his followers seem to have regarded him as a *Cakravarti* King who was an incarnation of the bodhisattva Ākāśagarbha.³⁷

The name of the era of the Jebtsundamba’s reign, *olan-a ergügsen*, which means “honored by many” (Chin. *Gongdai*, Skt. *Mahāsammata*), is also rooted in a story included in the *Abhidharmakośa*. According to the *Shes bya rab gsal*, in the early stages of humanity there were no social classes, but as time went by, the virtue of humans deteriorated and fighting broke out. At the time, a man of virtue was enthroned and became the first king in the world of humans, and so this first king was called “honored by many.” On the basis of this story, the Jebtsundamba seems to have adopted “Honored by Many” as his reign’s name, likening himself to the first king in the world of humans.³⁸

Buddha and his consort

Next, let us consider the esoteric deities “Vajradhara,”³⁹ “Cakrasaṃvara,” “Dākinī,” and “White Tārā”.

Vajradhara, which means “vajra holder,” is the equivalent of Vajrasattva, a Buddha who produces all Buddhas.⁴⁰ There exist portraits of the Jeb-

tsundamba and his wife that depict them as Vajradhara and his consort in the style of Tibetan Buddhism (Tsultem 1986: nos. 174–176). Cakrasaṃvara, a tutelary deity of the *Cakrasaṃvara-tantra*,⁴¹ is also one aspect of Vajrasattva. When we consider that Cakrasaṃvara rules the four continents, turning a golden wheel at the top of Mt. Sumeru at the center of the world and is surrounded by *yoginīs* forming the pattern of a wheel, we can readily conclude that Cakrasaṃvara is an esoteric interpretation of the *Cakravartī* (Willson 2000: nos. 482–487).

Vajravārahī (rDo rje phag mo), a consort of this Cakrasaṃvara, has many alternative appellations, including Vajrayoginī (rDo rje rnal 'byor ma), Karmamudrā, and Dākinī.⁴² From the fact that *karmamudrā* and *yoginī* refer not only to a Buddha's consort, but also to the consort of a male practitioner, it is evident that the Jebsundamba was announcing that his sexual relationship with Dondogdulam was a spiritual marriage.

It is well known that the Qianlong emperor was conferred the Cakrasaṃvara initiation by the state preceptor Changkya Khutugtu⁴³ in 1745, the tenth year of his reign, and that in a portrait of the Qianlong emperor Cakrasaṃvara is depicted above the emperor, with dancing *dākinīs* forming a circle around his throne.⁴⁴ In short, the Qianlong emperor was the most famous emperor to have an association with Cakrasaṃvara at the time. Therefore, the Jebsundamba seems to have assumed the image of Cakrasaṃvara in lieu of Qianlong in 1911.

That is to say, the honorific titles of the Jebsundamba were associated with two people, one being the Dalai Lama (“ruler of secular and religious affairs,” “omniscient one,” “Vajradhara,” and “Bodhisattva King”) and the other being the Qing emperor (“Cakrasaṃvara” and “Bodhisattva King”). The Dalai Lama was a virtuous monk who observed the vow of celibacy, while the Qing emperor was a secular practitioner with a consort. It seems that the Bogd Khaan government tried to produce the new concept of “a king in monastic robes with a consort” by combining these two images of kingship with a view, no doubt, to deflecting criticism to his transgressions.

One reason that Dondogdulam was referred to as White Tārā, a leading female Buddhist deity and one of the three deities of longevity (*tshe lha rnam gsum*),⁴⁵ must have been that she was expected to bless the Jebsundamba with longevity.

Conclusion

We have ascertained that the Jebtsundamba’s enthronement ceremony held on December 29, 1911, was modeled on the Dalai Lama’s enthronement with regard to its ritual procedures and symbolic offerings and that the Bogd Khaan government tried to present himself as combining the kingship already embodied in the Dalai Lama and the Qing emperor. At the time, most people in Mongolia, who had a strong faith in Tibetan Buddhism, did not understand the concept of “nation-state” or “modern monarch,” and so it was only natural that someone wishing to be a king in such circumstances would have followed the example not of rulers of modern European states, but of the ruler of a theocratic government like the Dalai Lama.

In 1911, neither the Dalai Lama nor the Jebtsundamba regarded the Qing emperor as a qualified Bodhisattva King and *Cakravarti* King. The Chinese army was invading their lands and trying to annex their territory. Therefore, by holding enthronement ceremonies, they intended to become bodhisattva kings and *Cakravarti* Kings in lieu of the dysfunctional Qing emperor. Thus, it would be dangerous for us to regard the nature of their kingship as that of a “modern monarch,” since their kingship was for most people the traditional kingship of the Tibetan Buddhist world and, if at all possible, they wanted to preserve their traditional society as it was.

Notes

- 1 When we see the relics of the Jebtsundamba’s court held by the Bogd Khaan Palace Museum and the Chojjin Lama Museum, we can easily find many points in common with the Dalai Lama’s relics.
- 2 Myagmarsambuu (2012) and Batsaikhan (2011) describe in detail the enthronement ceremony, using contemporary archives and other sources.
- 3 *Rab byung* is the sexagenary cycle in the Tibetan calendar, which began with the Fire-Rabbit year in which Buddha Śākyamuni is said to have died. The first year of the first *rab byung* corresponds to A.D. 1027.
- 4 The state yurt was called *ordu*, which means “palace” in Mongolian.
- 5 Tib. *gsol dpon* and *mgron gnyer*.
- 6 In a memorial expressing gratitude for the Jebtsundamba’s enthronement presented by his subjects, his wife was referred to as the female Buddha Tārā (Batsaikhan 2011: 140). White Tārā (Tib. *sGrol dkar*) is

regarded as one of the three divinities of long life.

- 7 The original trilingual text of the eulogy, written in Tibetan, Mongolian, and Soyombo, is preserved in the State Library in Ulaanbaatar. Nyam-Ochir has transcribed the Tibetan and Mongolian texts (Nyam-Ochir 2012).
- 8 In Guangxu 21 (1895), he succeeded to the title of Zasag Defender Duke of Tüsheet Khan Aimag, Left Flank Rear Banner (Bao 1995: 554). A Defender Duke (*zhengugong*) was a prince of the seventh grade. In 1911, the Jebtsundamba gave him the title of Tüsheet Zasag Toruyin Junwang. A *junwang* was a prince of the fifth grade (ZTS 1997: 18).
- 9 In Guangxu 18 (1892), he succeeded to the title of Zasag Qosigu yin Qinqwang of Tüsheet Khan Aimag, Right Flank Left Banner (Bao 1995: 537), and in 1911 the Jebtsundamba gave him the title of Erdene Daicing, equal in rank to a Khan (ZTS: 10–11).
- 10 He was the son of Mishigdorj, who succeeded to the title of first degree Zasag of Tüsheet Khan Aimag, Middle Left Flank Last Banner in Guangxu 18 (Bao 1995: 567). In 1911, the Jebtsundamba gave him the title of Erdene Toruyin Junwang (ZTS 1997: 22).
- 11 In Guangxu 22 (1896), he succeeded to the title of Zasag Qosiguyin Qinqwang of Sain Noyon Aimag, Sain Noyon banner (Bao 1995: 731), and in 1911 the Jebtsundamba gave him the title of Itegemjitü Eyetei Daicing, equal in rank to a Khan (ZTS 1997: 145).
- 12 In Guangxu 25 (1899), he succeeded to the title of Zasag Qosiguyin Beise of Setsen Khan Aimag, Middle Left Banner (Bao 1995: 604), and in 1911 the Jebtsundamba gave him the title of Erdene Dalai Toruyin Junwang (ZTS 1997: 72).
- 13 In Guangxu 30 (1904), he succeeded to the title of Tüsheet Khan of Tüsheet Khan Aimag Khan Banner (Bao 1995: 525), and in 1911 the Jebtsundamba gave him the title of Khalkha Vajrabatu Tüsheet Sain Khan (ZTS 1997: 7).
- 14 In Xuantong 1 (1909), he succeeded to the title of Khan of Setsen Khan Aimag Khan Banner (Bao 1995: 591), and in 1911 the Jebtsundamba gave him the title of Mahasamati Dalai Setsen (ZTS 1997: 56).
- 15 Tib. *rgyal srid sna bdun*. They consist of a precious wheel, jewel, queen, minister, elephant, horse, and general.
- 16 In Guangxu 34 (1908), he succeeded to the title of Zasag Beise of Setsen Khan Aimag, Right Flank Middle Banner (Bao 1995: 601), and in 1911 the Jebtsundamba gave him the title of Mergen Zasag Toruyin

- Junwang, equal in rank to Qinwang (ZTS 1997: 67).
- 17 In Guangxu 18, he succeeded to the title of Zasag Toruyin Junwang of Tüsheet Khan Aimag, Left Flank Middle Banner (Bao 1995: 529), and in 1912 the Jebtsundamba gave him the title of Mergen Zasag Toruyin Junwang (ZTS 1997: 26).
 - 18 Tib. *chos mngon pa'i mdzod* (Peking no. 5590).
 - 19 Tib. *bkra shis rtags brgyad*. They consist of a gilded fish, white conch, lotus flower, vase, excellent umbrella, endless knot, standard, and wheel.
 - 20 Tib. *bkra shis rdzas brgyad*. They consist of a mirror, curds, panicum dactylo grass, wood-apple fruit, right-coiling conch shell, bezoar, vermilion powder, and white mustard seeds.
 - 21 *sasin-yi manduyulqu amitan-i jiryayulyci, olan-iyar ergügdegsen mongyul ulus-yin ejen, shasin törü-yi qoushun bariyci naran gereltü bogd qayan-u jarliy*. According to Myagmarsambuu (2012), there are two people who may have read out this first edict. One, according to a book written by the aged cleric Navaannamjil (Ngag dbang nam rgyal), is Puntsagtseren (Phun tshogs tshe ring), who was the former Mongolian Amban residing in Urga, and the other, according to a book by the Great Khutughtu Gombo, is Da Lama Tserenchimed. Myagmarsambuu argues that it was Puntsagtseren who read the edict because Da Lama had already read the eulogy when the seals were offered and it would be unnatural for one of the appointees to announce his own appointment (Myagmarsambuu 2012: 154).
 - 22 Skt. *Mahāsammata*, Tib. *Mang pos bkur ba*, Mong. *Maqasanbadi* or *Olan-a ergügügsen*.
 - 23 'Phags pa blo gros rgyal mtshan: 17a1–b6; Uspensky 2006: f. 25b25.
 - 24 In the absence of any archival documents, Myagmarsambuu questions the testimony that after the ceremony the Jebtsundamba returned to the state yurt (Myagmarsambuu 2012: 155).
 - 25 The State Oracle of the Dalai Lama's government (Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1956: 444–454), who resided in the Néchung shrine in front of Drepung ('Bras spung) Monastery.
 - 26 Nachin (tenure: 1894–1896), a Mongolian from Abaganar banner.
 - 27 I interpret *dbyang bzang ma as gsung bzang ma* as the equivalent of chant master (*dbu mdzad*).
 - 28 *bkra shis pa'i rtags rdzas* may be a compound of “eight auspicious symbols” (*bkra shis rtags brgyad*) and “eight auspicious articles” (*bkra*

shis rdzas brgyad).

- 29 The 3rd Purchok (Phur bu lcog), Losang Tsultrim Jampa Gyatso (Blo bzang tshul khriims byams pa rgya mtsho, 1825–1901) of Sera (Se ra) Monastery. He was also the tutor lama of the 12th Dalai Lama.
- 30 The 9th Demo, Ngakwang Losang Trinlé Rapgyé (Ngag dbang blo bzang 'phrin las rab rgyas, 1855–1900).
- 31 The monastery inside the Potala Palace where monks serving the Dalai Lama and assisting at rites over which he presided resided.
- 32 See note 7.
- 33 1502–1566; founder of the Tsarpa subset of the Sakya school.
- 34 As we saw in Chapter 1, the head of Tüsheet Khan Aimag referred to the Jebtsundamba as Vajradhara in a memorial submitted in 1905, Kozlov testified that people in Mongolia called Dondogdulam Tara-eke in 1905, and the Qing conferred on her the title Erdene Setsen in the same year. Meanwhile, Magsarjav writes with respect to Dondogdulam's enthronement in 1911 that “the daughter under the Jebtsundamba's dominion (*shabi okin*), called Erdene Setsen Tsagan Tara Dondogdulam, was enthroned as the State Mother” (Batsaikhan 2011: 138). Taking these examples into account, we can infer that her designations Tārā and Erdene Setsen had already existed before 1911, while “State Mother” was a new designation used from 1911.
- 35 Judging from the Manchu-Chinese bilingual edict, “Boyda qayan” is a translation of Manchu *enduringge han* (e.g. QDH: 191–192). As for the Qing emperor's other designations, see Ishihama 2011: 186–190.
- 36 Tib. *'khor los bsgyur ba chen po*, Mong. *jakravād*.
- 37 One of a standard group of eight bodhisattvas. Tib. *nam mkha'i snying po*, Mong. *namqi ningbo*, which means “essence of space.”
- 38 SRS: 17b1–4.
- 39 Tib. *rdo rje 'chang*, Mong. *vacir dar-a*. We can confirm this designation in a Mongolian document of 1905.
- 40 Tib. *rdo rje sems dpa'*, Skt. *vajrasattva*. See Willson 2000: no. 474.
- 41 Tib. *'khor lo'i mgon po*, Mong. *jaydasambara*.
- 42 Tib. *rdo rje rnal 'byor*, Skt. *vajrayoginī*. For depictions, see Willson 2000: nos. 76–77, 87, 79, 84–86, 88–89, 98–99, 209. *Ḍākinī* is in Tibetan *d'a ki ma* and in Mongolian *dagini*. See Willson 2000: nos. 77–79.
- 43 The 3rd Changkya (lCang skya), Rölpa Dorjé (Rol pa'i rdo rje, 1717–1786). On the 3rd Changkya and the Qianlong emperor, see Ishihama 2011: 167–188.

44 On the portrait of the Qianlong emperor, see Ishihama 2011: 207–226.

45 The *tshe lha rnam gsum* consist of Amitāyus, White Tārā, and Vijayā (rNam rgyal ma).

CHAPTER SIX

*The Lungshar delegation and Britain in 1913*¹*Focusing on the letters of the 13th Dalai Lama*

Ryosuke Kobayashi

Introduction

As I have shown in Chapter 2, the 13th Dalai Lama tried to reach out to many foreign dignitaries, including those from the United States and Japan during his first exile from 1904–1909. The Dalai Lama considered these rising powers as potential supporters and sought their assistance; during this period and also during his second exile in India from 1910 to 1912. However, compared to his efforts in establishing ties with the United States and Japan, strengthening his relationship with Britain was the most important as he was in exile under the protection of British India, which had been a primary threat for Tibet from the late 19th century to 1904.

Sending the Lungshar² delegation to London in 1913 was one of the key strategies that the Tibetan government used to gain the support of the British government amid the rising tensions with the Republic of China. Lungshar was sent on this overseas trip to escort four Tibetan students to England to pursue Western education (Goldstein 1989: 156–164; Lamb 1966: 599–603; Tsering Shakya 1986). This was also one of the modernization projects launched by the 13th Dalai Lama, based on the advice of Charles Bell, Political Officer in Sikkim (Bell 1927: 162–163; Gould 1957: 27–29). However, the 13th Dalai Lama had a further agenda. Lungshar's mission was not only to chaperon the students, but also to deliver letters and gifts from the 13th Dalai Lama to King George V, Queen Mary, and ministers of the British government. Emma Martin has been credited as the first researcher to analyze these gifts and letters, and in her recent article "Fit for a King?" she examines in depth the inter-relationship between Tibet and Britain by



Figure 6-1 Lungshar (seated center) and the four Tibetan boys, Gangtok, Sikkim February 1913
 Courtesy of National Museums Liverpool (Charles Bell Collection).

focusing on the gift-exchange process between the two governments (Martin 2014). Although Martin does address the letters from the 13th Dalai Lama, as far as I know, no previous studies have examined them in their original language. Therefore, the 13th Dalai Lama’s intentions with his letters as articulated in his own language and how the British government interpreted and subsequently reacted to the interpretation of the letters have not been fully studied.

In this chapter, I will elucidate the relationship between Tibet and Britain by analyzing the Tibetan letters alongside their English translations, in conjunction with the British reaction to them. Furthermore, I will clarify the diplomatic agenda of the Tibetan government within international society during the early twentieth century by comparing these Tibetan letters with the letters that the 13th Dalai Lama sent to other countries.

The letters from the 13th Dalai Lama to Britain

Characteristics of the letters

The four original letters that Lungshar delivered to London are currently held in the archives of the India Office Records in the British Library in London. (They are attached to IOR/L/P&S/11/64, file P. 3937; see Table 6-1.) Each letter consists of one sheet of paper and is written in longhand

Table 6-1 Letters from the 13th Dalai Lama to Britain in 1913 (IOR/L/P&S/11/64, file P. 3937)

	Addressees in Tibetan	Addressees translated by Laden La	Recipients
1	bsod nams stobs kyi 'khor los bsgyur ba dbyin ci gong ma ^rg- yal po chen po mchog	His majesty the Great and Most Excellent Emperor, King of England, Who, by the Wheel of his Merit, exercises universal power	King George V
2	ring nas bsod nams du ma'i legs byas yongs su smin pa dbyin ji ^rgyal po'i btsun mo rin po che	Her Majesty the Great Sweet-Scented Jewel Empress, Queen of Merit in every Sphere by the Excel- lence of her Works	Queen Mary
3	bsod nams stobs dang ldan pa 'be lar spyi khyab blon chen mchog	The Excellent Chief Minis- ter of (or in) England who is very powerful by his merit	Robert Crewe (Sec- retary of State for India)
4	dbyin gzhung slob gnyer spyi khyab	The Chief Commissioner of Education of the British Government	Dunlop-Smith (po- litical aide-de- camp to the Secretary of State for India) Louis Mallet (Sec- retary for Indian Students)
5	Tibetan letter cannot be found in the same file	The Excellent Chief Minis- ter for Foreign Affairs of (or in) England, who is engag- ing the fruits of his merit	Edward Grey (Sec- retary of State for Foreign Affairs)

(i.e., *dbu med* script) in black ink. I am certain that the author of these documents was the 13th Dalai Lama (although technically his secretary [*drung yig*] most likely composed them on the basis of his dictation), since the author clearly identifies himself as the Dalai Lama (*tā la'i bla ma*) in every document, and his official seal is affixed to each.³ The same file contains the British translations of these Tibetan letters into English.

Each Tibetan letter is dated in the year of the Water-Mouse of the Tibetan calendar, which roughly corresponds to 1912 in the Western calendar. The month and day are not specified, but the letters' contents allow us to infer the date of their composition. In the letter to King George V, the Dalai Lama refers to his return to Tibet from exile in India following the withdrawal of

the Sichuan army from Tibet. According to British records, the Dalai Lama's arrival at the Potala Palace was on January 23, 1913 (FO535/16, 16173, No. 181, Enclosure 3). Therefore, these letters were likely composed between the end of January and the beginning of February 1913.

At the beginning of 1913, when these letters were composed, two highly important events took place in modern Tibetan history. One was the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty, in which the two countries recognized each other's independence, and it was signed in Mongolia on January 11.⁴ The negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty have not been studied in detail. The other event was the "Declaration of Independence" issued on February 13 by the 13th Dalai Lama. However, it is rather difficult to ascertain specific details of the 13th Dalai Lama's principles and ideas regarding his foreign policy with this declaration as a primary source, for it seems that it was circulated only domestically for a readership consisting solely of Tibetans. Thus, it had little to no direct impact on diplomatic relations.⁵ In comparison, the 13th Dalai Lama's letters, on which I focus here, are much more reliable in helping us to understand and analyze the diplomatic policies of the Tibetan government. These are extremely valuable documents in this regard, for we can understand how these letters were composed, how they were dispatched, and what the British reaction to them was.⁶

The 13th Dalai Lama put Lungshar in charge of delivering his letters and presents to the British. Lungshar stood out among the accountants (*rtsis pa*) in the Accounting Office (*rtsis khang*). Around December 1912, a short time before he left Tibet, Lungshar was promoted to the position of fourth-ranking (*rim bzhi*) official in the Tibetan government (FO535/16, 22626, no. 223, Enclosure 2). One of his main missions in this new role was to act as chaperon for the sons of Tibetan aristocrats. However, recently published Tibetan archives clearly state that Lungshar was responsible for negotiating with the British government in person about a wide range of issues such as modernization, diplomacy, military affairs, and relations between Tibet and China.⁷ There is a clear indication that the 13th Dalai Lama used Lungshar's voyage to Britain with Tibetan students to strengthen the political relationship between the two governments.

In late April of 1913, Lungshar's party, which consisted of Lungshar, his wife, and four Tibetan youths, arrived in Britain. His party was also escorted by two officials from the Government of British India: Basil J. Gould, who was returning to England on leave from his post as the British Trade Agent at Gyantse (rGyal rtse), and his assistant and Tibetan translator Laden La

(Sonam Wangfel Laden La, 1876–1936), who was from Sikkim. They met King George V in Buckingham Palace on 28 June, and Lungshar presented the letters and gifts from the 13th Dalai Lama to the King. Immediately after they met with the King, the original Tibetan letters were given to Gould, and Laden La then translated them into English (Martin 2014: 5–7).

Table 6-1 lists in sequence the addressees written in Tibetan, the addressees translated by Laden La, and the recipients (the actual people who received each letter). The 13th Dalai Lama composed letters to five people: the King, the Queen, and three Ministers of the British Government, although the fifth Tibetan letter to “The Chief Minister for Foreign Affairs” cannot be found in the same file.⁸

The disparity between the written addressees and the actual recipients for letters 3 and 4 reveals how the British government dealt with the Dalai Lama’s letters. The Tibetan addressees of the third and fourth letters were literally “The Chief Minister of England” and “The Chief Commissioner of Education” respectively, although the Dalai Lama did not use any specific names. We can interpret the former as a letter to the Prime Minister and the latter as a letter to the Chief Minister of Education of the Home Government. However, on June 30, 1913, Gould gave the third letter to Robert Crewe, Secretary of State for India,⁹ and the fourth letter to J. R. Dunlop-Smith, who was the political aide-de-camp to the Secretary of State for India, and to Louis Mallet, the Secretary for Indian Students (IOR/L/P&S/11/64, P. 3937, Political, no. 107). In other words, regardless of the Dalai Lama’s intended recipients, the British Government entrusted practically all matters concerning the letters to the India Office.

The letter to King George V

Of the four letters, the one to King George V is the longest and contains the Dalai Lama’s most important message. We can divide the contents of this letter into six parts:

- Addressee: “His majesty the Great and Most Excellent Emperor, King of England, Who, by the Wheel of his Merit, exercises universal power” (i.e. King George V).
- Explanation of China and Tibet’s patron-priest relationship (*mchod yon*).
- Expression of gratitude to Britain for its support of the 13th Dalai Lama when he was living in exile in India for three years.
- Enumeration of gifts to the King.

- Request for support from Britain for the sake of the political future of Tibet.
- The seal: *tā la'i bla ma'i tham ka rgyal* (official seal of the Dalai Lama written in Phakpa script).

In part 2, the 13th Dalai Lama writes, “China and Tibet had been in a Priest-Patron relationship” (*rgya bod sngar nas mchod yon rim 'brel*). The words *mchod yon* refer to the relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Qing emperor and meant that since the seventeenth century the Dalai Lama had always been the highest authority in Tibet, the center of Tibetan Buddhism, and the role of the Qing emperor was to protect Buddhism. This wording, which explains the historical relationship with the Qing emperors, is quite similar to what is stated in the aforementioned “Declaration of Independence” on February 13, 1913. We may conclude that the 13th Dalai Lama did not consider his relationship with previous Qing emperors as a relationship between ruler and subject.

Although the other parts of the letters’ contents are worthy of further scrutiny, I focus on part 5, in which the 13th Dalai Lama requests Britain’s support. I have translated the underlined sentences of the Tibetan text (see Appendix C-1) as follows:

A. [I would propose that,] if it pleases [the King], Russia and Britain could appoint representatives in Lhasa after the [two] countries have consulted, in order for [our Tibetan political and religious] system [of governance] to continue to develop primarily upon the independence of Tibet [in regard to its] religious and political power (*chos srid dbang byus rang btsan*). Otherwise, B. [in order for] no harm to come to Tibet from the Chinese, [I would request] your assistance in conferring with various foreign countries (*phyi rgyal khag*) who will come to support the independent power of Tibet [in regard to our] main affairs (*nang don bod dbang rang btsan*).

In section A, we can see that the 13th Dalai Lama considered the establishment of diplomatic relations with both Russia and Britain as most important for the security of Tibet and for gaining its *rang btsan*. I translate *rang btsan* as “independence” here in accordance with contemporary Tibetan usage, in which *rang btsan* is always translated to mean just that, although I discuss below how the British government originally translated it and the implications thereof.

In section **B**, the Dalai Lama clearly states what the next best option would be in the event that the dispatching of representatives from Russia and Britain to Lhasa could not be accomplished. The Dalai Lama asks Britain to negotiate with “various foreign countries” (*phyi rgyal khag*) in order, at the very least, to prevent Chinese interference in Tibet, although he does not specify which countries he was considering.

The contents of the other letters, except the fourth letter in Table 6-1,¹⁰ also closely relate to this letter to the King. First, in the letter to Queen Mary (second letter in Table 6-1, Appendix C-2), the shortest of the letters, the Dalai Lama asks that she persuade the King to fulfil the request that he made in his letter to King George V. Next, the third letter in Table 6-1 (Appendix C-3), received by Lord Crewe, includes almost the same contents as the letter to the King, except that the descriptions of the specific gifts being sent are omitted, in addition to other minor changes.¹¹

Why did the Dalai Lama prepare in advance for the possibility that he might not gain direct support from Russia and Britain? How did the British government react to these requests? In order to answer these questions, it is first of all important to know how the translator, Laden La, interpreted this letter to the King for the British government.

Translation by Laden La

Laden La, an assistant of Gould and the translator of these letters, mastered both English and Tibetan in Darjeeling when he was young. As a member of the Imperial Police Force in British India, Laden La also served as bodyguard for the 13th Dalai Lama when he was living in exile in Darjeeling. Laden La had considerable experience in Tibetan affairs on a practical level and enjoyed the confidence of British India’s officials such as Bell and Gould (Lamb 1966: 376–377; Rhodes 2006: 28; Martin 2014: 5).¹² Nevertheless, if we look carefully at Laden La’s translation of the letter to the King, we can find some parts that are worthy of extra scrutiny (Appendix: Translation by Laden La).

A. We also pray that, if it be possible, your Majesty and the Emperor of Russia will consult together, and that you and he will each depute a representative to Lhasa, for the benefit of Tibet, and that the Power, both Temporal and Spiritual, may remain with the Tibetans themselves. If this cannot be done, B. we beg that discussion may be held with other Kingdoms [?China] in such a way that the Chinese may not harm the Tibet-

ans, and that the Tibetans may enjoy their own power in Tibet.

As mentioned above, in contemporary Tibetan, *rang btsan* is translated to mean nothing but “independence” in English. However, in section A, Laden La has translated “*bod rgyal khab kyi chos srid dbang byus rang btsan*” as “the Power, both Temporal and Spiritual, may remain with the Tibetans themselves.” Secondly, in section B, “*nang don bod dbang rang btsan yong ba ...*” has been translated as “the Tibetans may enjoy their own power in Tibet....” In each case, not only is *rang btsan* not translated as “independence,” but also these passages are overall slightly more explanatory than strictly literal translations.

We need to investigate carefully the reason that *rang btsan* was not interpreted as “independence.” If we consider it from the perspective of the British government’s policy toward Tibet, there is a possibility that the British government intentionally avoided using “independence” in reference to the political status of Tibet because at the start of the twentieth century the principle of their policy toward Tibet was to recognize its “autonomy” under Chinese “suzerainty.”¹³

However, it is difficult to suppose that Laden La or Gould inserted this kind of political interpretation into their English translations of these letters. This translation was created not for the public, but for the purpose of intelligence analysis and decision-making inside the British government. Therefore, in order to convey the 13th Dalai Lama’s requests, Laden La and Gould would have tried to translate the letter accurately. From this example, at least, we can conclude that officials of British India did not necessarily use “independence” as the fixed parallel translation of *rang btsan* at the start of the twentieth century.

In addition to this, interestingly enough, if we look at section B, we can see that Laden La was confused about the Dalai Lama’s intentions. Although, as mentioned above, the Dalai Lama requested that Britain negotiate with *phyi rgyal khag* (various foreign countries) for Tibet’s political future, he did not clarify which specific countries he had in mind. Laden La translated this as “other Kingdoms,” but then added his own clarification by writing “[?China]” and noted his slight confusion with the inclusion of a question mark. In other words, this indicates that the British government had to consider their policy toward Tibet on the basis of a translation that did not accurately convey the 13th Dalai Lama’s request.

Which “countries” did the Dalai Lama mean? Was he indeed considering

“China” as one of the “various foreign countries,” as Laden La speculated? This letter is too concise to know the Dalai Lama’s real intentions in any detail. It is likely that the Dalai Lama expected Lungshar to have a chance to convey his request more concretely to the British government in person. I have not yet discovered anything in the British records to confirm whether the British government negotiated with Lungshar about this issue.

However, we can examine further what the Dalai Lama was trying to request of the British government through Lungshar by referring to another letter that the Dalai Lama composed during the same period. In the next section, I will examine the letter from the Dalai Lama to Russia, the country which the Dalai Lama referred to in his letter to the British King. I also discuss the influence and significance of the Lungshar delegation in international society during the early twentieth century by briefly explaining Tibet’s relations with Britain, China, and Russia.

Diplomacy for Tibet-Russia rapprochement

Prior to dispatching Lungshar to London, the 13th Dalai Lama sent a letter to the Russian emperor Nikolai II. The messenger sent from Tibet to Russia was Agvan Dorzhiev, a Buryat-Mongol who had received a prestigious Buddhist education in Tibet toward the end of the nineteenth century.

As previous research has shown, Dorzhiev played a remarkable role in helping to establish relations between Russia and Tibet (Snelling 1993: 32–42). In late 1912, Dorzhiev was entrusted with delivering a letter the 13th Dalai Lama had written to Nikolai II. This was around the time when the Dalai Lama was planning to return to Lhasa from his exile in India after the 1911 Revolution in China, and he would do so following the evacuation of Chinese troops from Lhasa. The following quotation is from a copy of this letter:

Although, with due consultation, there was much desire to declare Tibet as independent (*bod rgyal khang rang btsan pa*),¹⁴ the British, however, continue to insist on accepting Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.¹⁵ ... [We wish the Russians] to discuss [issues concerning Tibet] with the British and direct the envoys¹⁶ to immediately declare Tibet’s independence (*bod rgyal khang rang btsan yin pa*). It would be best if both Britain and Russia could establish the [office of their] representatives in Lhasa. If it is difficult [to act on the above stated request, because of] the terms of Anglo-Russian treaty (*ru dbyin ching[s]*), Russia may discuss [with other

influential countries], not bounded by the treaty terms, such as Germany (*sger ma ni*), France (*ha gol*), and Japan (*nyi hong*), and persuade them to establish representative [officers] in Lhasa.¹⁷

In this letter, the Dalai Lama first suggested the appointment of representatives from both Russia and Britain as the best option for Tibet, just as he did in the letter to Britain discussed above. For the Dalai Lama, this request was obviously an important part of his agenda in his negotiations with both Russia and Britain during this period. In other words, Lungshar’s mission to Britain and Dorzhiev’s mission to Russia were closely connected as part of a larger diplomatic strategy to encourage the two countries to adopt policies that were advantageous to Tibet.¹⁸

However, the Dalai Lama clearly realized that it would not be easy for the two countries to fulfill his request because of the “Anglo-Russian treaty” (*ru dbyin ching[s]*) of 1907, which is clearly mentioned in his letter to Nikolai II. In this convention, made at the end of the “Great Game” in Central Asia between Russia and Britain, the two countries recognized Chinese “suzerainty” over Tibet. The two governments also stated in the treaty that “[Britain and Russia] agree not to enter into negotiations with Thibet [*sic*] except through the intermediary of the Chinese government.” For the British and Russian governments, establishing representatives in Tibet would have contravened this agreement (Bell 1927).

Therefore, the 13th Dalai Lama had to seek the support of other countries, while at the same time encouraging Britain and Russia to revise their convention. As mentioned above, Laden La interpreted “various foreign countries” (*phyi rgyal khag*) as “China,” with a question mark. However, judging from this letter to Russia, “various foreign countries” presumably referred to Germany, France, Japan, and other countries that were not bound by the Anglo-Russian Convention.¹⁹ Before the 13th Dalai Lama fled to India, he had developed a strong understanding of international politics and of Tibet’s place in the world, and one of the ways he did so was through encounters with diplomats at Mount Wutai and in Beijing in 1908.

Laden La did not fully comprehend the 13th Dalai Lama’s intentions when he referred to “various foreign countries” in his letter to the British King. However, the Dalai Lama himself did seek opportunities to establish relations with foreign countries around the time of the collapse of the Qing. Lungshar attempted to visit other European countries when he was living in England and before he left for Tibet in September 1914 (Goldstein 1989:

162; Lha klu 1983: 473). In addition to this, as I argued in Chapter 2, around the time of the Lungshar delegation the 13th Dalai Lama tried to establish relations with Japan and the United States, and the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty was also concluded in January of 1913, as Chapter 7 will go on to examine.

The reactions of Britain and China

How did the British government react to these requests and what kind of effect did the Dalai Lama's letters have on British policy-making toward Tibet? The composition of a return letter and the selection of return gifts were mainly conducted by the India Office in the latter half of 1913.²⁰ The following quotation is from a draft of the King's reply to the Dalai Lama, dated August 18, 1913, which is recorded as NAI: Tibet Series, Part III, no. 69:²¹

It gave great pleasure to me and to the Queen to receive the letters from Your Holiness, dated on an auspicious day of a month, which were delivered to us by Kusho Lunshar; to accept the presents which you kindly sent by him; and to learn that you are offering up prayers for the long life and prosperity of ourselves and of our princes, and for the extension of my power. For all these things we thank you very much. It also gave us pleasure to receive at our Palace in London the four Tibetan students. I am glad to hear that they are working diligently, and are making good progress, under the superintendence of my officers. Your Holiness is aware that my Government is adopting means to effect a settlement between your country and China, and to establish good relations between the British Empire, China, and Tibet. I trust that the meeting between representatives which is to take place at Simla will be fruitful of good results, and will bring peace to the inhabitants of Tibet. We are sending the presents which are mentioned in the accompanying list. Will you accept these gifts with our best wishes for your welfare and long life. With a scarf of greeting, on the of 1913 from (our Buckingham Palace in London).

This reply, which was issued in the name of King George V, did not contain any specific responses to the requests from the Dalai Lama. Instead, it expressed the hope that the upcoming tripartite conference between Tibet, China, and Britain in Simla would discuss the Tibetan issues brought up by the Dalai Lama in his letter, such as Tibet's political status. Before receiving the Dalai Lama's letters, the British government had already started to make

arrangements for this Simla Conference, which would be held from October 1913 to July 1914. Although the Chinese government wanted bilateral negotiations with Britain without the participation of a Tibetan representative, in June 1913, under pressure from Britain, they reluctantly agreed to appoint a representative, Chen Yifan, for this tripartite conference (Lamb 1966: 469–471). The British government tried to avoid bilateral negotiations with Tibet, as it would have conflicted with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and would very possibly have damaged their relationship with Russia, as well as their relationship with China.²² As far as we can see, the Dalai Lama's requests in his letters to Britain did not have any noticeable influence on the British government and their decision-making process regarding Tibet.²³

Although Lungshar's visit and the letters he delivered from the Dalai Lama had minimal impact on the British government and their policy-making, the Chinese government was from the beginning concerned about Lungshar's visit with the British government. In April 1913, Shi Youming, the Chinese trade agent at Gyantse, informed Beijing that Lungshar and Gould had left for London and expressed his concerns about the delegation's influence on Britain in regard to Chinese authority over Tibet (ZMWD, 03-28-004-03-004). On July 25 in 1913, Liu Yulin, the Chinese Minister in London, also continuously informed Beijing about Lungshar's whereabouts and activities in Britain, including the fact that he had an audience with the King on June 28 (ZMWD, 03-28-005-02-004).

Yet, if we look at these Chinese diplomatic archives, we can see that the Chinese government did not formally express its concerns to the British government. It seems that, as long as the British government did not treat the Lungshar delegation as formal diplomats, the Chinese government deemed that there would be no serious diplomatic conflict between the Chinese and British governments.

Conclusion

It is difficult to conclude that the Lungshar delegation in London from 1913 to 1914 was effective in influencing British policy toward Tibet. However, Lungshar's visit and the letters entrusted to him by the 13th Dalai Lama are of key importance for understanding the Dalai Lama's entire diplomatic strategy at the time. If we look at the letter to King George V, which has a lot in common with the letter to Russia a year earlier, it becomes apparent that the Dalai Lama truly did hope to alter the 1907 Anglo-Russian Conven-

tion in order to secure Tibet's political status. Again, these letters also indicate that his intention was to seek support from countries such as Japan that were not under the restrictions of the above convention. Lastly, the Dalai Lama's attempt to contact Japan and the United States, as Chapter 2 examined, can be seen as one of the other important components to his diplomatic strategy in addition to the Lungshar delegation and Dorzhiev's mission. Taken together, these constituted his coherent assertion of the *rang btsan* of Tibet to these countries.

Moreover, I would like to emphasize the value of these Tibetan letters as historical artifacts on account of the fresh insights that can be gained when conducting a close comparative analysis with their English translations by British India's officials. Not only was Laden La not able to decipher fully the nuances of the Dalai Lama's request, but his translation also reveals an ambiguous interpretation of Tibetan terminology regarding the political status of Tibet, especially when considering the translation of *rang btsan*. On the other hand, as the 13th Dalai Lama and the Tibetan officials did not attach their own translations of the Tibetan letters, it is difficult to suppose that they gave full consideration to how their message and particular wording would be interpreted in English, specifically concerning the political terminology that was used. In other words, we have to examine more carefully when and how the translation of *rang btsan* as "independence" became standard and fixed in diplomatic correspondence between Tibet and wider international society on the basis of a comparative analysis of many additional examples beyond those discussed here.²⁴

This case study also makes us reconsider the negotiations that took place between Tibet and Britain. Needless to say, there was much correspondence between the government of British India and the Tibetan government at the time. However, it has not been fully clarified how both governments, in their negotiations, literally and figuratively translated each other's concepts and terminology regarding state-building and international relations. If there were other kinds of discrepancies in perceptions of political concepts in the correspondence between Tibet and Britain (and/or China) beyond the inconsistencies as addressed in this chapter, it would be of significant influence on their relationships during this modern period (Kobayashi 2019). This chapter illuminates this important unexplored aspect of diplomatic relations between Tibet and the international community during the first half of the twentieth century and the political limitations that Tibet faced.

Notes

- 1 This article, previously published in *Inner Asia*, 18 (2), 2016, has been edited and published here with appendices of images of original Tibetan documents. The Tibet-Japan section of the original article is covered in Chapter 2.
- 2 Lung shar rDo rje tshe rgyal (1881–ca. 1940) was a Tibetan aristocrat and government bureaucrat. The 13th Dalai Lama confided closely in Lungshar, and he was promoted and appointed as one of the Financial Ministers (*rtsis dpon*) after he returned to Tibet from Europe in 1914. Afterwards, he gained political power from 1925 to 1931.
- 3 This seal, which reads “*tā la’i bla ma’i tham ka rgyal*” and was written in Phakpa (’Phags pa) script, was often affixed to diplomatic documents and treaties issued in the name of the Dalai Lama (FO93/105/2, Convention, United Kingdom, China and Tibet, July 4, 1914; FTC: 138, OF18607-2; Schuh 1981: 14).
- 4 The most up-to-date work on this treaty can be found in Amnye Machen Institute 2013.
- 5 The only copy of this declaration can be found in Shakabpa (1976: 219–24). Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa copied this document from the archives of Seng-ge district in southern Tibet.
- 6 The letters examined in this chapter were not the first letters from the 13th Dalai Lama to London. Chandra Das quotes a Tibetan letter from the Dalai Lama to Edward VII which was composed in Darjeeling in 1910 (Das 1972: Appendix IV). In this short letter, the Dalai Lama expressed his gratitude to the King for his help with the Dalai Lama’s exile and asked him for his continuing support.
- 7 This letter was written by the Kashak (*bka’ shag*), or Cabinet, to Agvan Dorzhiev in 1913 (FTC: 105–107, OF18579).
- 8 It is likely that this original letter was transferred from the India Office to the Foreign Office. However, I have not discovered it in the course of my research in the National Archives, London, and it requires further investigation.
- 9 Before Gould left for London, it seems that he had already decided to give this third letter and the attached presents to “His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India” (FO535/16, 22626, no. 223, Enclosure 4, List of presents from the Dalai Lama, April 9, 1913).
- 10 This letter to “The Chief Commissioner of Education” expresses the Dalai Lama’s requirement for Tibetan students to receive a prestigious

education in England for the sake of Tibet (Appendix C-4).

- 11 This third letter contains an additional explanation about the historical relationship between China and Tibet. In Kobayashi (2019), I focused on this letter to analyze the 13th Dalai Lama's understanding of this issue. As for the fifth letter in Table 6-1, although I have not yet found the original Tibetan document (as mentioned in note 8), as far as I can tell from the English translation in IOR/L/P&S/11/64, file No. 3937, its contents are almost the same as those of the third letter.
- 12 Emma Martin, in her recent article, has examined Sikkimese translators such as Laden La, Rai Bahadur Achuk Tsering (1877–1920), and Kazi Dawa Samdup (1868–1923), who worked for British India as interpreters in English and Tibetan around this period (Martin 2016).
- 13 In this regard, the British government clearly mentioned the principle of their policy in a memorandum to the Chinese government on August 17, 1912 (Lamb 1966: 433–435, 604–605). They also basically maintained this principle in the tripartite conference between Tibet, China, and Britain at Simla in 1913–14, although the Chinese government persisted in asserting its “sovereignty” (*zhuquan*) over Tibet (Okamoto 2017: 353–380).
- 14 In contrast to the British translation of the Tibetan letter to the King, the Russian translation of *rang btsan* in the letter to Nikolai II is независимость, which means exclusively “independence” (RIT: no. 114).
- 15 Regarding this “Chinese suzerainty over Tibet,” as translated by Jampa Samten and Tsyrempilov, in the Tibetan text this part reads “*bod 'di phyi rgya khongs,*” which can be translated literally as “Tibet [is] under Chinese territory externally.” We can see rather similar wording to the Tibetan translation of “suzerainty” in the Simla Convention in 1914. The Tibetan text of this treaty translates “Tibet is under the suzerainty of China” as “*bod ljongs 'di bzhin phyi rgyar rgya nag gi mnga' khongs yin*” (FO93/105/2, Convention, United Kingdom, China and Tibet, July 4, 1914). I am quite sure that it was really difficult for people using Tibetan as their first or second language to interpret this English political concept of “suzerainty” in traditional Tibetan vocabulary at the start of the twentieth century (Kobayashi 2019).
- 16 In this context, “envoys” (*mi sna*) refers to the Russian envoy that was requested for negotiations with Britain.
- 17 I have quoted the English translation by Jampa Samten and Tsyrempilov, but have added some Tibetan words in parentheses (FTC: 64–65, 103–104, 132, OF18617). Although this letter does not give a specific

- date, Jampa Samten has identified the date of its composition as late 1912 (Jampa Samten 2010: 368).
- 18 The letter from the Tibetan government to Dorzhiev in 1913 also clearly reveals this strategy (FTC: 105–108, OF18579).
 - 19 In the Dalai Lama’s conversation with the Russian Consul in Urga in early 1905, the Dalai Lama had earlier mentioned that he would try to enlist aid from France and Germany if Russia refused to support him. (RIT: no. 28) It is worth discussing if the Dalai Lama thought that the two countries could be potential supporters against Britain based on the information that Dorzhiev brought from his trip to Europe in 1898. It is also worth noting the Dalai Lama’s omission of the United States, in spite of his friendship with the U.S. diplomat William Woodville Rockhill, as seen in Chapter 2. There is a possibility that the Dalai Lama had sensed that the United States was not as supportive of Tibet, even before his exile in India, from his relationship with Rockhill, that the latter had attempted to keep Tibet under the Qing’s authority. How the Dalai Lama became aware of the various countries’ foreign policies toward Tibet requires further research.
 - 20 Martin 2014: 19–21; IOR/L/P&S/11/64, P. 3937, Foreign Office to India Office on August 8 1913.
 - 21 I identified the date of its composition on the basis of the record in L/P&S/11/64, P. 3937.
 - 22 Before Lungshar left India in May 1913, the India Office, through consultation with Gould, had already tried to make Lungshar leave for Tibet immediately after arriving in London (FO535/16, No. 223, the Marquess of Crewe to Government of India).
 - 23 The British government made arrangements for the return gifts around the same time as the first half of the Simla Conference. In the summer of 1914, the return letter, together with the gifts, were finally handed to Lonchen Shatra, the plenipotentiary of Tibet for the Simla Conference, when he was leaving for Tibet after the conclusion of the conference (L/P&S/11/64, P. 3450, The Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, on August 13, 1914).
 - 24 The correspondence between the two terms would not have been established until at least the conclusion of the Simla Convention in July 1914. The Tibetan text of this treaty translates “the autonomy of Outer Tibet” as “*bod phyi ma’i nang don rgyal khab rang dbang rang btsan*” (FO93/105/2, Convention, United Kingdom, China and Tibet, July 4, 1914). Thus, *rang btsan* is here translated as “autonomy.” It seems that Tibetan officials persisted in using *rang btsan* regardless of the English terminology for indicating the political status of Tibet. See Kobayashi 2019.

CHAPTER SEVEN

*A re-examination of the Mongol-Tibetan
Treaty of 1913
Its contemporary significance*

Makoto Tachibana

Introduction

The Mongol-Tibetan Treaty—there is no such mysterious treaty. It was concluded between two states, Mongolia and Tibet, that declared their independence before or after the collapse of the Qing dynasty, on January 11, 1913. From the outset, however, many have denied the existence of the treaty. The main reasons for this denial, among others, are that the original text of the treaty had remained a secret and a key signatory on the Tibetan side, Agvan Dorzhiev, makes little mention of the treaty in his autobiography.

Although some researchers have admitted its existence, others continue to question the validity and effectiveness of the treaty because it is unclear whether the key representative of Tibet, Agvan Dorzhiev, was entitled to represent Tibet, as he was a Russian subject. Moreover, it is well known that Charles A. Bell noted, “The Dalai Lama denied that his letter—which enjoined Dorjieff to work for the Buddhist religion, a not uncommon request—justified anything in the nature of a treaty” (Bell 1927: 151).

Further, the question of under whose leadership the treaty was concluded has been raised. G. E. Morrison, the political advisor to the Chinese government, mentions the treaty in his letter to D. D. Braham on February 18, 1913. He writes: “You will know of the intrigues of Dorjeieff, the Russian Buriat, who was the cause of the Younghusband Expedition, whose policy has led China in recent years into serious conflict with Russia, with Great Britain...” (Lo 1978: 89). Nikolay Tsyrempilov has pointed out that Britain and China suspected Russia of having been directly involved in the treaty at the time, but Russia’s Triple Entente with Britain and France made direct

involvement unlikely (Tsyrempilov 2013b: 36–37). However, the jury is still out on this question.

In 2008, the situation changed dramatically because the original texts of the treaty in Mongolian and Tibetan were published in a book by O. Batsaikhan (Batsaikhan 2008: 334–336). The seals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia and the Tibetan signatories were stamped on the treaty. The treaty’s existence, at least, was confirmed.

The situation regarding the paucity of documents about the treaty has not changed, although there have been many discussions about it. Therefore, discussions continue in support of researchers’ claims without concrete evidence. In other words, researchers seek to determine whether Tibet was an independent state or was agreed to be an independent state by other countries. The attitudes of researchers are based on the current awareness of this issue.

For instance, some claim that the treaty is definitely invalid because Dorzhiev, Tibet’s plenipotentiary, was a Russian subject and the Dalai Lama did not ratify the treaty, or because Mongolia did not have the right to conclude an international treaty at the time (Wang 1993: 219–225). The counterargument asserts that the treaty was valid because Mongolia and Tibet had treaty-making capacities for the following reasons:

- Mongolia concluded the Russo-Mongolian Agreement in 1912.
- The Mongol-Tibetan Treaty was concluded before the Russo-Chinese Declaration or the Kyakhta Agreement, in which Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia was recognized.
- The signatories of both sides were invested with full powers to conclude a treaty.
- Article 9 of the treaty states, “From the day when this treaty is concluded and confirmed by seals it will come into force.” Therefore, there was no need for the treaty to be ratified (Praag 2013: 81–100).

Further, Jampa Samten has insisted that the Dalai Lama’s letter authorized Dorzhiev to conclude treaties with other countries (Jampa Samten 2015).

These issues are related to the legal validity of the treaty or the question of who initiated the treaty, and so the lack of evidence makes it difficult to reach an agreement. Therefore, we will not discuss the validity of the treaty. In this chapter, the historical facts will first be ascertained, then the objectives of concluding the treaty are examined; finally, the contemporary—

not today's—significance of the treaty is discussed. As Uradyn E. Bulag writes, “we need to rewrite the history of early modernity for both Mongolia and Tibet, not in separation, but in connection” (Bulag 2013: 3). This study seeks to clarify the contemporary significance of the treaty through such an examination.

Mongol-Tibetan relations before the treaty

The relationship between Mongolia and Tibet, believed to be grounded in Tibetan Buddhism, has a long history. The first symbolic episode of this relationship occurred when Khubilai Khaan invited the Phakpa (’Phags pa) Lama to be his National Preceptor in the thirteenth century. Later, Altan Khan designated Sönam Gyatso (bSod nams rgya mtsho), a monk of the Geluk school, as the Dalai Lama in the sixteenth century. Compared with these episodes, the relationship between Mongolia and Tibet in the twentieth century has barely been described in academia, apart from the exile of the 13th Dalai Lama to Mongolia.

As is mentioned in Chapter 1, it was said of the religious leaders of Mongolia and Tibet, the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutugtu and the 13th Dalai Lama, that they met in an informal setting in Ikh Khüree in 1905, when the 13th Dalai Lama escaped to Mongolia in the face of the invasion led by a British army officer, F. Younghusband, though details of the meeting remain unclear. N. Magsarjav, a famous Mongolian historian, has stated that the Jebtsundamba Khutugtu fell out with the Dalai Lama (Magsarjav 1994: 7).

Russian documents suggest that the two religious heads did not meet at this time. P. M. Lessar, the Russian envoy stationed in Beijing, reported to V. N. Lamzdorf, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the prestige of the Jebtsundamba Khutugtu in Mongolia was expected to suffer from the Dalai Lama’s arrival in Ikh Khüree (RIT: 59). The Russian consul in Ikh Khüree explained that the two leaders did not meet because the Jebtsundamba Khutugtu was afraid of losing the eminence that he enjoyed in Mongolia (Batsaikhan 2008: 6–7). In fact, many Mongolian Buddhists started making offerings to the Dalai Lama rather than the Jebtsundamba Khutugtu.

Furthermore, as Tanase has already mentioned in his book (Tanase 2009: 77), on April 26, 1904, Ernest Satow, the British minister in Beijing, wrote to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs that:

A private letter from Kalgan of the 18th instant contains the following

information: it is quite certain that the Dalai Lama is still at Urga. The Mongols are making large presents to him in silver bullion, cattle, horses, &c.... His presence at Urga is ruining the local Incarnate Buddha or Bogdo Lama both in revenue and reputation, and this is one of the reasons why it is not considered desirable that he should remain at Urga.... The same good authority informed me that the relations of two "Incarnate Buddhas" were the reverse of friendly.¹

Younghusband wrote, "the two incarnations do not appear to have hit it off very well, and the Dalai Lama's presence is reported to have nearly ruined the other both in revenue and in reputation" (Younghusband 1910: 377). Some researchers have referred to this to argue that the division of the offerings created a rift between the two "living Buddhas" (Liu 2009: 46). Moreover, Jebtsundamba Khutughtu was instructed by Beijing "not to pay homage to the Dalai Lama" (Shaumian 2000: 91).

On the other hand, according to a recent study by Ts. Batbayar and D. Gombosüren, the Dalai Lama and the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu had a peaceful discussion and promised to meet again (Batbayar and Gombosüren 2009: 45). Also, in the biography of Tsarong Dasang Damdul, who accompanied the Dalai Lama to Mongolia, we read: "The Grand Lama of Mongolia, Jetsun Dhampa, was seen coming towards the monastery and, with much excitement, preparation was made to receive him. But when the Grand Lama approached, accompanied by his wife, Tsakhang Tari, a few servants, and his dogs, he barged in and entered the Dalai Lama's private room without greeting anyone" (Tsarong 2000: 17).

Although the question whether they met officially or not remains unresolved, it is quite possible that the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu was apprehensive about suffering a loss of authority with the appearance of the Dalai Lama, who occupied a higher position in the religious hierarchy. There was friction between them at the time because the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu did not show due respect to the Dalai Lama; however, contact with the Dalai Lama enabled the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu to recognize the Dalai Lama's greatness once again. Thus, it seems that the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu had mixed feelings, awe and rivalry, about the Dalai Lama.

In 1910, the 13th Dalai Lama had to flee again, this time because of the invasion by Chinese troops. The Mongols proclaimed their independence from Qing domination on December 1, 1911, and the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutughtu was enthroned as the Bogd Khaan. The Dalai Lama, who re-




Figure 7-1 Mongolian text of the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty




Figure 7-2 Tibetan text of the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty

Source: Batsaikhan 2008: 335, 336.

turned to Lhasa in January 1913, issued the so-called declaration of independence on February 13, 1913.

Before this, on November 3, Mongolia had concluded the Russo-Mongolian Agreement with Tsarist Russia, in which Russia guaranteed the autonomy of Mongolia. Thus, for the Mongols, the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty of 1913 affirmed the "independence" of Mongolia. For the Tibetans, the treaty, in which Mongolia recognized the formation of an independent Tibet, was concluded before the 13th Dalai Lama declared Tibet's "independence."

Thus, there is no doubt that the treaty was of great importance to both Mongolia and Tibet in terms of enhancing their political status.

The Mongol-Tibetan Treaty and the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutugtu

Around the time of the conclusion of this treaty, Russia and China started to conduct negotiations on the Mongolian issue. I. IA. Korostovets, the Russian plenipotentiary who signed the Russo-Mongolian Agreement on November 3, 1912, and remained in Ikh Khüree, wrote to S. D. Sazonov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on January 19, 1913:

From the standpoint of Russian interests, the rapprochement between Mongolia and Tibet is somewhat convenient [for Russia], even though the treaty is not legally sufficient, as the treaty helps to restrain the eagerness for fame and self-esteem of the [Chinese] Republican Government and might induce them to be more amenable to our demands.

Furthermore, he wrote about the treaty as follows:

In the opinion of the Buddhists, applause from and approval by the head of the religious sect (the Dalai Lama) has great ethical and religious significance, and helps the masses accept the complete coup d'état by the Khutugtu and his gaining a new title. For the Khutugtu, who occupies a lower rung in the religious hierarchy, concluding a treaty with the Tibetan incarnation, whose authority is regarded as absolute in the religion, was very attractive. (JACAR: Ref. B06150061300: 74–75)

From this statement, it is obvious that Russia did not take part in the treaty.

According to Korostovets, the treaty enhanced the authority of the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu because his name was written alongside that of the Dalai Lama. As Korostovets has pointed out, the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu had the same standing as the Dalai Lama in the treaty.

The first and second articles of the treaty read:

- Article 1. The Monarch of the State of Tibet, the Dalai Lama, approves and recognizes the formation of an independent State of Mongolia, and the proclamation of Jebtsundamba Lama, leader of the Yellow religion, as Monarch of the State.
- Article 2. The Monarch of the State of Mongolia, Jebtsundamba Lama, approves and recognizes the formation of an independent State established by Tibetans, and the proclamation of the Dalai Lama as Monarch of the State. (Amnye Machen Institute 2013: 107)

This could not have happened in Tibetan Buddhist society before the Jebtsundamba Lama became the political leader of Mongolia as the Bogd Khaan, since the Dalai Lama was a teacher and the Jebtsundamba Lama a pupil in their religious order. As Ishihama has discussed in Chapter 5, the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutughtu imitated the enthronement ceremonies of the



Figure 7-3 The 8th Jebtsundamba Khutughtu

Source: Batsaikhan 2008: 218.

13th Dalai Lama when he was enthroned as the Bogd Khaan on December 29, 1911. That is to say, the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutughtu had been trying to place himself on a par with the Dalai Lama, and he achieved his objective with these articles.

Before the treaty was concluded, Korostovets wrote about the negotiations between Mongolia and Tibet in his diary on January 9, 1913:

Dorzhiev informed me that the negotiations with princes had begun and he expected that the agreement would be concluded. I hinted that we were not interested in this matter. From the Buddhist viewpoint, such an agreement would naturally enhance the spiritual authority of the Khutughtu, but it does not have any political significance. The reason for this is that Tibet is still a subject state. (Korostovets 2009: 219)

What Korostovets meant was that the agreement would be politically insignificant at an international level. However, he did not necessarily mean that it would be meaningless within Mongolia. The treaty, above all, satisfied the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu at a time when he was on the crest of a wave.

On February 5, 1913, *Le Journal de Peking* carried an article on the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty by Marchel van Lerberghe. It says:

Above all, it must be very prestigious for Mongolia that the Dalai Lama, the head of their religious sect, admitted the independence (of Mongolia). Moreover, there is no doubt that the Mongols feel very proud, and the result of the treaty influenced the Buddhists a great deal, because the Head of Lhasa first suggested the treaty. Furthermore, for Tibet, the treaty declared its independence and stated that there was no longer any Chinese claim on Tibet.

Van Lerberghe further mentioned that the treaty helped to resolve the economic problems between Mongolia and Tibet (JACAR: Ref. B06150061200: 65). Korostovets mentions this article in his diary entry for February 19, 1913. He writes, "It is said that the conclusion of the peace treaty caused discomfort among the Chinese leadership" (Korostovets 2009: 283).

To sum up, the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty resulted in reconciliation between the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu and the Dalai Lama, who had been at odds with each other since 1904. Moreover, the treaty was quite satisfactory for the former, since he was on an equal footing with the Dalai Lama in the

treaty. This is because the logic of the treaty reflected the ideas of the Mongolian side.²

The preamble of the treaty states that “We, Tibet and Mongolia, having achieved independence from the Manchu dominion and separated from China, became independent states respectively.” According to Kobayashi, this statement implies that Tibet was under the control of the Manchus before the 1911 revolution, but this idea is very different from what the 13th Dalai Lama wrote in his letters at the time. He always reiterated that Tibet was not under the control of the Qing (Kobayashi 2012; 2019).

Domestic politics in Mongolia

What motivated the Mongols to conclude a treaty with Tibet? They had already made an agreement with Russia that guaranteed Mongolian autonomy. As noted above, one of the reasons for concluding the treaty with Tibet was the Jebtsundamba Khutugtu’s desire to enhance his authority in Mongolia. Moreover, it is reasonable to suppose that the Mongols wanted to establish a relationship with more states to seek further affirmation of their “independence.” As examined in Chapter 8, the treaty was concluded to deal with problems between Mongolia and Tibet such as trading by Tibetan merchants in Mongolia. Here, we will attend to the internal significance of the treaty, that is, its significance in the context of the domestic politics of Mongolia.

It is said that one of the most serious problems in Mongolia in the early twentieth century was the contest for power between princes and Buddhist monks. Tüsheets Khan Dashnyam, a descendant of Chinggis Khan who made a claim to become the Khaan of Mongolia, is said to have been an opponent of the Jebtsundamba Khutugtu (Shirendev 1968: 433). However, it seems that the princes of Khalkha were mainly hostile to the Ministry of Interior Affairs, led by Da Lama Tserenchimed, who had gained the Jebtsundamba Khutugtu’s trust (Tachibana 2011: 69–76). In any case, there was a struggle for power within the Mongolian government when the treaty was concluded in January 1913.

Khanddorj, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was regarded as a prominent leader of the princes, was absent from Ikh Khüree when the treaty was concluded because he was on a trip to Saint Petersburg. Moreover, Namnan-süren, the Prime Minister of Mongolia, did not sign the treaty, even though he was in Ikh Khüree at the time. Thus, no princes descended from Chinggis Khan signed the treaty document. Instead, the Mongolian signatories to the

treaty were Da Lama Ravdan and Damdinsüren, the vice-ministers of Foreign Affairs. The former, a monk, was acting for the absent Khanddorj and the latter, an officer, joined the Mongolian government from Khölönbuir.

It was well known that Tserenchimed and Khanddorj had been at odds for some time: they had quarreled when they visited Saint Petersburg to seek Russian support in July 1911 (Tachibana 2011: 71–72). Because Khanddorj was still in Ikh Khüree when Dorzhiev arrived there in November 1912, it was possible to begin negotiations with him. If he left Ikh Khüree after the negotiations with Dorzhiev began, this might imply that he did not place any great significance on the treaty. In any case, there seems to have been no unanimity in the Mongolian government regarding the treaty with Tibet, and Tserenchimed left Ikh Khüree for Japan soon after the treaty was concluded.³

More curiously, the conclusion of the treaty was not reported to the Bogd Khaan, although the signatories “were granted the authority to negotiate the treaty by the imperial edict” in the preamble to the treaty. This raises the question of whether the treaty was concluded by the Mongolian government. As discussed in the next chapter, there is no document related to the negotiations in the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Of course, it is impossible to prove that something was not done as documents may be found in the future.

The distinctive feature of the Bogd Khaan was that the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu, the religious leader of Mongolia, assumed political leadership as well. Some researchers consider Mongolia at the time to have been a theocracy (Tsatsral 2004: 56); however, if that was the case, the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu would not have needed to be enthroned as the Bogd Khaan or to re-establish lord-vassal relationships with the Mongolian princes (Tachibana 2011: 183). Although negotiations began by imperial edict, the treaty was concluded by Ravdan, a subordinate of the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu, without any involvement by Mongolian princes. It might have been that the treaty was concluded secretly, anticipating the objections of the princes to the treaty, in which the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu, who was in an inferior position to the Dalai Lama in the religious hierarchy, was on an equal footing with him in the political hierarchy.

It is true that the treaty is quite strange from the perspective of modern international law, but once it was concluded, it played a role as a treaty, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

Independence or not?

One of the reasons that the treaty has attracted people's attention is that Mongolia and Tibet approved their "independence" from each other in the treaty. Further, the treaty is very important as the only evidence that Tibetan independence was approved by another country. However, these arguments are not necessarily based on a detailed examination of the articles of the treaty. According to E. Sperling, the common English text is a translation of the Russian translation of the Mongolian version (Sperling 2013: 9). The Japanese and French translations seem also to have been translated from the Russian version. In the Russian translation, the term for "independence" was translated as "самостоятельный" (JACAR: Ref. B06150061300: 72–73), while in the Japanese and French translations it was translated as "*dokuritsu*" 獨立 and "*indépendant*" respectively. How, then, was the term "independence" rendered in the Mongolian and Tibetan texts?

The preamble reads:

Our two States, Mongolia and Tibet, having come out from under the domination of the Qing State and separated from China, have each formed their independent (*öbertegen ejerkekü*) States...

Further, as quoted above, the first two articles refer to "an independent (*öbertegen ejerken*) State of Mongolia" and "an independent (*öbertegen toytanin*) State established by Tibetans," respectively (Batsaikhan 2008: 334). Here, the phrases "*öbertegen ejerken*" and "*öbertegen toytanin*" were used in each article where the intended meaning was "independent." In the Tibetan text, both were rendered as "*rang btsan*."⁴ What, then, do "*öbertegen ejerken*" and "*öbertegen toytanin*" mean?

One clue can be found in the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of 1912, which was concluded two months before the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty. The first article of the agreement states:

The Imperial Russian Government shall assist Mongolia to maintain the autonomous (*öber-tegen toytaniju öber-iyen ejerkekü*) regime which she has established, and also the right to have her national army, and to admit neither the presence of Chinese troops on her territory nor the colonization of her land by the Chinese. (MATTTTT: 175)⁵

The Mongolians used the phrase “*öber-tegen toytaniju öber-iyen ejerkekü*” to express the Russian equivalent of “autonomous.” This is exactly the combination of words used in the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty for “independent.” Therefore, some might consider that “*öbertegen ejerken*” and “*öbertegen toytanin*” simply meant “autonomy” at the time.

However, there has been some debate about the first article. The Mongolian researcher Sh. Sandag has pointed out that:

The first article of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement defined the status of [the] Bogd Khanate state as a “Mongolian” “autonomous regime.” However, in the Mongolian text, it was written as a “self-standing and self-ruling” (*öber-tegen toytaniju öber-iyen ejerkekü*) “Mongolian state,” which meant “sovereign state.” (Sandag 1971: 21)

Further, L. Jamsran writes that: “Mongolian leaders understood the words ‘self-standing and self-ruling’ (*öber-tegen toytaniju öber-iyen ejerkekü*) regime as ‘independence’” (Jamsran 1992: 106). However, neither Sandag nor Jamsran present any evidence to prove that “*öber-tegen toytaniju öber-iyen ejerkekü*” means “independence.”

It is widely known that the *Wanguo gongfa* 萬國公法, the Chinese translation by William Martin of Henry Wheaton’s *Elements of International Law*, played an important role in introducing international law to East Asia. In fact, the Mongols translated the *Wanguo gongfa* into Mongolian in the early twentieth century and called it *Tümen ulus-un yerüde-yin čayaja*.⁶ It is reasonable to surmise that this is the Mongolian version of the *Wanguo gongfa*, since *tümen* means *wan* 萬 (ten thousand), *ulus* means *guo* 國 (state), *yerüde-yin* means *putong* 普通 (ordinary), and *čayaja* means *fa* 法 (law).

The phrase “*öber-tegen toytaniju öber-iyen ejerkekü*” appears in the *Tümen ulus-un yerüde-yin čayaja*. Chapter 2, section 14 in the first part of the *Tümen ulus-un yerüde-yin čayajaz* reads:

alban bariqu alban_a qariyatu ayimay-un üldegsen ejen-ü erke-yi alban bariqu ulus ba, basaqu qariyatu ayimay ulus-i yerüde-yin čayajatur tegün-ü üldegsen ejen-ü erke-yi ülemji qobur-i üjeju tegün-ü öber-iyen ejerkekü-yin qubi-yi toytayamui. ou lü ba-yin dalai-yin ulus urida ba bari ulus-tur alban bariqu caytu tegün-ü öber-tegen toytaniju öber-iyen ejerkekü-yin erke-tür yerü qarsilaysan yabudal ügei.... (TUYeTs: 184–185)

The Chinese version of this part reads:

進貢之國、並藩邦、公法就其所存主權多寡、而定其自主之分。即如歐羅巴濱海緒國、前進貢於巴巴里時、於其自立自主之權並無所碍。(WGGF: Bd. 1, §2.14 「進貢藩屬所存主權」)

The corresponding section in Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* reads:

Tributary States, and States having a feudal relation to each other, are still considered as sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not affected by this relation. Thus, it is evident that the tribute, formerly paid by the principal maritime powers of Europe to the Barbary States, did not at all affect the sovereignty and independence of the former. (Wheaton 1855: 51–52)

It is evident that the phrase “*öber-tegen toytaniju öber-iyen ejerkekü*” was the translation of the Chinese “*zili zizhu*” 自立自主, which was the translation of the English “sovereignty and independence.” As noted above, the phrases used in the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty were “*öbertegen ejerken*” and “*öbertegen toytanin*,” and these are literal translations of the Chinese *zizhu* and *zili* respectively. Therefore, as noted in previous studies, Mongolia and Tibet recognized the independence of each other in the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty.

The Mongols used translations of the Chinese words *zili* and *zizhu* to signify “independence.” Because the word *duli* 獨立, which means independence, had been introduced into Chinese by the time of the treaty, there were discrepancies between the translated Chinese words and the original words, such as “*öbertegen ejerkekü*” and *zizhu* or “*öbertegen toytaniqu*” and *zili*.⁷

Conclusion

As demonstrated above, the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty had more domestic than foreign policy significance, at least for Mongolia, since the treaty definitely enhanced the authority of the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu in Mongolia. Some princes like TüsHEET Khan Dashnyam claiming descent from Chinggis Khan

opposed the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu, who had become the Bogd Khaan. Therefore, the treaty helped the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu to further secure his position as Mongolia’s Khaan. Also, the fact that the Mongolian government did not actively propagandize the conclusion of the treaty to the world supports this hypothesis.

However, there are still many unanswered questions: for example, which side took the initiative during the negotiations, how the negotiations were conducted, and whether the Mongolian princes really abstained from the negotiations, among others.

Further, when viewed from modern international law, there is an irregularity in the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty, but it does not necessarily mean that the treaty was meaningless. As discussed in the next chapter, the treaty was often referenced by the two parties, Mongolia and Tibet, after its conclusion, and therefore it should be considered to have been historically very significant.

Notes

- 1 Quoted from EAST INDIA (TIBET), Further Papers Relating to Tibet (In continuation of Cd. 2370), No. 13.
- 2 The treaty itself seems to have been drafted in Tibetan first (Tsyrempilov 2013b).
- 3 Tserenchimed transferred his seal of the Ministry of Interior Affairs to the vice-minister on January 31, 1913, and so it seems that he left for Japan at the start of February (NCAM. FA3-D1-KhN17-Kh246). It is said that Khanddorj was against Tserenchimed’s visit to Japan (JACAR: Ref. B06150062700: 86).
- 4 For details on the contemporary use of the Tibetan term *rang btsan*, see Kobayashi 2019.
- 5 The English translation has been quoted from The American Society of International Law 1916: 180–187.
- 6 For more details, see Tachibana 2011, chapter 5.
- 7 For details, see Tachibana 2014a.

CHAPTER EIGHT

*Tibetans in Mongolia**Mongol-Tibetan relations in the early twentieth century*

Makoto Tachibana

Introduction

It is widely known that Mongolia and Tibet declared their independence around the time of the collapse of the Qing dynasty in February 1912. Specifically, Mongolia declared its independence on December 1, 1911, and Tibet followed suit on February 13, 1913.

Mongolia and Tibet are usually regarded as having been ruled by the Qing dynasty, although some researchers may disagree. The most notable difference between Mongolia and Tibet in the Qing period was the existence of a type of government headed by the Dalai Lama in Tibet: there was no central government in Mongolia because it was divided into several leagues and banners. Therefore, there were no natural political relationships between Mongolia and Tibet during the Qing period.

Mongolia and Tibet endeavored to build cooperative relationships with the establishment of the new Mongolian government, the Bogd Khaan government. Mongolia sought political connections as well as the existing religious connection. This chapter considers the formation of Mongol-Tibetan relations and their development in the early twentieth century in the context of the actual situation.

Many studies have investigated relations between Mongolia or Tibet and the Qing court or the Republic of China. The international relationships surrounding Mongolia and Tibet have been widely examined too.¹ However, Mongol-Tibetan relations after the fall of the Qing dynasty have not been researched, with the exception of the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty of 1913, despite continuing relations between the two countries after the treaty was signed

and even after the Mongolian Revolution of 1921.

There is little mention in previous studies of Tibetan merchants in Mongolia. According to L. Dūgersüren, Tibetans in Mongolia were exempt from taxation (Dūgersüren 1956: 73), and the Dalai Lama’s *Sang*² was established to manage the Dalai Lama’s property when he was exiled to Mongolia in 1905 (Dūgersüren 1956: 42). However, its real activities remain unclear. The discussion below focuses on Tibetans in Mongolia in the early twentieth century, especially their status in Mongolia, as one aspect of the actual relations between Mongolia and Tibet.

Mongolian independence and the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty of 1913

Mongolia’s independence from the Qing dynasty was declared by the princes and lamas of Outer Mongolia. The so-called “declaration of independence” states that “it is proclaimed to all Mongolians, Russians, Tibetans, Chinese, and the Sacred and the Profane” to “do your business quietly as formerly and live in peace” (MATTTTT: 10). This demonstrates that there were a considerable number of Tibetans living in Mongolia at the time.

According to a report written by Miyazaki Kaichi 宮崎嘉一 of the Mitsui Trading Company, there were 500 Tibetans in Ikh Khüree, the capital of Mongolia, in 1917 (Mitsui bussan kabushiki gaisha gyōmuka 1918: 70). The report by Ōshima Kiyoshi 大島清 of the Mitsui Trading Company records 1,500 Tibetans in Ikh Khüree in 1917 (Ōshima 1969: 8). The difference in the numbers might be a result of seasonal fluctuations in the number of Tibetan merchants trading in Mongolia. Jurisdiction over Tibetans in Mongolia, which had been controlled by the Manchu *Amban* in Ikh Khüree in the Qing period, was transferred to the new Bogd Khaan Mongolian government with the collapse of the Qing dynasty.

Relationships between the Bogd Khaan government and the Dalai Lama government must be considered as context for the activities of Tibetans in Mongolia. There is no doubt that the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty concluded on January 11, 1913, was the most important event for the governments of Mongolia and Tibet. The reasons for concluding the treaty and the political situation of the Mongolian government have been discussed in Chapter 7: this chapter examines matters concerning trade between Mongolia and Tibet.

Article 6 of the treaty is concerned with trade between Mongolia and Ti-

bet. Article 6 states:

Mongolia and Tibet will continue, as formerly, to trade goods produced in their territories, such as livestock, skins and other such items; to manufacture [them]; and to provide for monetary circulation. (Amnye Machen Institute 2013: 107)

This article stated simply that trade should “continue, as formerly.” The content of the trade was not specified at all. This meant that various problems occurred when the two governments built new relationships under different conditions than formerly. The first issue to arise was the question of which office in the Mongolian government should be in charge of Tibetan matters in Mongolia. During the Qing period, Mongolian offices did not take charge of Tibetan affairs because there was the Manchu *Amban* in Ikh Khüree. This issue was mentioned in a memorandum to the Bogd Khaan dated August 28, 1913, which reads:

Tibet has already become an independent state and concluded the Friendship Treaty with Mongolia, but they have not specially stationed an officer in our capital. There are many merchants from Tibet living and engaging in trade, and so the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should administer their matters the same as other countries. However, this is not a matter that we, the subjects, may decide by ourselves.... (MUDY: 239–240)

On the same day, the Bogd Khaan issued an imperial edict, in which it was written in red pen that the matter would be decided “just as you asked.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be in charge of Tibetan matters, “the same as other countries.” This decision was unsurprising, since Mongolia and Tibet had already approved their “independence” from each other in the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty.

The next problem was whether Tibetan merchants should pay taxes. The Mongolian government had concluded the Russo-Mongolian Agreement with Tsarist Russia on November 3, 1912, and Article 2 of the protocol annexed to the agreement states:

Russian subjects, as formerly, shall enjoy the right at all times to import and export, without payment of import and export dues, every kind of product of the soil and industry of Russia, Mongolia and China, and

other countries, and to trade freely in it without payment of any duties, taxes, or other dues. (The American Society of International Law 1916: 241)

Thus, Russian subjects were exempt from import and export duties. Other citizens such as the Chinese were taxed at five percent across the board, and liquor and tobacco were taxed at ten percent (Lonjid 2000: 16; Ōshima 1969: 25).

On November 18, 1913, the Ministry of Taxation posed the following question to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

According to the Bogd Khaan's edict, since the Ministry of Taxation has already been established, it should manage all matters relating to taxation. However, because we sometimes collect taxes from foreign countries, the Ministry of Taxation should make judgments with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Tibet has already become an independent state and concluded the Friendship Treaty with our country.... In the rules for taxation, it is not clear whether Tibetan merchants should be taxed. Further, we do not have any documents that clarify for us whether the taxation of Tibetan merchants was discussed at the negotiations for the Friendship Treaty.... We would like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to decide whether we should collect taxes from Tibetan merchants. In addition, if we decide to collect taxes from the merchants from their country, we would like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to decide which Ministry should present a memorandum to the Bogd Khaan to ask for the edict. (NCAM: FA8-D1-KhN409-Kh3)

As this letter shows, one of the problems that the Ministry of Taxation ran into was taxation for Tibetan merchants. Because there was no regulation about taxation from Tibetan merchants in the rules for taxation or the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty, the Ministry of Taxation sought a judgment from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which administered Tibetan matters. Although a number of rules for taxation from Chinese merchants were already established at the outset of the Bogd Khaan government, there was no regulation for Tibetans.

The answer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Taxation, dated November 20, 1913, was interesting. It reads:

We never discussed the issue of collecting tax from Tibetan merchants at the negotiations for the Friendship Treaty we concluded with Tibet. Now, there is no reason for not collecting tax from Tibetan merchants. We should ask the Bogd Khaan whether we should tax Tibetans, and obey the imperial decision. We would like the Ministry of Taxation, which administers tax matters, to deliberate as soon as you receive this letter and report to the Bogd Khaan. (NCAM: FA8-D1-KhN409-Kh1)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered it reasonable to collect tax from Tibetan merchants because there was no regulation about tax exemption for Tibetans in the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty.

Nevertheless, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' statement was not based on facts. As quoted above, it is a fact that Article 6 of the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty did not mention tax-free trade. However, Article 3 of the Mongolian and Tibetan drafts of the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty, discovered by Nikolay Tsyrempilov at the M. N. Khangalov History Museum of Buryatia states that "[Mongolia and Tibet] mutually do not tax trade goods that come and go, and try to develop the trade" (Tsyrempilov 2013b: 38–40).³ In other words, the treaty draft declares that trade between Mongolia and Tibet is to be tax-free. Therefore, tax-free trade must have been discussed at the treaty negotiations.

This supports the view that the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty is not the treaty that the Mongolian government signed, as discussed in Chapter 7. It is a fact that Ravdan, the vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, affixed the seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the treaty, seizing the opportunity presented by the absence of Khanddorj, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but the Ministry, as such, did not necessarily engage in negotiations. This hypothesis would explain why there were no documents concerning the negotiations stored at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia, and why the conclusion of the treaty was not reported to the Bogd Khaan. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty was ineffective; rather, it looks odd from the perspective of modern international law. It appears that the treaty was concluded under different principles from those of modern international law.

S. Idshinnorov has cited a document, dated July 21, 1914, about the taxation of Tibetans, which reads, "There is no need to regard Tibetans as special. They should be taxed the same as the Chinese" (Idshinnorov 1996: 36). This suggests that the Mongolian government intended to tax Tibetans.

However, the Ministry of Taxation sent a letter on June 25, 1914, to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance to discuss the issue of taxation of Tibetans. The letter reads:

We, the Mongols, introduced Buddhist rituals from Tibet, and so we wonder if we should regard it as special from Russia or China. And if so, it might cause a disturbance in friendships with foreign nations like Russia because we now tax all kinds of Russian goods crossing the China-Mongolian border like Manchuria. (NCAM: FA8-D1-KhN162-Kh26-29)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied, “When we tax trading goods, we collect taxes from the Mongols, so it is not improper to collect taxes from the Tibetans” (NCAM: FA8-D1-KhN162-Kh31-34).

Having discussed the matter with other ministries, the Ministry of Interior Affairs insisted that: “Our nation collects this kind of tax from the nation and other nations, and so we do not have to discuss this matter by singling out the Tibetans.” The Ministry of the Army agreed with the Ministry of Interior Affairs. Citing Article 6 of the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty, the Ministry of Justice pointed out that there was no item related to taxation in the treaty and insisted that it would benefit both Mongolia and Tibet if both parties collected taxes from each other (NCAM: FA8-D1-KhN162-Kh47-51).

Although it is still unclear whether a memorandum was presented to the Bogd Khaan and how he decided, most ministries considered that the Tibetans should be taxed. Nevertheless, as we will demonstrate below, Tibetans seem to have been exempt from taxation.

Tibetans in Mongolia after the Simla Convention and the Kyakhta Agreement

International relations surrounding Mongolia and Tibet, including those relating to China, were changing dramatically at the time when the issue of taxation of Tibetans in Mongolia was being discussed in the Mongolian government. First, negotiations among Britain, China, and Tibet at Simla in India began in October 1913 and concluded with the Simla Convention of July 3, 1914. This convention decided the political status of Tibet: Outer Tibet was to enjoy autonomy under Chinese suzerainty and Tibet was a part of Chinese territory. Although the Chinese delegation initialed the convention, the Chinese central government refused to ratify it because of disagreement

about the border issue between Tibet and China. Therefore, the convention was agreed between Britain and Tibet only, and as a result the international status of Tibet remained very ambiguous.

On the other hand, Mongolian autonomy had been guaranteed by Russia in accordance with the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of November 3, 1912. The Mongolian government sought to understand the “autonomy” that was not stipulated in its relationship with China as “independence,” but Chinese suzerainty over Outer Mongolia, which enjoyed autonomy, was agreed between China and Russia in the Russo-Chinese Declaration of November 5, 1913. This agreement stipulated that Outer Mongolia was a part of Chinese territory. Furthermore, the Kyakhta negotiations began on September 8, 1914, and the Kyakhta Agreement was concluded between Russia, China, and Mongolia on June 7, 1915. On the basis of the Russo-Chinese Declaration, this agreement confirmed that Outer Mongolia enjoyed autonomy under Chinese suzerainty and was a part of Chinese territory.

The issue of the legal status of Tibetans in Mongolia arose as a consequence of the Kyakhta Agreement. According to the Kyakhta Agreement, although Outer Mongolia enjoyed autonomy, it was a part of Chinese territory, and China, which did not ratify the Simla Convention, asserted sovereignty over Tibet. Therefore, according to Chinese understanding, both Outer Mongolia and Tibet were included in Chinese territory, and so Tibetans in Mongolia were still residing within Chinese territory. The questions here are what Chinese suzerainty restrained the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, and what the autonomy of Outer Mongolia enabled the Mongolia government to do.

On October 4, 1915, the following exchange occurred between V. N. Kurpenskii, the Russian minister in Beijing, and Lu Zhengxiang, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

- Kurpenskii: Should Tibetans living in Outer Mongolia obey Chinese law or Mongolian law?
- Lu: Although our Ministry (of Foreign Affairs) will thoroughly investigate it, in my opinion, Tibetans living in Mongolia naturally should obey Chinese law. But it is not clear how many Tibetans are living in Mongolia.
- Kurpenskii: There are not a few Tibetans coming to Mongolia for religious events every year. (ZMWD: 03-32-171-01-046)

That is to say, China thought that Tibetans in Mongolia should obey Chinese law even though it did not know the number of Tibetans in Mongolia.

Four days later, on October 8, 1915, Wang Tingzhang, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, visited Kurpenskii and replied:

- Wang: As for the matter of whether Tibetans in Outer Mongolia should obey Chinese law or not, which you asked the other day ... naturally they should obey Chinese law. That is why I was sent to respond to your inquiry.
- Kurpenskii: That is fine. I will inform our government. (ZMWD: 03-32-171-01-049)

The opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was very clear.

Articles 13 and 14 of the Kyakhta Agreement concerned jurisdiction in Outer Mongolia. Article 13 states:

Civil and criminal actions arising between Chinese subjects residing in Autonomous Outer Mongolia are to be examined and adjudicated by the Chinese Dignitary at Urga and by his assistants in other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia.

Further, Article 14 states:

Civil and criminal actions arising between Mongols of Autonomous Outer Mongolia and Chinese subjects residing therein are to be examined and adjudicated conjointly by the Chinese Dignitary at Urga and by his assistants in other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia, or their delegates, and the Mongolian authorities.... The guilty are to be punished according to their own laws.... (The American Society of International Law 1916: 254)

Therefore, if people in Tibet, which was a part of Chinese territory, were "Chinese," they should obey Chinese law in the same way as did the Han Chinese.

Alexandre Andreyev has studied contemporary Russian documents which note that Russian officials were concerned about the administrative status of Tibetans in Outer Mongolia. He states:

The Peking Government claimed they were under Chinese jurisdiction, whereas the Mongolian Government insisted that the Tibetans should continue to be looked after by the Department of Spiritual Affairs and Property, the Shantszodba, as had been the case before the Mongolian revolution. Both Khionin and Sazonov subscribed, naturally, to the latter view. (Andreyev 2003: 67)

The Chinese government later sought to recover the right to administer Tibetans in Mongolia.

There are few Tibetan documents kept at the National Central Archives of Mongolia. Only the following two letters are closely related to this matter.⁴ The first letter is dated the 22nd day of the fourth month in the Fire-Dragon year (May 23, 1916). It notes that “a treaty [between Tibet and Mongolia] signed in the Water-Mouse year (1913) also clearly shows that local areas shall lend support to all movement between each other because Tibet and Mongolia share loyalty to Buddhism.” This demonstrates that the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty was known among the Tibetans in Mongolia. The letter continued:

Recently, we received an order from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. “A letter from a Minister (*Amban*) of the Revolutionary Government (Republic of China) reached [us]. The content is an order that the Chinese *Amban* will have leadership over all Tibetans; therefore, [the Mongolian Government] has to transfer [authority to China]. If you wish to ask the Chinese *Amban* to have leadership [over all Tibetans], you do not have to report [to us, the Foreign Ministry] for that. If you wish to make appeals to the Mongolian Ministry [of Foreign Affairs] as in the past, for that purpose you need documents with the seal [of the Foreign Ministry].”

This suggests that China tried to recover the right to administer Tibetans in Mongolia, which they had lost in 1911. Tibetans in Mongolia replied as follows:

The main content of this letter that we are sending to you about this issue is that we, all the lay people and monks who have lived in Da Khüree, and the lay and monk merchants, and monks [who do not engage in trade], as mentioned above, have lived under the protection of the Pro-

tector Ejen Bogd, Jebtsundamba Rinpoche, as well as continuing to follow the law of Ejen Bogd, Protector Jebtsundamba Rinpoche. We note that, except for Ejen Bogd Protector Jebtsundamba Rinpoche, there is no leader for all the lay people and monks who live here, and it will never change in the future. (NCAM: FA4-D1-KhN408-N1; See Appendix D-1)

It is obvious from this letter that Tibetans in Mongolia expected to remain under the protection of the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu.

Another letter dated the 1st day of the fifth month in the Fire-Dragon year (June 1, 1916) has almost the same contents. The sender was the Amdo people in Mongolia, and the letter reads:

Recently, [we] received an order from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 16th of the 4th month. The order says, “You, Amdo people, do not have to report to us, the Foreign Ministry, if you follow the law of the Chinese Revolutionary (Republic of China). Otherwise, if [you wish to do] as usual in the past, you need documents sealed by the Ministry [of Foreign Affairs].”

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked them which administration they wanted to follow, China or Mongolia. The Amdo people in Mongolia replied as follows:

From the past until now, we, all the people from Amdo here, trading merchants and monks, have followed the orders of Protector Ejen Bogd Jebtsundamba Rinpoche. We will definitely continue to obey the orders of Ejen Bogd, Protector Jebtsundamba Rinpoche. (NCAM: FA4-D1-KhN408-N2. See Appendix D-2)

They expected to remain under the protection of Jebtsundamba Khutughtu, the same as in the first case.

Interestingly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent letters to the Tibetans and Amdo people when the Ministry informed them of the Chinese *Amban*’s demand that they recognize his leadership over all Tibetans. A question now arises: who were the Tibetans? The Tibetans and the Amdo people conveyed their requests separately to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the two letters quoted above. In this case, it is not clear whether they were regarded as different categories and were administered separately in Mongolia. Originally,

the Amdo people should have obeyed Chinese law because Amdo was supposed to be under the sovereignty of China at the time, but they hoped to remain under the protection of the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu as before. It might be that the Mongolian government treated Amdo people as “Tibetans” when conveying the order from the Chinese Minister to them.⁵

This fact is closely related to the issue of how the Mongolian government positioned Tibet at the time. Mongolia’s and Tibet’s independence, of which the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty mutually approved for each other, was denied by the Simla Convention and the Kyakhta Agreement. Therefore, it might have been natural for the Mongolian government to regard Tibet as a part of Chinese territory, the same as Outer Mongolia under Chinese suzerainty. However, the Simla Convention was negotiated between Tibet, Britain, and China without Mongolia. Also, the Kyakhta Agreement allowed Outer Mongolia to conclude “international treaties and agreements respecting all questions of commercial and industrial nature concerning autonomous Mongolia” (Article 5), though they had no right to conclude international treaties related to “political and territorial questions” (Article 3) (The American Society of International Law, 1916: 251–252). In this case, there still was room for the Mongolian government to regard Tibet as a “state”, and Tibetans in Mongolia were not “Chinese.”

As a consequence of the change in international relations surrounding Mongolia and Tibet, an issue of taxation of Tibetan merchants arose again. On June 21, 1915, just after the conclusion of the Kyakhta Agreement, the Ministry of Taxation prepared the following draft for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mongolian purchasers should pay tax when they buy goods from merchants who are exempt from taxation, such as Russian and Tibetan [merchants]; accordingly, it is possible to prevent tax leakage by reselling.... There are no rules for that, but if we do not tax them, it is difficult to ensure tax revenue. Cunning Mongolians might give false testimony that they bought their livestock from Russian or Tibetan [merchants]. (NCAM: FA8-D1-KhN627-N19)

It is worth noting that tax exemption for Tibetans was clearly mentioned in this draft. As discussed above, the decision of the Mongolian government was that “it is not necessary to view Tibetans separately. They should be taxed the same as the Chinese.” If we assume that this decision was made on

June 21, 1914, it was overturned within a year. Further, this draft gives us a glimpse into the practice of some Mongolians, who tried to commit tax evasion by pretending they had bought their goods from Russians and Tibetans.

Ten days later, on July 1, 1915, the Ministry of Taxation prepared another draft for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The draft reads:

Last summer, the Ministry of Taxation discussed with six Ministries, including the Prime Minister’s office, the matter of whether trade from Tibet should be taxed ... and reached the decision that they would decide after discussing it with the Tibetan government. (NCAM: FA8-D1-KhN627-N1)

Thus, tax-exempt trade should have been agreed after negotiations with the Tibetan government. Then, what Tibetan government did the Mongolian government negotiate with?

There is no indication that the Mongolian government dispatched an envoy to Tibet at this time. With whom did the Mongolian government negotiate? One possibility is the Dalai Lama’s *Sang*, which managed the alms received from Mongolian adherents of Buddhism. Batbayar and Gombosüren have pointed out that the Dalai Lama’s *Sang* played a role similar to the Representative Office of Tibet (Batbayar and Gombosüren 2009: 132). In fact, one of the signatories of the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty from the Tibetan side was Ishjamts, who was the manager of the Dalai Lama’s *Sang*. Although the process whereby Tibetans were exempted from tax in Mongolia was still unclear, tax-free trade, which the draft of the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty aimed at, was accomplished as a result. However, the above-mentioned draft continues, “Mongolian products and livestock sold by Tibetans are taxed the same as the others.” That is to say, the Mongolian government decided that goods brought from Tibet were not taxed, but they were taxable when Tibetans handled Mongolian products. Furthermore, this draft reads: “Please decide whether to collect tax on products from Tibet which they bring [to Mongolia] as well.” (NCAM: FA8-D1-KhN627-N1) This demonstrates that there were still some people who wanted to tax Tibetans and the local response regarding trade by Tibetans changed repeatedly due to a lack of clear regulations.

According to Batbayar and Gombosüren, the Mongolian government decided to tax Tibetans after the Mongolian Revolution of 1921, but Buddhist scriptures and statues were exempted from tax in November 1925 (Batbayar

and Gombosüren 2009: 131).

On October 14, 1922, the Mongolian government sent a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tibet, in which the former asked the latter to dispatch a delegation to Mongolia, but Tibet did not reply to this request (Gombosüren 2013). In addition, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia stated at the second State Great Khural of Mongolia in 1925 that Mongolia was planning to send a delegation to Tibet (BNMAU2Ikh: 75–76). In fact, Gomboidshin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Mongolia to Tibet, was sent to Tibet in September 1926. Gomboidshin stayed in Lhasa from April 28 to December 9, 1927, and met the Dalai Lama on December 13, but it is said that the negotiations were not necessarily successful (Batbayar and Gombosüren 2009: 114–127). It is not certain when the Dalai Lama's *Sang* was closed at that time, but it seems that it ceased activities in Mongolia in 1935 or 1936 (Batbayar and Gombosüren 2009: 133).

The diplomatic activities of Mongolia toward Tibet after the Mongolian Revolution of 1921 were carried out within the framework of Soviet Russia's international strategy.⁶ Therefore, Mongol-Tibetan relations changed qualitatively from those of the period of the Bogd Khaan government.

Conclusion

After the fall of the Qing dynasty, Mongolia and Tibet fought for independence from China. Mongolia and Tibet asked for support from Russia and Britain; consequently, changes in the international situation such as World War I or the Russian Revolution had a direct impact on them. However, rather surprisingly, Mongol-Tibetan relations stipulated in the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty were not influenced by changes in Mongol-Chinese relations or Tibet-Chinese relations. Previous studies, conducted from the perspectives of the great powers, have not identified this fact.

Tibet and Mongolia were regarded by the Simla Convention of 1914 and the Kyakhta Agreement of 1915 as regions that enjoyed autonomy under the suzerainty of China. However, Mongolia still retained the right to conclude international treaties not related to “political and territorial questions.” Therefore, Mongolia continued to see Tibet as a “state” and retained the right to manage Tibetans living in Mongolia. This meant that China could not interfere actively in Mongol-Tibetan relations at the time. In other words, Mongolia and Tibet had established mutual relations independently.

After the Mongolian Revolution of 1921, Mongol-Tibetan relations en-

tered a new phase. The 13th Dalai Lama was wary of Mongolia, which was absorbed into Soviet communism’s sphere of influence, and so all attempts by the Mongolian government to establish relations with Tibet failed. However, details of these negotiations and Tibet’s reactions remain unclear.

Notes

- 1 See, for example, Friters 1949, Goldstein 1989, Nakami 1994, Zhang 1995, Feng 1996, and Kobayashi 2019.
- 2 “*Sang*” is derived from the Chinese word *cang*, which means “a fund in a lamasery, the capital fund of a high lama” (Bawden 1997: 294). It was generally regarded as a bank (*vinhang*) in Chinese sources (ZMWD: 03-32-192-03-004).
- 3 For details of the “Documents of Dorzhiev” kept in the History Museum of Buryatia named after M. N. Khangalov, see Asai 2009.
- 4 I am grateful to Ryosuke Kobayashi for translating these letters from Tibetan into English.
- 5 Because the actual situation regarding Tibetan communities in Ikh Khüree is still unclear, it requires further research.
- 6 For details on Soviet Russian policy toward Tibet through Mongolia, see Andreev 2003.

CHAPTER NINE

Between Mongolia and Tibet
Qinghai (Kökenuur) Mongols in the early twentieth
century

Makoto Tachibana

Introduction

On December 1, 1911, the Mongols declared their independence in Ikh Khüree in Outer Mongolia after the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution in China. The 8th Jebtsundamba Khutugtu was elevated to the position of Bogd Khaan and the new government was established with five ministries on December 29. The government called on Mongols to join the government and advocated military action against China to unify the Mongols in the Khovd region, Inner Mongolia, and the Khölönbuir region. Further, they made contact with the Qinghai Mongols, who lived far from Ikh Khüree in Outer Mongolia, and tried to intervene in political issues faced by the Qinghai Mongols.

Although the relationship with Inner Mongolia was the most important political issue for the Bogd Khaan government at the time, conventional research has discussed this issue merely on the basis of the fact that thirty-five of the forty-nine banners of Inner Mongolia showed allegiance to the Bogd Khaan, and the question of when and in what circumstances their allegiance was shown has yet to be clearly explained.

The assertion that thirty-five of the forty-nine banners of Inner Mongolia showed allegiance to the Bogd Khaan appeared first in *The New History of Mongolia*, written by N. Magsarjav in 1927 (Magsarjav 1994: 35–36).¹ This account was quoted in *The History of Mongolia* published in 2005 (Mongol ulsyn shinjlekh ukhaany akademi tüükhiin khüreeleen 2003: 64). However, the numbers have for a long time taken on a life of their own, and the reality remains unclear.

Some researchers in Inner Mongolia have published papers on the matter. They have identified proof that at least thirty-six or thirty-eight at most of the forty-nine banners showed allegiance to the Bogd Khaan (Wang 1996; Taibun 2001), but they have not presented their evidence. In fact, the princes of Inner Mongolia did not define their position and Inner Mongolia was not under the complete rule of any power at the time.²

As for the relationship between the Bogd Khaan government and the Qinghai Mongols, there are few studies on this issue. However, this does not necessarily mean that they did not make contact with each other. The Bogd Khaan government insisted at the Kyakhta Conference that the Qinghai Mongols should be included in the territory of Mongolia, as was the case with other regions such as Outer Zasag, Inner Zasag, Khölönbuir, Solon, Barga, and Ööld (KhOM1915KhG: 72): they did not abandon the Qinghai Mongols.

Thousands of documents that passed between the Bogd Khaan government and Inner Mongolia or the Qinghai Mongols are kept in the National Central Archives of Mongolia, some of which have been published.³ This chapter analyzes these documents to examine the reaction of the princes of Mongolia, especially the Qinghai Mongols, to the Mongolian independence movement and clarify the circumstances in which the Qinghai Mongols found themselves at the time.

The Mongolian independence movement and the Qinghai Mongols

One of the policies the Bogd Khaan government implemented after the declaration of independence was unifying the Mongols who had been under the rule of the Qing dynasty. The appeal by the Jebtsundamba and the princes of Khalka to Inner Mongolia began immediately after the declaration of independence. On December 6, 1911, the princes and lamas who had met in Ikh Khüree sent letters to the chiefs of the leagues and the generals in Outer and Inner Mongolia. In the letters, the *lündeng*⁴ of the Jebtsundamba was quoted as follows:

Nothing is everlasting. Just because the time had come, the emperor of Manchu turned out like that. Now is the time to eliminate all afflictions by being independent with unification of the Mongols and developing Buddhism.

And the letters continued:

We have decided to draft soldiers from each *aimag* and train them to protect Buddhism, including those from the Bogd Gegeen down in the countryside, and we have already issued a document. We have to inform the princes, such as the chiefs of leagues, generals, khan, *wang*, *beile*, *beise* ... and the people of this. (KKhAOMTKhZB: 97–99; XXZMTES: 118–120)

Thereafter, the Bogd Khaan government sent letters to Inner Mongolia in which they persuaded the princes of Inner Mongolia to join the government. The phrase always used in the letters was “to protect the religion and nation.” In other words, along with the nation, protecting Buddhism was one of the most important factors behind the establishment of the new state. How, then, did the Qinghai Mongols respond to this appeal from the Bogd Khaan government?

To begin with, the Qinghai Mongols had emerged at the time when Güshi Khan allocated his people to his ten sons. After Lubsangdanjin’s “rebellion” against the Qing dynasty, the Qinghai Mongols were divided into 29 banners: 20 Khoshud, 4 Torghut, 2 Choros, 1 Khoid, 1 Khalkha, and 1 lama banner of Tsagaan nomonkhan; these banners were further subdivided into a left-wing league and a right-wing league, and they were supervised by the Manchu *Amban* in Xining (*Xining banshi dachen*) (Chen 2004; Zhu 2006).

During the Qing period, there were high priests, such as the Changkya Khutughtu and the Kanjurwa Khutughtu, who were invited from Qinghai to other Mongolian regions. The Qinghai Mongols thus had a relationship with other Mongolian regions that was based on Buddhism.

After the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution in China on October 10, Linanxing was appointed governor of Qinghai (*Qinghai banshi zhangguan*). He held the lake festival (*jihai* 祭海; *nayur-un takily_a*)⁵ and sent the following telegraph to Beijing on December 10, 1912:

All of the *jünwang*, *beile*, *beise*, *güng*, and *taij* of the 29 banners, such as the chief of the left-wing league, *Zasag beise* Namdanchoikhür, the vice-chief, Sonomdash, the chief of the right-wing league, *Zasag beise* Choimpilnorov, and the vice-chief, *beise* Dashnamjil, have approved of

the Republic. (Mi 1996: 450-451)

According to this telegraph, the Qinghai Mongols appeared to have been favorably incorporated into the Republic of China.

Ma Qi also sent a telegraph to the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (Meng-Zang shiwuju). It reads: "I proclaimed the favor of the central government and let the princes understand the idea of a republic.... They submitted to us with their people." (Mi 1996: 451) Thereafter, a power struggle occurred between Lianxing and Ma Qi, and the former was expelled by the latter. Ma Bufang, later the King of Qinghai, was Ma Qi's second son.

Thus, according to previous studies, Ma Qi seized power gradually and the princes in the Qinghai region accepted the republic after the 1911 Revolution. However, because the Bogd Khaan government was trying to unify the Mongols who had been under the rule of the Qing dynasty, as long as the Qinghai Mongols belonged to the "Mongols" at that time, it is unlikely that the Qinghai Mongols did not have anything to do with the activities of the Bogd Khaan government. How, then, did the Bogd Khaan government manage the Qinghai Mongols and how did they react to the Mongolian independence movement amid the confusion of the 1911 Revolution in China?

Namdanchoikhür's visit to Ikh Khüree

Namdanchoikhür, the chief of the left-wing league of Qinghai, sent a letter dated February 27, 1912, to the Bogd Khaan government. He mentioned that he had received Ochirdari Bogd Jebtsundamba's edict and wrote:

I have a domain in the northern Tsaidam. Because there are so many thieves among the domains of the princes in Qinghai, it is difficult to come and go. Also, some princes are living on the other side of the Yellow River and some are living among the Manchus and the Chinese, so it is difficult to forward your letter right now. Therefore, I will inform them when we meet in Xining next time.

He continued: "[I] announced it to all the lamas and the people of my banner" (NCAM: FA3-D1-KhN351-N43).

This letter shows that news of the declaration of Mongolian independence had reached Qinghai. Approximately four months later, Namdanchoikhür's letter finally arrived in Ikh Khüree on June 13, 1912. Subse-

quently, he sent another letter dated August 7, 1912, to complain about the difficulties of living with the Chinese and the Tibetans in Qinghai (NCAM: FA3-D1-KhN350-N50).

During the Jiaqing period (1796–1820), the Mongols living on the southern bank of the Yellow River escaped to the northern bank because of Tibetan oppression (Oidtmann 2016: 50–51). Furthermore, in 1821 the Tibetans crossed the Yellow River and occupied the domains of the Qinghai Mongols; the governor-general of Shaan-Gan (*Shaan-Gan zongdu*) sent troops to drive away these Tibetans (Mi 1996: 376–380). Consequently, the population of Mongols in the Qinghai region decreased. According to one study, there were 17,875 households in total when the 30 banners were organized; the number decreased to 6,216 households in 1810, and further decreased to 1,989 households in 1910 (Du 2008: 36–37).

Having received Namdanchoikhür's letter, the Bogd Khaan issued the following edict: "Provide 100 rapid-fire rifles with 30,000 bullets for him" (NCAM: FA3-D1-KhN351- N6). In *The New History of Mongolia*, Magsarjav wrote:

On behalf of the twenty-four *Zasags* of Qinghai, *Khörlög beis* [Namdanchoikhür], the chief of the left-wing league of Qinghai, arrived [in Ikh Khüree] with the letter from the chiefs of both the left- and right-wing leagues, in which they explained the straitened circumstances in the Qinghai region and asked to show the way to not leave Buddhism. At the time, [the Bogd Khaan] promoted the peerage of the twenty-four *Zasags* and gave him 100 rapid-fire rifles with 30,000 bullets to protect their domains. (Magsarjav 1994: 37)

L. Dendev has reported similar observations in *The Brief History of Mongolia* (Dendev 2006: 112). Given the fact that the Bogd Khaan government supported Namdanchoikhür with weapons, there is no doubt that they contacted each other at this time.

In late 1913, Namdanchoikhür personally visited Ikh Khüree, the capital of Mongolia, and handed a letter to the government. This letter reads as follows:

[The Bogd Khaan] bestowed the title of *jünwang* on Lhawanregjin, the son of the late *beile* [Tserendondov], of the west-rear banner of our league.... Although Lhawanregjin truly worships the Bogd Ejen Gegeen,

he escaped from his land because villains slandered him terribly many times. He met with me and voiced every complaint. (NCAM: FA3-D1-KhN416-N88)

Namdanchoikhür also asked the Bogd Khaan government to provide Lhawanregjin with a new seal for the banner. In short, Lhawanregjin, the son of the former *Zasag* of the west-rear banner, was deprived of his seal after his father Tserendondov's death, and therefore he fled his land.

Here, we will describe only briefly the circumstances because the problems of the succession to the *Zasag* in the west-rear banner of Qinghai have already been examined elsewhere (Tachibana 2012). In the *Qinghai minzushi rumen*, Tsengünwanjilravdan is regarded as the 11th *Zasag* after the 10th *Zasag*, Tserendondov (Mi 1996: 454). However, there are several records that point to a succession problem among the *Zasags* in the west-rear banner of Qinghai. These records state:

Tserendongdov succeeded to the position of *Zasag* in the 15th year of Guangxu's reign (1889) and died in the 2nd year of Xuantong's reign (1910).... Choikhürsenge and Lhawanregjin fought over the familial right to be *Zasag* in the 3rd year of Xuantong's reign (1911). Choikhürsenge succeeded to the position of *Zasag* in the 2nd year of the Republic (1913).... Lhawanregjin escaped to Ikh Khüree and succeeded to the title of *beile* by the authority of the Bogd Khaan. (Wulanxian zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 2003: 546–547; Cai 1993: 161)

Further, Magsarjav wrote in *The New History of Mongolia*:

Lhawanregjin asked for help because he had been deprived of his peerage, and so [the Bogd Khaan] bestowed on him the title of *beile* and the seal of *Zasag*. (Magsarjav 1994: 38)

Therefore, there was a dispute between Lhawanregjin and Choikhürsenge over the position of *Zasag*, and eventually Choikhürsenge succeeded to it; Tsengünwanjilravdan was the son of Choikhürsenge and succeeded to the title of *jünwang* in 1930 (Cai 1993: 161).

Lhawanregjin, who lost the power struggle in the west-rear banner of Qinghai, contacted the Bogd Khaan government, and on March 16, 1914, he was given a new seal engraved with the words “köke nayur-un jegün yar-un

irügeltü jasay-un qosiyu-yi jakiruyči tamay_a.”⁶

The Qinghai Mongols after the Kyakhta Agreement

On June 7, 1915, the Kyakhta Agreement was concluded between Mongolia, Russia, and China at Kyakhta, a city on the Russo-Mongolian border. The princes who submitted to the Bogd Khaan government were pardoned and those who wanted to return to their homeland were allowed to leave Outer Mongolia.

Lhawanregjin, who was still in Ikh Khüree after the Kyakhta Agreement, asked the government to provide weapons to the messengers from Qinghai, as they had before. In response to this request, the Bogd Khaan government sent Lhawanregjin a letter dated September 26, 1915, which reads: “It is unbecoming to give weapons to protect the domains as before because the tripartite agreement has already been concluded. The government just gave five rifles for their self-protection” (NCAM: FA2-D1-KhN302-N1).

Thereafter, Lhawanregjin planned to return to the Qinghai region, and he presented a petition for the pardoning of his “crime.” However, in this letter he wrote:

Although the tripartite agreement has been concluded, all of Mongolia could not be unified.... I will ask the ministers to instruct me whether I should remain here or return to the homeland. (NCAM: FA4-D1-KhN321-N3)

From this letter, it seems that he was hesitant about returning to the Qinghai region.

Lhawanregjin also presented another letter, dated January 23, 1916, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this letter, he explained the details of how he had been deprived of his position. The letter reads:

My father, Tserendondov, was the chief of the left-wing league of the Qinghai. He died in January of the 3rd year of Xuantong’s reign (1911).... The first-grade *taij* Sonomsengeravdan, who conspired with Chinese officers, deprived me of my father’s seal and gave it to Choikhürsenge in July.... Choikhürsenge’s followers sent letters to Xining and Beijing in which they gave false testimony that Choikhürsenge, Tserendondov’s son, is a first-grade *taij* and Lhawanregjin is a second-grade *taij*.

Choikhürsenge was given the title and my father’s seal....

Thus, Choikhürsenge was reported to be Tserendondov’s first son and succeeded to the title and seal. Lhawanregjin asked the Bogd Khaan government to inform the president of China of this matter and punish Choikhürsenge (NCAM: FA4-D1-KhN321-N5).

The next day, Lhawanregjin presented another letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this letter, he claimed that the princes of Qinghai were aware that the Dalai Lama had confirmed Lhawanregjin as the only son of Tserendondov in a letter dated July 27, 1914 (NCAM: FA4-D1-KhN321-N4).

Most importantly, the princes of the Qinghai Mongols had contacted the Dalai Lama, who had confirmed the successor of the *Zasag* in Qinghai. However, the Dalai Lama’s letter has not yet been found, but the document cited below shows that the princes of the Qinghai Mongols and the Dalai Lama communicated with each other.

On May 17, 1916, Namdanchoikhür, the chief of the left-wing league of Qinghai, sent a letter to the Dalai Lama requesting him to bestow a set of the Golden Kangyur scriptures. In addition, Namdanchoikhür informed the Dalai Lama of the following three matters (See Appendix E-1).

- When I visited the capital of Zi-ling 西寧 in the 3rd month of the current year (May 1916), I was very sorry to hear that the Governor of Lan-tu was making preparations to gather some thousands of Chinese soldiers with the intent of marching to Tibet, but I could not do anything. He interviewed Ma Darin 馬大人, the governor of Zi-ling, and after making certain arrangements regarding the dispatch of the Lan-tu soldiers, he returned. I believe that if Your Holiness were to be kind enough to write a letter to Ma Darin, then no harm will come to the Buddhist religion.
- Ma Darin of Zi-ling has no intention of taking money. I beg to suggest that necessary action be taken to prevent the Chinese from dispatching troops to Tibet in the future.
- As commanded by Your Holiness, I have built a new monastery. There are twenty monks living in it. Please send me the holy books and images for the same. (FO228/2749)⁷

Thus, there is no doubt that the princes of the Qinghai Mongols had contacted the Bogd Khaan government of Mongolia while also communicating

with the Dalai Lama of Tibet and supplying him with information.

Moreover, Namdanchoikhür again sent a letter to the Bogd Khaan government, dated February 6, 1916, in which he wrote:

A man from Lhawanregjin's banner went to Beijing, and he was appointed *Zasag*. He torments half of the banner people and robs the people of livestock. He does not listen to us. (NCAM: FA4-D1-KhN332-N4)

This letter arrived in Ikh Khüree on March 18, 1916, and on the same day Lhawanregjin submitted a letter to the government, asking for the acceptance of the people who had escaped from the banner in Qinghai.

The Ministry of the Interior replied to Lhawanregjin on April 15, 1916, and in this letter they quoted Lhawanregjin himself:

Because Choikhürsenge, the new *Zasag* of the banner, robbed the people in the banner of money or livestock, the people moved to Shalgaj to escape from his oppression. I would like the people who escaped to a place called Shalgaj to emigrate here (i.e., Outer Mongolia) as my subjects. I request the provision of land [in Outer Mongolia for them] to live there.

After consulting with other ministries, the government responded as follows:

Shalgaj, where the people are staying, is the land of *Khörlög wang*, the chief of the league, and it is far from here. It would be a contravention of the tripartite agreement concluded between Mongolia, Russia, and China if we forced the people to move here. Therefore, we will not approve his request this time and will decide again when the people migrate spontaneously. (NCAM: FA3-D1-KhN771-N22)

Thus, it may be assumed that the west-rear banner of Qinghai was divided into two parts: some of the people belonged to Choikhürsenge, the new *Zasag*, and the others belonged to Lhawanregjin. Although the latter tried to bring his people to Outer Mongolia, his request was rejected by the Bogd Khaan government.

Lhawanregjin was still in Ikh Khüree in 1917. He again submitted a letter dated January 29, 1917, in which he quoted the letter from the chiefs of the Qinghai Mongols. The letter reads:

The chiefs of our league sent me a letter in which it was suggested that "We, the chiefs [of Qinghai], discussed your matter and ordered them to live separately as the [west-rear] banner was divided into two [parts]. You should inform the Ministries of this matter and ask the Bogd Ejen Gegeen's decision."

The chiefs of the Qinghai Mongols decided to divide the west-rear banner into two parts and requested permission from the Bogd Khaan government. Lhawanregjin wrote:

I would like to request leave of absence to determine whether it is possible to rule half of the banner. If it is impossible, I will go to Shalgarj, where 80 households are staying, to meet with them, and I will return here to report the circumstances. (NCAM: FA3-D1-KhN771-N40)

Although it is not easy to accurately estimate the population of the west-rear banner, according to the statistics of Qinghai prefecture in 1928, there were 300 households and 1,500 people in the banner (Qinghaisheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 2003: 353).⁸ Thus, approximately 80 houses and 400 people were following Lhawanregjin.

More importantly, the chiefs of the Qinghai Mongols thought that they needed the permission of the Bogd Khaan even though the Kyakhta Agreement had already been concluded at the time and Qinghai was excluded from the territory of the Bogd Khaan government. The chiefs of the Qinghai Mongols focused on maintaining good relations with the Bogd Khaan government, and the government responded to their request.

Furthermore, Wang Caihua conducted interviews with old residents of the west-rear banner, who stated:

There were two seals in our banner. One was a silver seal and the other was a bronze seal. Choikhürsenge had the bronze seal, and he lived at east Tohoi. We do not know him well. Lhawanregjin had the silver seal and we lived together, so we know him. (Vang 1999: 224)

This verbal testimony also shows that the west-rear banner had actually been divided.

In addition, Namdanchoikhür informed the Bogd Khaan government of their having allowed Tseldenjav to succeed to his father Enkhjargal's

title and asked that he be provided with weapons. However, on March 14, 1917, the government rejected this request because of the Kyakhta Agreement (NCAM: FA4-D1-KhN546-N1). The very next day, Namnansüren, the Prime Minister, informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Lhawanregjin had been permitted to return to Qinghai (NCAM: FA4-D1-KhN321-N7). Lhawanregjin left Ikh Khüree for Beijing, and he was bestowed the title of *beile* by the president of China in September 1917 (ZG: September 5, 1916, No. 589).

Thereafter, when Choikhürsenge died in 1920, Lhawanregjin was permitted to take his place (Cai 1993: 161). Thus, Lhawanregjin still maintained his power in the banner, even though he was not the *Zasag* appointed by the Republic of China.

Conclusion

Few studies have addressed the response of the Qinghai Mongols to Outer Mongolia's independence movement, since it was a sort of enclave for the Bogd Khaan government. However, it would be wrong to assume that the Bogd Khaan government was out of touch with the Qinghai Mongols, as it insisted that the Qinghai Mongols be included in the territory of Mongolia at the Kyakhta Conference. In fact, several Qinghai Mongol princes traveled back and forth between Qinghai and Outer Mongolia in the 1910s.

Although the Qinghai Mongols were often assumed to be politically incorporated into the Republic of China after the 1911 Revolution, some princes of the Qinghai Mongols, such as Namdanchoikhür and Lhawanregjin, established contact with the Bogd Khaan government; Lhawanregjin requested a new seal of a *Zasag*, since the old one had been incorrectly acquired by Choikhürsenge. Consequently, there were two *Zasags*, one appointed by the Chinese government and the other appointed by the Bogd Khaan government, in the west-rear banner. To resolve the succession dispute, the chiefs of the Qinghai Mongols decided to divide the west-rear banner into two parts and allowed Lhawanregjin and Choikhürsenge to rule them separately.

The Republic of China ruled Inner Mongolia and the Qinghai Mongols as a territorial sovereign state; while the Bogd Khaan government governed the princes and their people, and therefore some banners in Inner Mongolia belonged to two governments for a short period in the 1910s. However, the ruling principle of Mongolia in the early twentieth century was different

from that of a territorial sovereign state in the modern world, although this does not necessarily imply that the Mongols were indifferent to this.

As previously highlighted, the Bogd Khaan government translated a book on international law from Chinese into Mongolia and created maps to demarcate the borders of Mongolia (Tachibana 2011: 198–200), indicating their intent of establishing territorial rule. Thus, Mongolia in the early twentieth century was in a transitional stage of coming to terms with the new era, adopting a dual standard of employing the territorial principle in dealings with foreign countries while using traditional principles in internal dealings with Mongolian nomads.

The government of the Dalai Lama was crucial as a third party for the Qinghai Mongols. As quoted in Lhawanregjin’s letter, the Dalai Lama had an influence on the princes of the Qinghai Mongols. In addition, Namdan-choikhür, the chief of the left-wing of the Qinghai Mongols, had established contact with the Dalai Lama. Thus, for the Qinghai Mongols located between Mongolia and Tibet, the Bogd Khaan and Dalai Lama governments had more similarities than differences, like the nations of “Mongolia” and “Tibet.”

Notes

- 1 This book was published in the Cyrillic script for the first time in 1994.
- 2 For details, see Tachibana 2014b.
- 3 For examples, see MATTTTT, XXZMTES and MNUBTT I, II, III.
- 4 Order, commandment or instruction issued by Jebtsundamba Khutughtu (Bawden 1997: 205).
- 5 The lake festival was usually held between July 15 and 25 of the lunar calendar (Cairenbali and Hongfeng 2015: 22–25).
- 6 This seal is still kept at Qinghai Province Museum.
- 7 The original letter was written in Mongolian and sent to the Dalai Lama with a Tibetan translation in June 1916. The Dalai Lama forwarded this letter to D. Macdonald, the British Trade Agent in Yatung. This English translation seems to have been translated from the Tibetan translation. These letters were sent to C. A. Bell, the Political Officer in Gangtok, Sikkim, and forwarded to A. H. Grant, the Secretary to the Government of India in Simla. A. H. Grant then sent these letters to J. Jordan, the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Beijing, in August 1916.
- 8 According to Zhu Puxuan, the houses of the west-rear banner numbered 600 in 1938 (Zhu 2005 :12).
- 9 I am grateful to Ryosuke Kobayashi for providing this letter.

Glossary

cang	倉	lama	喇嘛
Cen Chunxuan		Lama shuo	喇嘛說
	岑春煊	Lifanbu	理藩部
Chen Yifan	陳貽範	Lianshun	連順
cheng shun zan hua		Lianxing	廉興
	誠順贊化	Lianyu	聯豫
Cixi	慈禧	Liangguang	兩廣
Daci pudu xizheng xifu zhisheng		Liu Yulin	劉玉麟
shangcheng wenshu Huangdi		Lu Zhengxiang	
	大慈普度，息爭錫福，		陸徵祥
	至聖上乘，文殊皇帝	Ma Bufang	馬步芳
dalai	達賴	Ma Qi	馬麒
Daqing	大清	Meng-Zang shiwuju	
De Wang	德王		蒙藏事務局
duli	獨立	Pingding shuomo fanglüe	
Guangxu	光緒		平定朔漠方略
gui	跪	putong	普通
Huangsi	黃寺	Qianlong	乾隆
Huizongsi	彙宗寺	Qianqingmen	乾清門
jihai	祭海	Qinghai banshi zhangguan	
Jiaqing	嘉慶		青海辦事長官
jiao	教	sangui jiukou	三跪九叩
Junwang	郡王	Shaan-Gan zongdu	
Kangxi	康熙		陝甘總督
Kulun	庫倫	Shangdu	上都

shi	釋	zhuzang dachen	
Shishengsi	實勝寺		駐藏大臣
Shi Youming	史悠明	Zifuyuan	資福院
Shunzhi	順治	zili	自立
suoling	所領	zizhu	自主
Ta'ersi	塔爾寺		
Taining	泰寧		
tianxia	天下		
Tongzhi	同治		
wachila danla	瓦赤拉旦喇		
Wanguo gongfa	萬國公法		
Wang Tingzhang	王廷璋		
Waiwubu	外務部		
Weihaiwei	威海衛		
Wutaishan	五臺山		
Xining banshi dachen	西寧辦事大臣		
Xitian dashan zizaifo suoling tianxia shijiao putong Wachila Danla Dalai Lama	西天大善自在佛所領 天下釋教普通瓦赤喇 怛喇達賴喇嘛		
Xinzheng	新政		
Xuantong	宣統		
Yanzhi	延祉		
yinhang	銀行		
Yonghegong	雍和宮		
Yongle	永樂		
Yongzheng	雍正		
Yutai	有泰		
Yuan Shikai	袁世凱		
Zhang Yintang	張蔭棠		
zhenguogong	鎮國公		
zhuquan	主權		

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- JACAR: Japan Center for Asian Historical Records アジア歴史資料センター, Tokyo.
- NAI: National Archives in India, New Delhi.
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- OSC: Okuma Shigenobu Collection 大隈重信関係資料, Kotenseki Sōgō Database: Japanese and Chinese Classics, Waseda University Library, Tokyo.
- PAAA: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin.
- RGIA: Russian State Historical Archive, Saint Petersburg.
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Appendix

* For the Tibetan texts, I added alternative spelling in parenthesis, (), after some words to indicate standard orthography.

A-1. The 13th Dalai Lama's letter to W. W. Rockhill

Tibetan text

tā la'i bla ma'i yi ge / nye char de nas rog se sa heb la gnas tshul zhib 'khod
gnang 'dug pa'i don gnad rnams zhib rtogs byung ba dga' spro che / ngos snga
mo lha 'byor mtshams lha sdod lan am ban sogs rgya phyogs blon rigs ngan
mthun gyis bod kyi bstan srid dbang byus rtsa 'phrog byed blo nyag gcig gis
mdo smad khams phyogs dgon sde mang po bstor (gstor) mi bsad / rgyu 'phrog
tshod med bgyis pas mi tshad rgya dmag khyon che lha 'byor thog bod dpon
rigs che 'dring bsad rmas sogs dpung bshed khirms 'gal spyod ngan ci rigs la
brten ngos dang / srid blon ston 'khor nyung bsdus bod dbyin ching (chings)
bzhag dang / sa 'dres la brten pa'i mthun lam che stabs 'di phyogs bskyod de
dbyin gzhung brgyud krung gol la gsung mol zhu bzhin yang / da dung rgya
phyogs nas bod du gsar spros gzhi brling je rgyas je 'phel byed bzhin bcas khy-
ed rang nang pa'i chos la dad zhen che khar ngos dang snga phyir ngos 'phrad
thog blo dkar gyi gnas la brten da cha bod kyi bstan srid dbang byus sngar gnas
rang btsan yong ba'i de nas thabs shes mdzad 'os dang / gzhan yang gnad don
legs byus ci mchis nang ma'i gnas tshul zhib lhug yang yang nges stsol yod
pa ma zad / 'di phyogs gsung 'os kyang nar mar gnang lugs bcas dgongs 'jags
'tshal / rten ngos kyi 'dra par bcas rdo rje gling nas / zla 9 tshes 1 la /

Seal

I (Swin Linn) am very glad to hear of the letter you have sent to Dr. Kinn about me. I should like to express you my thanks that last year when I passed Kham, I found the Chinese Government had been so kind to have the Chinese soldiers ready to assist along the borderland as the temporary force of Tibet, that is the reason why in the Kham district no any resistance has been destroyed, persons killed and a property plundered. Besides large number of Chinese troops came to Kham and held and secured some Tibetan officers of various ranks, I was therefore, compelled to leave Kham and the frontier and a small number of men to the neighboring country (Acha), for since the last conversation between the Great Britain and Tibet we are in friendly terms. With I reached here I made a representation to the Emperor of China (Yang) the British Government yet the Chinese in Tibet are dealing more severely with the Tibetan. I have you personally that you believe in the Buddhist religion, I shall therefore, request you that you will be good enough to help me in this destination and above me if there is any way of reaching me the religious country. Further I shall let any place to hear from you now and then any interesting news regarding Tibet.

Another place find a copy of my photo.

Yours truly
Swin Linn
Representing the British

Handwritten text in Burmese script, consisting of approximately 10 lines. The text is written in a cursive style. At the bottom right, there is a circular seal or stamp, likely an official mark or signature.

I (Dalai Lama) am very glad to hear for the letter you have sent to Dr. Ross about me. I should like to express you my trouble that last year while I reached Lhasa, I found the Chinese Resident Lien Yu and some Ministers of China with their illwill ready to snatch away the Spiritual as well as the temporal power of Tibet, that is the reason why in the Kham districts many monasteries have been destroyed, persons killed and the properties plundered. Besides large number of Chinese troops came to Lhasa and killed and wounded some Tibetan Officers of various ranks. I was therefore, compelled to leave Lhasa with the Ministers and a small number of suite to the neighbouring country (India), for since the last convention between the Great Britain and Tibet we are in friendly term. While I reached here I made a representation to the Emperor of China through the British Government, yet the Chinese in Tibet are dealing more seriously with the Tibetans. I know you personally that you believe in the Buddhist religion, I would therefore, request you that you will be good enough to help me in this disturbance and advise me if there is any way of restoring me the religious country. Further I shall be very please to hear from you now and then any interesting news regarding Tibet.

Enclose please find a copy of my photo.

Hill Side

Darjeeling the 4th October 1910.

Dalai Lama.

English translation attached to A-1 letter

I (Dalai Lama) am very glad to hear that for the letter you have sent to Dr. Ross about me. I should like to express you my trouble that last year while I reached Lhasa, I found the Chinese Resident Rien Yu and some ministers of Lhasa with their ill will ready to snatch away the Spiritual as well as the Temporal powers of Tibet, that is the reason why in the Kham districts many monasteries have been destroyed, persons killed and the properties plundered. Besides large number of Chinese troops came to Lhasa and killed and wounded some Tibetan Officers of various ranks.

I was therefore, compelled to leave Lhasa with the ministers and a small number of suite to the neighboring country (India), for since the last convention between the Great Britain and Tibet we are in friendly term. While I reached here I made a representation to the Emperor of China through the British Government, yet the Chinese in Tibet are dealing more seriously with the Tibetans.

I know you personally that you believe in the Buddhist religion, I should therefore, request you that you will be good enough to help me in this disturbance and advise me if there is any way of restoring me the religious country. Further I shall be very please to hear from you now and then any interesting news regarding Tibet. Enclose please find a copy of my photo.

Hill Side

Darjeeling the 4th October 1910

Dalai Lama

A-2. The 13th Dalai Lama's letter to W. W. Rockhill, December 1910

Tibetan text

tā la'i bla mas / rmig gol chin kral mchog la /
nye char de nas sbrag thog gnang ba'i yi ge 'bras ljongs spyi khyab 'bel sa
heb nas phyi lkog (skogs) ral skyon 'dug ces kha dbyes phyi lkog (skogs)
'bel gyi tham 'byar skyar rgyag gis 'dir phul 'byor don gsal / rgyu rkyen
phra zhib dang / rgya bod sngar nas mchod yon 'brel lugs skor rgyal khag
yongs grags ha go ched deb gsar bkod gnang ba gang legs ngos kyang sems
dga' po byung zhing deb deng bod yig tu bsgyur nas tshang mar bkram rtsis
yod / rgya bod skor mchod yon sngon 'brel thog gcig phan gcig grogs las
phar tshur 'gal yi byed pa'i mna' yig rdo la bskos te phan tshun su yi 'gal

rung / lha dkon mchog gi chad pa drag po yong rgyu chos rgyal ^gong ma
 nams nas bka' rtags kyi bcad de thugs rmon bden tshigs yod mur slar yang
 skye phreng snga skabs sog rigs rgyal khab nams rgya khongs bsdu thabs
 su slar yang sngar srol 'gyur med gnang bzhin mur nye lam nas rgya phyogs
 phyi nang blon rigs ngan mthun gyis yon bdag nas mchod gnas kyi rgyu
 dngos za sems bzhin ^gong ma'i chab srid rgyal pa'i rtsa ba bod kyi bstan
 srid dbang byus tsa 'phrog byed 'dun nyag gcig gis bod kyi bde sdug skor
 rgyu rkyen snga phyir lan mang zhus kyang rgyal kha blon bsgyur gyi gsan
 dgongs lta ci / lan am pas gang zhus la tshad 'dzin gyis bod mis zhu yul
 dben gshis ching don dang sa 'dres babs kyis dbyin gzhung la gsung mol
 zhu mus yin stabs khyed rang mkhyen rlabs che khar nang bstan la dad mos
 ngos la'ang brtse sems che zhing / lhag don rgyal khag tshang ma'i lam lugs
 dgongs mngags la brten dbyin gzhung la legs 'khrun myur chod kyi bstad
 (bstan) srid phug brtan yun gnas 'byung thabs sogs ^gong mar bskul bcags
 bka' mol 'phral du gnang thub tshe phan pa yong nges la de don dgongs
 'jags dang / gzhan yang gang ci'i gnad don legs byus ci mchis nang ma'i
 gnas tshul gnang 'os kyang nges 'drongs yod pa 'tshal / rdor rje gling nas
 lcags khyi zla 10 tshes 25 dge ba la /



Seal

English translation attached to A-2 letter

From The Dalai Lama

To The Excellent American Ambassador

Recently (on the 29th November 1910 30th of the 10th moon) I received your letter from Mr. C. A. Bell, the Political Officer of Sikkim in a fresh cover duly sealed by him which was to have been received in a torn condition from the Post Office. I fully understood its content. I am glad that you have published a new book "History of the Relations between Tibet and China" and made known among the foreigners. I am intending to translate this history with Tibetan and distribute. I believe you know that the relations between ancient Emperors and the Tibetan Pontiffs taken oath and written their bond on stones regarding to help each other but not to bring trouble, if any one violates the oath will be severely punished by the Almighty and during the time of the 5th Dalai Lama, the Mongolian princes were brought under the rule of the Chinese, since then, it was going on quite as ever before. A few years ago, the evil minded Chinese ministers are trying to snatch off the Temporal power from the Tibetans. The Tibetans memorialized several times to the throne giving the circumstances in detail but to no effect; for



Translation

From

The Dalai Lama

To

The Excellent American Embassy

Recently (on the 29th November 1910 = 30th of the 10th moon) I received your letter from Mr. C. A. Bell, the Political Officer of Lichim in a fresh cover duly sealed by him which was he said to have been received in ten conditions from the Post Office. I fully understood its content; I am very glad that you have published a new book "History of the relations between Tibet and China" and made known among the foreigners. I am intending to translate this history into Tibetan and distribute it. I believe you know that the relations between ancient Empress and the Tibetan Princes taken oath and written their bond on stones regarding to help each other but not to bring trouble, if any one violates the oath will be severely punished by the Heavenly. And during the time of the 5th Lama the Mongolian Princes were brought under rule of the Chinese, since then it was going on quite as ever before. A few years ago the evil minded Chinese Ministers are trying to snuff off the ten thousand flowers from the Tibetan. The Tibetans memorialized several times to the throne giving the circumstances in detail but to no effect, for the Ministers take part of the Resident Lön Ju of Khasa and grant whatever he states. Referring our last convention we are now discussing the matters with British Government. You are not only so sincere to me and a believer in the religion of Buddha but you are a learned man and knows custom and Rules of all different powers so it will be a great boon if you will kindly ^{see a way} bring to the notice of the notice of His Majesty the Emperor of China to settle the present Tibetan affair in a favourable state through the British Government without further delay. Besides kindly do not fail to communicate me if you find anything important and interested to me.

Hill Side
Lhasa, December 1910 }

the ministers take part of the Resident Lien Yu of Lhasa and grant whatever he states. Referring our last convention, we are now discussing the matters with British Government. You are not only so sincere to me and believer in the religion of Buddha but you are a learned man and knows custom and Rules of all different powers so it will be a great boon if you will kindly, see a way to bring to the notice of His Majesty the Emperor of China to settle the present Tibetan affairs in a favourable state through the British Government without further delay. Besides kindly do not fail to communicate me if you find anything important and interested to me.

Hill Side
Darjeeling the December 1910

B-1. Lamden Kempo's letter to Aoki Bunkyo

Tibetan text

mkhyen brtse'i spyang stong bkra ba phyag mdzod mi si zar a o ki rin po cher /
stabs 'bul / sngon du de nas gsung bris don mtshan zhib 'khod gnang 'byor
don gsal ^gong sa srid blon lhan rgyas su ^snyan sgron zhu 'os de 'phral zhus
zin cing / sku nyid kyis rang cag nang bstan la rgya gcig bzung gi bod mi las
lhag pa'i bstan srid skor 'phral yun bde skyid 'byung thabs gong (dgongs)
bzhed rgya che gting gzab kyi 'char gzhis don mtshan rim gnang legs byus
zol med dngos 'brel stabs ^gong blon nmams kyang thugs kyi dgyes pa che
cher bltas shing / kho bo yang dga' gus spro gsum gyi gnas su 'gyur / phyogs
der mi drag ched rdzong brkyang rgyu bod don skor de snga ru dbyin ch-
ing (chings) yig sngon bzhag khar / deng skabs dbyin ji'i sa khongs bzhugs
mus la dbyin ji dwogs 'drogs yong gzhir gnas skabs mi drag mngags rdzong
mdzad bder ma 'gyur cing / 'on kyang de ga sogs rgyal khag che btsan khag
nas 'phyar ba gru 'degas kyis don snying bod kyi bstan srid dbang byus sger
btsan zhig rang yong ba'i thabs tshul legs byus ci mchis sngar bzhin thugs
'khur 'dor med nas / slar drin gso zhus 'thus dang / de phyogs rigs gnas slob
spel du zhol drung bsod nams ji phebs ltar gtong rtsis kyang / kho pa deng
dus bsad min la ring min 'byor rgyur de mtshams ched rdzong zhus chog
pa ma zad / sku zhabs khri sprul mchog la sngon chas (chad) kyang nyid nas
phan grogs gang zab nang gcig mi ltar gnang 'dug pa da dung yang gang cir
phan 'gyur rog (rogs) ram mdzad 'os ci mchis dam don zhu rgyu bcas zab
'jags mkhyen mkhyen mkhyen / rten lha rdzas dbang gis mdangs ldan bcas
rdor gling nang khang nas bla sman mkhan pos zla 11 tshes 17 la 'bul /

Handwritten text in a cursive script, likely a letter or document. The text is written on a single sheet of paper, with a large, decorative initial 'A' at the top left. The script is dense and flowing, characteristic of early modern handwriting. The text is written in a single column, with some lines starting with a small 'A' or 'B' indicating a new section or paragraph. The paper shows signs of age, including some staining and a slightly uneven texture.

B-1 Aoki Bunkyo Archive, no. 23

English translation

Dear Mr. Aoki Rinpoche, trustee, who has 1,000 eyes of wisdom and compassion.

Writing in brief. A letter, with items written in detail, reached [us] from your side the other day. It clearly mentions that it is appropriate to report [this letter to] both the Dalai Lama and the Chief Minister, and I did so immediately. Sharing our devotion to Buddhism, so that peace and happiness will be brought to the religion and politics in the present and future, you revealed, one by one, the items of a plan that [you] extensively and deeply considered more than the Tibetan people did. Since [those] great strategies [which you suggested] are sincere and include truth, I saw that everyone including the Dalai Lama and the Chief Minister has become more and more pleased. I also came to have the three states of mind: love, respect, and happiness.

As for the postponement of dispatching an envoy to you, not only have Russia and Britain signed a treaty on the Tibet issue before, but also recently [the Dalai Lama and the Chief Minister] have been living in the British territory and it could cause the British to be suspicious and cautious [if we send an envoy]. [Therefore] it would be difficult to dispatch an envoy presently.

However, [if] each strong county including you (Japan), having conferred with each other, does not give up its concern for whatever good measures there are, as before, such that the "independence" of religious and political power in Tibet comes about, allow [us] to repay the kindness [to the countries] later.

[We] plan to send Shodrung Sonam [to Japan] as soon as [he] reaches here for the sake of developing the study and education [of Tibetan Buddhism in Japan]. He is absent now, but nevertheless expected here soon, so allow us to send him at that time. Moreover, you have given [Lama] Tritrul the utmost support and treated him like family so far. Please keep in mind that I sincerely hope [you] will continue doing your best in terms of assistance minding [his] welfare, and give whatever other aspect [of support] in the future. [Together with this] Katag that shines with power, Lhamen Khenpo sends [this letter] from the place where attendants [of the Dalai Lama] reside in Darjeeling on the 17th of the 11th month [in the Tibetan calendar].

[Translated by Ryosuke Kobayashi]

B-2. The 13th Dalai Lama's letter to the Japanese emperor via Aoki Bunkyo

Tibetan text

bsod nams stobs kyi mngon mtho nyi hong rgyal po chen po mchog gi drung
 du / deng / rgyal po chen po bar der sku gzugs bde min dkon mchog gi thugs
 rjes da cha sing dwangs thub pa ngos kyang blo bder gyur / bod dang / nyi
 hong gnyis nang bstan gcig gyur la brten snga lo 'di ga'i slob ma sprul sku
 ngag dbang blo bzang so'o 'byo de phyogs bskyod skabs hong 'gan ji dang
 / rgyal po chen pos nang bstan lar rgyar dgongs pa'i rogs phan gang drag
 gnam 'dug pa thugs rje che / deng skabs bod rgya lab rtsod skor rdo gling
 du dbyin bod rgya gsum gyi dpon rigs 'dzoms gtan stabs 'di nas srid 'dzin
 nang blon bshad sgra ba phebs rgyu yin rung / rgya phyogs nas bod sa dngos
 gnas kham chab brag khul dmag mi btang te khriims 'gal byed mus la rgya
 dmag phyir 'then gyi bod ljongs rang btsan yong thabs 'phral phug bod don
 'jog bzo legs thon 'byung ba'i rgya phyogs su shugs bskyed rogs mgon gang
 zab gnam lugs ma zad / mthun lam gsung bris phebs 'os yang yang yod pa
 zhu / rten kha btags dang / sangs rgyas kyi sku brnyan bcas ^tā la'i bla mas
 bod lugs chu glang zla 5 tshes 22 la phul /

Seal: tā la'i bla ma'i tham ka rgyal


English translation

To His Majesty the Great King of Japan who holds the highest power of merit,

[It seems that] recently, the Great King was under the weather for a while, but it comforts to me to hear that currently you have completely recovered thanks to the three jewels.

I express gratitude that, since both Tibet and Japan are Buddhist [countries], a few years ago, when the "student" Trulku Lozang Söjo from our side (Tibet) visited your side (Japan), Honganji Temple and the Great King [in Japan] assisted him as best as possible out of devotion to Buddhism.

Currently, as for the dispute between Tibet and China, because it was decided that the representatives from the three [countries], Tibet, China and Britain would gather in Darjeeling, the Prime minister Shatra Paljor Dorjé from our side plans to visit [there]. However, China sent an army to Chamdo



and Drayap in the Kham region where our natural territory is and continues to commit illegal actions. If it pleases you, you might support [Tibet] by [having Japan] exert pressure on China as best as it could, such that “independence” will be brought to Tibet through the evacuation of the Chinese army, and such that a good outcome will be obtained for Tibetan affairs in the present and future. [As such, we are] looking forward to continuously receiving letters of friendship.

[I send this letter] together with presents such as [this] Katag and [this] statue of Buddha. The Dalai Lama sent on 22nd of the 5th month of the Water-Ox year in the Tibetan calendar.

C-1. The 13th Dalai Lama's letter to King George V

Tibetan text

bsod nams stobs kyi 'khor los bsgyur ba dbyin ci ^gong ma rgyal po chen po mehog gi drung du / 'bul 'bras / rgya bod sngar nas mehod yon rim 'brel skor gyi gnas lugs rim gsol deb 'khod dgongs mngags bzhin ngos tā la'i bla ma ston 'khor rgya gar phyogs bskyod skabs sna gdong sa heb brgyud sa gzhung du rogs phan yod pa zhes tar phul la phan che'i bka' bzang thob khar / dbyin gzhung sa gnas su 'byor nyid nas lo ngo gsum tsam ring sdod yul ko Ti dang srung cha pu li si 'go dmag gtan 'dzugs / sne shan dang / em rjer phogs thob 'phar stsal sogs gzengs bstod chen po gnang ba ma zad / da cha bod ljongs su ngo bskyod thub pa sogs bka' drin chen po yongs grags su gyur te ngos dang / bod 'bangs tshang ma shin tu yid rangs kyis deb yig la bkod de nam yang mi brjed pa'i bka' drin gsab rgyu rgyal blon tshogs 'du bcas par mol bsdur zin don da lam thugs rje che zhur mi sna 'di pa ched rdzong gdong bkra shis pa'i kha btags gcig gser zangs kyi sku brnyan nam bcas gcig dang / gdung rten nam bcas gcig / zhal thang gra mtshungs bdun / gser srang lnga yod kyi thum bdun / dngul gyi bzi'u lha khang gnyis / gu sha'i sba rtir khebs ldan gcig dang / gdong phan gcig / gri glo 'dogs legs pa gcig / g.yi wa'i pags pa so so nas nyi shu tham pa re / zangs dmar gyi sba rtir dngul shan ma khebs ldan gnyis / gser zangs kyi rgyal srid sna bdun / rtags rdzas so so nas cha tshang re / lcags dkrol gser tshag gi dkar shubs gcig / rin rgyan gyi rta sga cha tshang gcig lcags rmog ldan gzhon rang 'grigs gcig / byang khrab gcig ko ba gser bris kyi phub gnyis / lcags kyi khrung khrung gser dngul tshag ldan cha gcig gos tshon khra yug bam bzhi bcas phul ba dgyis bzhes thog de ga rgyal khab chen po nyam chung nmams bzod bder 'tsho skyong gnang gshis bod nas kyang de don snga phyir re

ltos snying bcol zhu yul nyag gcig stabs 'tsho skyong mthun lam 'gyur med
 thog nas bod rgyal khab kyi chos srid dbang byus rang btsan thog las lugs
 yar rgyas yong ched lha sar ru dbyin rgyal khab bka' mol gyi sku tshab re
 'jog gnang bde na dang / de min rgya mis bod gnod mi 'byung bar nang don
 bod dbang rang btsan yong ba'i phyi rgyal khag la bka' mol rogs mgon yod
 pa nas rgyal po chen po dang btsun mo sras 'khor rnams sku tshe chab srid
 rgyal pa'i dkon mchog la gsol 'debs zhus chog pa dgongs 'jags mkhyen /
 gzigs rten kha btags nang mdzod bcas zla tshes bzang por phul /

Seal: tā la'i bla ma'i tham ka rgyal

English translation by Laden La

To His Majesty the Great and Most Excellent Emperor, King of England, who, by the Wheel of his Merit, exercises universal power.

The reason of submitting this: —Be pleased to remember that Tibet is related to China as a Priest to his Disciple. Of this I have already informed Your Majesty by letter from time to time. When I and my Ministers were on our way to India we requested your Government by telegram, through the British Trade Agent at Yatung, to help us, and we received a favourable reply. From the day of our arrival in British Territory, for nearly three years, we were provided with houses to live in; with police to protect us; with a police officer [Mr. Laden La] who assisted us in every way; with a doctor; and with food. These were signal honours which were shown to us. Furthermore, I received great help towards my return to Tibet.

All these things are known by all my subjects, and I, and they, are filled with great content. Therefore, I, the King, my Ministers, and my National Assembly, have discussed the matter, and have recorded it in a book, that this great kindness may not be forgotten, for ever. Therefore, also, we are sending this our man purposely to submit our thanks, and with him we send:

A scarf of good luck. One old image, gilded with gold. Seven scrolls. One chorten, containing religious emblems. Seven bundles of gold, weighing five sangs each. Two charm-boxes of silver. One kettle and one bowl, of enamel. One old Tibetan sword, or Lhodo. Twenty lynx-skins and twenty fox-skins. Two copper tea-pots ornamented with silver. Seven gold-gilt Buddhist emblems. Two complete sets of emblems. One steel cup-case, decorated with gold. One complete set of saddlery, which belonged formerly to the King of Rimpung. One steel coat of armour and one steel helmet. Two leather shields, worked with gold. One pair of iron cranes, ornamented with gold and silver. Four different kinds of silk.

Your Majesty may be pleased graciously to accept these gifts. Your Great Empire affords protection to the small kingdoms, so that the inhabitants live in peace. So, therefore, there has been, and will be, none other than Your Majesty who can afford protection to Tibet, and this protection we have resolutely determined to crave. We beg that you will protect us, and will continue to maintain an unbroken friendship towards us. We also pray that, if it be possible, Your Majesty and the Emperor of Russia will consult together, and that you and he will each depute a representative to Lhasa, for the benefit of Tibet, and that the Power, both Temporal and Spiritual, may remain with the Tibetans themselves.

If this cannot be done, we beg that discussion may be held with other Kingdoms [?China] in such a way that the Chinese may not harm the Tibetans, and that the Tibetans may enjoy their own power in Tibet. I am offering prayers for the long life and prosperity of Your Majesty, of Your Queen, and of all Your Princes, and for the extension of your power. Please remember this. Submitted with a scarf of greetings, on an auspicious day of a month.


Seal of the Dalai Lama

C-2. The 13th Dalai Lama's letter to Queen Mary

Tibetan text

ring nas bsod nams du ma'i legs byas yongs su smin pa dbyin ji ^gong ma
^rgyal po'i btsun mo rin po cher /
^tā la'i bla mas yi ge 'bul don / ngos ston 'khor rgya gar dbyin gzhung sa
gnas su lo ngo gsum tsam sdod ring sa gzhung nas gang spyir rogs mgon
gnang ba tshang mas brjed med snying bcangs kyi da lam thugs rje che zhur
mi sna 'di pa ched rdzong zhus pa bod kyi re ltos zhu yul dbyin gzhung nas
'tsho skyong mthun lam nam yang 'gyur med yong ba'i rgyal po chen por
zhu yig zur 'bul ltar btsun mo nyid nas zhabs bskul rogs ram dam don yod
pa dang / sku tshe brtan pa'i gsol 'debs zhus chog pa mkhyen / gzigs rten
kha btags a she / gser zangs kyi sku brnyan nam bcas / ldzul (rdzul) gyi ske
phreng rgyan ldan 'then thag rang 'grigs gcig snam khra'i steng btsegs skyin
khebs kyi dpung 'byar gcig / mo zon yu 'byar cha gcig bcas zla tshes bzang
por phul /

Seal: tā la'i bla ma'i tham ka rgyal



English translation by Laden la

To Her Majesty the Great Sweet-Scented Jewel Empress, Queen of England, the Acquirer of Merit in every Sphere by the Excellence of Her Works.

During the period of some three years that I, with my ministers, resided in British Territory, the Great British Government showed us great favour in every way. Now, therefore, we of one accord have resolved that this kindness shall be remembered in our hearts, and shall not be forgotten, and we are sending this man to express our thanks. There is no Power, save the British Government, to which we can turn for help, and for a continuance of unchanging kindness for ever. This matter has been set forth in our letter to His Majesty. We request Your Majesty to show your kindness towards us by not failing to move His Majesty the King to help us. I am offering prayers for your long life. Please remember this. Submitted with: —A silk scarf of greeting. An old gold-gilt image. A complete jade necklace. A Tibetan Lady's gown, made of spotted woolen cloth. A pair of boots.


On an auspicious date of a month.

Seal of the Dalai Lama

C-3. The 13th Dalai Lama's letter to "the Excellent Chief Minister of England"

Tibetan text

bsod nams stobs dang ldan pa 'be lar spyi khyab blon chen mchog gi drung
 du / tā la'i bla mas yi ge 'bul don / rgya bod mchod yon rim 'brel las mnga'
 'og min pa sogs snga phyi'i yong rkyen ji zhus deb 'khod dgongs mngags
 bzhin ma zad / ngos ston 'khor lo ngo gsum tsam ring dbyin gzhung sa gnas
 su sdod yul ko Ti dang / srung cha pu li si 'go dmag gtan 'dzugs / sne shan
 dang / em rjer phogs thob 'phar rtsal (stsal) sogs gzengs bstod bka' drin
 chen po yongs grags gnang ba ngos dang / bod 'bangs tshang ma yid ches
 ('ches) kyis deb yig la bkod de nam yang mi brjed pa'i bka' drin gsab rgyu
 rgyal blon tshogs 'du bcas par mol bsdur zin don da lam thugs rje che zhur
 mi sna 'di pa ched rdzong gdong bkra shis pa'i kha btags / gser zangs kyi
 sku brnyan nam bcas / gser srang lnga yod thum / gu sha'i sder rtse che ba
 gcig zangs dmar gyi rba rtir dngul shan ma gcig / gzig pags gcig / gos ya
 shel nag po yug bam gcig / snam pho rog mdog bubs gsum bcas phul ba
 dbyin bod phan grogs mthun lam nam yang 'gyur med kyi rgyal po chen por
 zhu yig phul ba ltar bod rgyal khab kyi chos srid dbang byus rang btsan thog



las lugs yar rgyas yong ched lha sar ru dbyin rgyal khab bka' mol gyi sku
 tshab re 'jog gnang / de min rgya mis bod gnod mi 'byung bar nang don bod
 dbang rang btsan yong ba'i phyi rgyal khag la bka' mol dang / mi snar yul
 babs rogs mgon yod pa 'tshal / chu byi bod zla tshes la /

Seal: tā la'i bla ma'i tham ka rgyal

English translation by Laden la

To the Excellent Chief Minister of (or in) England who is very powerful by his merit,

The reason of submitting this by the Dalai Lama:

Be pleased to remember that Tibet stands to China in the relation of a priest to his disciple, and that Tibet is no subject to the power of China. Of this I have already informed you by letter from time to time. When I and my Ministers stayed in British Territory, for nearly three years, we were provided with houses, a Police officer and a Police guard, a General assistant, a doctor and food. These were signal honours which were shown to us. I and all my Tibetan subjects are filled with content. Therefore, my ministers and the National Assembly of Tibet, have discussed this matter, and have recorded it in a book, that this kindness may not be forgotten, forever, and that the kindness may be returned. Therefore, I am sending this, my man, purposely to submit thanks, and with him I beg to send: —

One scarf of good luck. One old gold gilded image. One bundles of gold weighing five sangs. One enameled plate. One copper tea-pot ornamented with silver. One leopard's skin. One piece of dark Ya-shen silk. Three bundles of dark blue woolen cloth.

I beg that, as I requested in my letter to His Majesty the King-Emperor, you will kindly continue to maintain unbroken the friendship between us, and that, if it be possible, after consulting the Russian Government, both Great Britain and Russia may kindly each depute a Representative to Lhasa, for the benefit of Tibet, so that the Power, both Temporal and Spiritual, may remain with the Tibetans themselves. If this cannot be done, I beg that discussion may be held with other Kingdoms in such a way that the control of Tibet may remain with the Tibetans themselves. I beg that necessary assistance may be given to this, my man. In a day of a month of the Water-Mouse year (1912-1913).

Seal of the Dalai Lama

C-4. The 13th Dalai Lama’s letter to the Chief Commissioner of Education

Tibetan text

tā la’i bla ma’i yi ge / dbyin gzhung slob gnyer spyi khyab pa la / dbyin gz-
hung nas bod la mthun lam thugs rje chen po gnang te bod dbyin ji srid bar
mthun lam ’gyur med byung song gshis bod kyi slob phrug mi bzhi dbyin
ji’i las lugs slob par btang yod pa slob gra chen mor bcug ste bod rgyal khab
tu phan pa’i yon tan gang ci legs par shes pa’i slob sbyongs (sbyong) mthar
phyin yod pa yid ’jags byed / rten kha btags a she / sangs rgyas kyi sku
brnyan nam bcas / dngul zangs ra ma lug gi khru bum gcig / gru rtse sngon
po yug gcig / snam pho rog mdog bubs gnyis bcas chu byi zla tshes la /

Seal: tā la’i bla ma’i tham ka rgyal

English translation by Laden la

From the Dalai Lama to the Chief Commissioner of Education of the British Government,


The British Government has shown great friendship and kindness to Tibet and therefore the friendship between the British and Tibet is unchanged forever. On this account, I am sending four Tibetan students to obtain a thorough English education. Will you please remember to send them to a great school and to give them the best education, so that they may reach the extreme limit, and so may be competent to help the Tibetan Government. I beg to send this with—One scarf of good luck. One gold gilt image of Buddha. One copper consecrated water pot. One robe of blue silk. Two bundles of dark-blue woolen cloth. On a day of a month of the Water-Mouse year.

Seal of the Dalai Lama


D-1. Tibetans in Ikh Khüree to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia

Tibetan text

’di ga khal kha rdā khu ral du bod mi gtan sdod dang / tshong ’grul ser skya /
dge bskul ba bcas pa deng phan sa gnas ’dir ’byor mtshams e tsun rbog do
^skyabs mgon rje btsun dam pa sku khreng rim byon nas thugs rje’i grib
bsil kyi ’tsho zhing bskyod bde’i bka’ khriims kyis rim skyongs la bod mi



C-4 IOR/L/P&S/11/64



D-1 NCAM: FA4-D1-KhN408-N1

ser skya nas kyang bka' don spyi 'khur zhu lus thog chu byi lo 'chings (ch-ings) bzhags (bzhag) don gsal la'ang bod sog bstan la gcig gyur la rten phan tshun 'grul bskyod rnam la sa babs rog (rogs) ram phan skyob bgyis rgyu gsal khar nye lam zla 4 tshes 16 nyin dga' dag ya mon nas bka' bsgyur spyi phebs su kad min am ban nas yi ge 'byor don bod mi tshang ma'i 'go 'doms rgya phyogs am ban nas bgyis rgyur de don rtsis sprod dgos rgyu phebs pa khyed rang bod mi rnam kyi 'go 'doms rgya phyogs am ban la zhu 'dod yod tshe de don brjod med dang / sngar rgyun sog po'i ya mon rang la zhu btugs byed 'dod yod tshe de don yi ge dam 'byar dgos rgyu phebs pa de'i ched yi ge 'bul ba'i snying por / bod mi ser skya 'di ga rdā khu ral du gtan sdod dang / tshong 'grul ser skya / dge bskul bcas pa deng phan e tsun rbog do skyabs mgon rje btsun dam pa rim po che'i ^skyabs khongs su 'tsho zh-ing bka' khrims spyi 'khur zhu lus gong gsol ltar la slad kyang 'dir yod bod mi ser skya'i 'go 'doms e tsun rbog do ^skyabs mgon rje btsun dam pa rim po che las gzhan du ma mchis pas de don 'gyur med yin zhus ba'i bod mi spyi mthun dang / gzhung dngul khang do dam pa gsar mnying thung mong bcas kyi me 'brug lo zla 4 tshes 22 la /

Seal

English translation

All the Tibetans who have settled down in Da Khuree, the lay and monk merchants, and monks [who do not engage in trade], have lived happily under the cool shade of the compassion of successive Ejen Bogd Protector Jebtsundampa Rinpoches for a long time since we came to this region, as well as having been protected by the law which guarantees the ease of travel [between Mongolia and Tibet]. The Tibetan monks and laymen have continued to follow the law. On top of this, a treaty [between Tibet and Mongolia] signed in the Water Rat year, also clearly shows that local areas shall lend support to all movement between each other because Tibet and Mongolia share loyalty to Buddhism. Recently, we received the [following] order from the Minister of Foreign Affairs: "The letter from a Minister (Amban) of the Revolutionary government (Republic of China) reached [us]. The content is an order that a Chinese Amban will have leadership over all Tibetans, because of that, [the Mongolian government] has to transfer [the authority to China]. If you desire to ask the Chinese Amban to have leadership [over all Tibetans], you don't have to report [to us, the Foreign Ministry] for that. If you have the desire to make appeals to the Mongolian Ministry [of foreign affairs] as in the past, for the purpose of that, you need the documents with

the seal of [the Foreign Ministry].”

The main content of this letter that we are sending you about this issue is that we, all the lay people and monks who have lived in Da khree, and the lay and monk merchants, and monks [who do not engage in trade], as mentioned above, have lived under the protection of the Protector Ejen Bogd Jebtsundampa Rinpoche as well as having continued to follow the law of Ejen Bogd, Protector Jebtsundampa Rinpoche. We reaffirm that, except for Ejen Bogd Protector Jebtsundampa Rinpoche, there is no leader for all the lay people and monks who live here, and it will never change in the future. Tibetans, in one united body, together with the new and former presidents of the bank of the Tibetan government sent [this] on the 22nd day of the Forth month in the Fire-Dragon year.

[Translated by Ryosuke Kobayashi]

D-2. “Amdo people” in Ikh Khüree to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia

Tibetan text

lugs gnyis bka' khrims kyi mdzad po rin po che'i zhabs drung du / sngar phan nges a mdo ba 'dir yod tshang ma dang tshong 'grul dge bskul ba rnams i rtsin 'bog rdo ^skyabs mgon je btsun dam pa rin po che'i thugs rje'i gdugs dkar gyi grib sil brtan bde bar 'tsho bzhin / nye lam 'di zla 4 tshes 16 nyin / dga' dag thu ya mon nas bka' spyi 'phebs (phebs) la / khyod a mdo ba rgya mi skar min gyi bka' khrims 'khyer tshe / nges 'di ga dga' dag thu ya mon la brjod med dang / de min sngar rgyun ltar yin tshe 'di ga ya mon la yi ge bzhog (bzhag) dgos bka' 'phebs (phebs) par / sngon nas da bar yi tsin 'bog rto / skyabs mgon je btsun dam pa'i bka' lung la / a mdo ba 'di yod dang tshong 'grul dge bskul ba rnams kyi spyi 'khur bzhus (zhus) pa ltar / slar phyin chad kyang i rtsin 'bog rdo skyabs (^skyabs) mgon je btsun dam pa rin po che'i bka' spyi 'khur zhu nges yin pas / a mdo gnyer rgan gzhon bzhi dang / ser skya drag gzhan bar gsum tsang mas / me 'brug zla 5 tshes 1 la phul ba'i rtags /

Seal

English translation

To the Rinpoche who controls the laws of the secular as well as the religious order.

From the past up until now, we the people from Amdo, merchants and monks have lived happily under the cool shade of the white umbrella of Ejen Bogd Jebtsundampa Rinpoche.

Recently, [we] received an order from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 16th of the 4th month. The order says, “You, Amdo people, don’t have to report to us, the Foreign Ministry, if you follow the law of the Chinese Revolutionaries (Republic of China). Otherwise if [you do] as usual in the past, you need the documents sealed by the Ministry [of Foreign Affairs].”

From the past up until now, we, all the people from Amdo here, trading merchants and monks, have followed the orders of Protector Ejen Bogd Jebtsundampa Rinpoche. We will definitely continue to obey the orders of Ejen Bogd, Protector Jebtsundampa Rinpoche.

The following signature [reaffirms] that all four stewards, including the chair and vice-chairs from Amdo as well as lay and monk officials including high, middle and low class, sent [this] on the 1st day of the Fifth month in the Fire-Dragon year.

[Translated by Ryosuke Kobayashi]

E-1. Namdanchoikhür’s letter to the 13th Dalai Lama

Mongolian text

köke nuur-un jegün ɣar-un čiyulɣan-u terigün da dayičing jasay törü-yin
giün vang namdančoyikür-ber kičiyenggüyilen
degedü abural-un orun бүкүн-i nigen-dür quriyaɣsan boditai abida burqan
boyda dalai blam_a-yin gegegen bolun töbed-ün orun-i šašin törü qoyar-i
tegši jokiyān qamuy amitan-u tusa amuyulang-i qayirlayči, qamuy burqan-u
mön činar ilide-yin nigen-dür quraɣsan
ačitu boyda ündesen-ü blam_a vačir dar_a-yin tümen ölemei lingqu_a-yin
tal_a negegsen-ü dergede sedgil-ün uy-ača bisiren masi ünenkü süsüg-ün
čing-iyer arban qorɣu-iyān orui deger_e-ben qabsaran jalbirču tabi lang-
un mandul ergün debsigüljü tümen amuyulng-yi ayiladqan tngri-yin čayan
seltes ergübe. medegülkü inü urid ečüken nadur altan ɣanjuur örüsüen qay-
irlaqu kemen dakin dakin
jarliy boluysan bölüge. edüge qayirlaqu-yi örüsiy_e. jiči nigen jüil ene jil-

ün yurban sar_a-dur seveling dongqurdu kürkü çaytu lanju jongdu kedün tümen çerig çuylayulju töbed-ün orun-du yabumui kemegsen-i sonusuşad arğ_a baraju da bi seveling-un ma çi da rin-dü ayuljayad lanju-yin çerig-yi töbed-ün orun-du yavuyulqu ügei-yin arğ_a-yi jasayad buçagaba. buçuysan bolbaçu jongdu-yin durun-du tong qoşusun bolqu ügei tula ma çi-yin köbügün cögükün döçi tabin çerig-tei yabuysan. egün-i

açitu boyda-yingegegen örüsüen eb-ün dedü jakiy_a qayirlan ayiladbasu şaşın-dur mayu qor_a kikü-yi qojimdur ügei bayimui kemen da bi-ber mungqaylamui. jiçi qoyar jüil

açitu enerenggü çiketü boyda minü biy_e laşın tayibing amuyulang bayiqu-yi eçüken bi küsejü medegülkü inü ene seveling köke nuur-un yajar-i medejü bayıçı ma çi da rin kemegçi nigen noyan amban sayuysan ene bolbasu mönggü idekü duru ügei kümün güdeng tübşin olja üüşı nigen çu qayıqu duru ügei kümün mön şinggi bayın_a. Ene uduy_a qayiram biçig qayirlayad örsiyebeşü qojimdur kitad-aça çerig böged kereg yabudal ügei-yin arğ_a-yi idaqu bayimui. egün-i todorqayılan medegüljü kedün üsüg-ün ergülte ergün mörgüjü debşigülbe.

jiçi yurban jüil. urid jarlıy-un yosuşar nigen süm_e bayıyulju qorın şabitai bayıqu bölüge. egün-dür şütüjü sayuqu şütüge, süm_e-dü jalaqu burq_a örüsüen qayirlaqu-yi ayilad ayilad örüsiy_e örüsiy_e. tngri-yin ariyun çay seltes-i

ergün debşigülbe.



jiçi nigen jüil. eçüken tuslayçı zungji tayiji dambi nar-bar kiciyenggüyilen açitu boyda dalai blam_a-yin tümen amuyulang-yi ayiladqaju tabun lang-un mandul ariyun çayan badar-i ergün bariba.

yal luu jil-ün dörben sarayın arban tabun_a

English translation attached to the letter from D. Macdonald to C. A. Bell

His holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, the most merciful Divine Buddha, etc.

With folded hands and humble submission, I, Dzun-wang Nam-dren Cho-kar, bearing the title of Dai-chi Dza-sa appertaining to the first tribe of Mongolians residing to the east of Tso-ngon or "Blue Lake," approach Your Holiness with a present of 50 Ngu-sang (about Rs. 88/5/-) and a silk scarf of greeting, and would request that Your Holiness be kind enough to send me the Kangyur scriptures that Your Holiness promised to give me.



Handwritten text, likely a letter or document, showing several lines of cursive script. The text is written on aged, slightly wrinkled paper. The handwriting is fluid and characteristic of the 18th or 19th century. The text is written in a cursive script, likely from the 18th or 19th century. The paper is aged and shows some creases and discoloration. The text is written in a cursive script, likely from the 18th or 19th century. The paper is aged and shows some creases and discoloration. The text is written in a cursive script, likely from the 18th or 19th century. The paper is aged and shows some creases and discoloration.

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The second point is as follows: When I visited the capital of Zi-ling in the third month of the current year (May 1916), I was very sorry to hear that the Governor of Lan-tu was making preparations to collect some thousands of Chinese soldiers and that he intends to make them go to Tibet, but I could not do anything. He interviewed Ma Darin, governor of Zi-ling, and having made certain arrangements regarding the dispatch of the Lan-tu soldiers, he then went back. If Your Holiness were to be kind enough to write a letter to Ma Darin, then I think no harm will come to the Buddhist religion.

The third point is that Ma Darin of Zi-ling has no intention of taking money. I beg to suggest that necessary action be taken to prevent the Chinese from dispatching troops to Tibet in the future. As commanded by Your Holiness, I have built a new monastery. There are twenty monks living in it. Please send me the holy books and images for the same. We, Thu-sa-lak-chhi-phung-che and The-ji Ten-dam-pa, send respectful greetings to Your Holiness. In order that Your Holiness, the Reverend Patron of Love, may have a long life, we beg to send 5 Ngu-sang (about Rs.13/5/-) and a silk scarf for the prosperity of Tibet.

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